Issues on South-South Cooperation
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Abbreviations

AEO   African Economic Outlook
BANDES  Banco de Desarrollo Económico y Social de Venezuela
BAPA   Buenos Aires Plan of Action
BASIC   Brazil, South Africa, India, China
BRICS   Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CLMV   Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam
DAC    Development Assistance Committee
DCF    Development Cooperation Forum
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council
FOCAC  Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GEPDC  Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation
GNI    Gross National Income
HLF    High-Level Forum
IBSA   India, Brazil, South Africa
ITEC   Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme
KFAED  Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development
LDC    Least Developed Country
ODA    Official development assistance
OECD   Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OOF    Other official flows
SSC    South-South cooperation
TCDC   Technical cooperation among developing countries
TICA   Thailand International Cooperation Agency
TT-SSC Task Team on South-South Cooperation
UNOSCC UN Office on South-South Cooperation
WP-EFF Working Party on Aid Effectiveness
Introduction

The landscape of international development cooperation is changing. Two decades ago, Northern donors – member countries of the DAC OECD and the Bretton Woods Institutions – were the overwhelming source of international development assistance. Aid was a government-to-government affair, and their relationship that was between a donor and a passive recipient. It was common practice for donors to set the agenda, control implementation, and attach conditions on their aid. By and large, these features of the aid system endure. Yet some things are different, owing to changing economic conditions, as well as to efforts to rethink and reform the practice of development assistance:

- Northern aid is losing (some) ground. DAC OECD donors remain the main source of official development finance. However, the pursuit of fiscal austerity has led to declining aid budgets in some donor countries. Furthermore, many developing countries aim to reduce their aid dependence, impelled not least by dissatisfaction with how Northern donors practice development cooperation. They are helped by greater access to a wider range of instruments and sources to promote development outcomes.

- Alternative sources and actors are taking hold. Though still dwarfed by traditional ones in terms of magnitude, these new sources and actors are gaining ground. Non-traditional sources and actors include philanthropic organizations, global vertical funds, developing countries, the private sector, and civil society organizations (CSOs). The 4th High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) in Busan formalized the inclusion of these actors and their forms of cooperation into the global dialogue for development cooperation, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC). Particularly important is the recognition and inclusion of CSOs and South-South cooperation (SSC), mindful of their distinct roles in the development process.

- There is wider consensus around inclusive partnerships and the centrality of country ownership. Busan has built a consensus around a set of principles, chief among them, a commitment to developing country ownership and inclusive development partnerships. In contrast to Paris, these principles apply to a wider constituency of actors and more diverse forms of development cooperation.

Among the new actors that now come under the aid architecture’s expanded mandate, none have drawn more attention than the “emerging” developing country donors. South-South cooperation is by no means new. South-South cooperation has a long history, with some Southern institutions and developing countries contributing development assistance for almost half a century. The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED), for example, was set-up in 1961. China has also been providing assistance to African countries since the 1960s.
In recent years however, SSC has been reinvigorated by the rising scale and scope of assistance being provided by large middle income countries, notably China, Brazil and India. While nowhere near the scale of Northern aid, SSC now makes up a sizable share of international development assistance. Using data compiled by Walz and Ramachandran (2011), assistance from China, Brazil, India, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates is estimated to amount to somewhere between 5% -11% of gross ODA in 2009 (Walz & Ramachandran, 2011). In the medium term, SSC flows are projected to rise faster than Northern aid. SSC’s growing significance forms part of a larger trend many call the rise or resurgence of the South – a trend marked by strong economic growth of Southern economies, expanding South-South ties, and increasing influence of developing countries in international affairs.

South-South cooperation has been practiced in numerous ways ranging from economic integration, the formation of negotiating blocs within multilateral institutions, military alliances, to cultural exchanges. It has included humanitarian assistance and technical cooperation as well as the provision of concessional financing for development projects, programs, budget support and strengthening balance of payments. As such, SSC is a much broader and deeper concept than foreign aid. A comprehensive discussion of South-South Cooperation in all its diverse and multi-faceted forms is beyond the scope of this text. For our purposes, we focus on SSC that most closely resembles ODA, i.e., broadly, South-South transfers of public concessional resources in support of development objectives in recipient countries.

Southern providers are bringing important resources and skills on the table. Their experience as late developers means they are more attuned to the realities and challenges faced by developing countries they partner with. Many of them refuse to be regarded as “donors” and consider their development assistance to be a mutually beneficial cooperation.

How differently do SSC providers behave from their Northern counterparts? China, Brazil and India package their assistance with a strong language of respect for sovereignty, non-interference, and mutual benefit. Most importantly perhaps, Southern providers openly eschew the practice of attaching political and economic conditions to their assistance. This contrasts to the paternalistic approach and intrusive practices of Northern donors. Nevertheless, there are concerns that SSC might be reproducing Northern aid’s undesirable features.

- Tied aid. A large portion of Southern assistance is provided as tied aid. Northern donors still also tie their aid but have committed to untie assistance to Least Developed Countries. Tied aid is viewed with disfavor by CSOs in the development community.

- Debt. New loans being offered to low income countries, some having recently received debt relief, are feared to saddle these countries with unmanageable debt burdens.

- Wider social, political and environmental impact. Southern donors are viewed as having less regard for the human rights and governance record of governments they provide assistance to. They are also perceived to have less due diligence and concern about the social and environmental impacts of their projects.

- Unsustainable development. Relationships between wealthier providers and poorer recipients may be creating new unequal economic relationships and perpetuating underdevelopment.

- Lack of space for CSOs. There is currently little evidence that SSC providers are engaging CSOs in recipient countries. Much of SSC remains a government to government affair.

It is apparent that SSC holds both potential and risks in terms of promoting democratic ownership and inclusive development approaches in aid receiving countries. As SSC is expected to expand and increase in importance, it is essential for CSOs to better understand the nature, shortcomings and potential SSC in order to inform and strengthen CSO advocacy for greater development effectiveness of aid.
2 Background on South-South cooperation

2.1 What is South-South cooperation?

There is yet no conventional definition of South-South cooperation (SSC). However, in its use by the United Nations and many Southern providers, SSC encompasses, but is more than just, foreign aid. In this text, we define Southern (or SSC) providers as non-OECD countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Oceania that provide foreign aid. This definition excludes OECD members which the UN still classifies as developing countries (South Korea, Turkey, Chile, Mexico and Israel), and includes high-income countries (following the World Bank classification) that do not belong to the OECD (e.g. Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait). This definition also excludes countries in transition (e.g. Russia).

The UN Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSCC) defines South-South cooperation as

a broad framework for collaboration among countries of the South in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and technical domains. ...South-South cooperation is initiated, organized and managed by developing countries themselves; often, Governments play a lead role, with active participation from public- and private-sector institutions, non-governmental organizations and individuals. It involves different and evolving forms, including the sharing of knowledge and experience, training, technology transfer, financial and monetary cooperation and in-kind contributions (UNOSCC, n.d.).

Apart from responding to other developing countries’ needs and contributing to international development, SSC’s objectives also include enhancing Southern nations’ collective self-reliance, collaboration, internal capacities for analysis of and action on development issues, and participation in the global economy. The UNOSCC spells out these objectives in detail:

[South-South cooperation’s] objectives are to:

- foster the self-reliance of developing countries by enhancing their creative capacity to find solutions to their development problems in keeping with their own aspirations, values and special needs;
- promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among developing countries through the exchange of experiences; the pooling, sharing and use of their technical and other resources; and the development of their complementary capacities;
- strengthen the capacity of developing countries to identify and analyse together their main development issues and formulate the requisite strategies to address them;
- increase the quantity and enhance the quality of international development cooperation through the pooling of capacities to improve the effectiveness of the resources devoted to such cooperation;
• create and strengthen existing technological capacities in the developing countries in order to improve the effectiveness with which such capacities are used and to improve the capacity of developing countries to absorb and adapt technology and skills to meet their specific developmental needs;

• increase and improve communications among developing countries, leading to a greater awareness of common problems and wider access to available knowledge and experience as well as the creation of new knowledge in tackling development problems;

• recognize and respond to the problems and requirements of the least developed countries, land-locked developing countries, small island developing States and the countries most seriously affected by, for example, natural disasters and other crises; and

• enable developing countries to achieve a greater degree of participation in international economic activities and to expand international cooperation for development (UNOSCC, n.d.).

The idea of South-South cooperation is suffused with political, historic, and aspirational meaning. This is rooted in the political origins of SSC, as well as the shared conditions and experiences of Southern nations, namely poverty, underdevelopment, dependency and colonialism. For instance, the 2009 Nairobi outcome document of the High-level UN Conference on South-South Cooperation describes SSC as “a manifestation of solidarity among peoples and countries of the South that contributes to their national well-being, national and collective self-reliance and the attainment of internationally agreed development goals...” It adds that SSC “is a common endeavour of peoples and countries of the South, born out of shared experiences and sympathies, based on their common objectives and solidarity...” (UN General Assembly, 2009).

The Nairobi outcome document also identifies normative and operational principles that guide SSC. Notably, these principles are a hybrid of the more distinctly Southern ideals that hark back to Bandung, and the more recent ideals rooted in the aid and development effectiveness traditions represented by Paris and Busan. These principles, according to the UN (2012) are:

(a) Normative principles
   o Respect for national sovereignty
   o Partnership among equals
   o Non-conditionality
   o Non-interference in domestic affairs
   o Mutual benefit

(b) Operational principles
   o Mutual accountability and transparency
   o Development effectiveness
   o Coordination of evidence- and results-based initiatives
   o Multi-stakeholder approach

“South-South cooperation flows” can be defined as

[including] grants and concessional loans (Including export credits) provided by one Southern country to another to finance projects, programmes, technical co-operation, debt relief and humanitarian assistance and its contributions to multilateral institutions and regional development banks....

All military assistance, grants and loans to the private sector, foreign direct and portfolio investment, flows which do not entail cross-border transactions and flows which are not part of cooperation agreements, subsidies between agencies within the Southern partner country and funding of activities aimed at combating terrorism are not to be classified as South-South cooperation....

Debt relief is to be included in South-South cooperation (UN ECOSOC, 2009).
2.2 South-South cooperation’s changing contexts

The “Bandung era”
South-South cooperation has a fairly long history and is in fact not that much younger than Northern aid. Some of today’s more prominent Southern providers have been engaged in aid-giving since the 1950s and 1960s1—driven, like other donor countries, by the desire to cooperate as well as by other policy objectives. China began giving aid to its neighbors in the 1950s and expanded in the 1960s to Africa, where it completed big projects such as the Tanzania-Zambia railway. China in this period was a supporter of decolonization, and had known rivalries with Taiwan (diplomatic) and the Soviet Union (political and ideological). India’s initial aid efforts were smaller and directed mainly to its immediate neighbors thought to be within its sphere of influence (Agrawal, 2007). India launched the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) in 1964 as its flagship bilateral technical assistance program.

Among Southern providers, oil-rich Arab donors – namely Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE – have the most established aid agencies. In the 1960s-70s, the three Gulf countries launched the first Southern bilateral aid agencies (the Kuwait Fund in 1964, the Abu Dhabi Fund in 1971, and the Saudi Fund in 1974) and spearheaded the establishment of multilateral funds such as the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (1972), the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (1974), and the Arab Monetary Fund (1976). Arab aid during the 1970s comprised one-third of total international assistance (Walz & Ramachandran, 2011). Villanger observes that Arab donors have used their aid to reward allies or build strategic alliances (Villanger, 2007).

![Figure 1: Net ODA by major donor group, 1969-1997](image)

Source: Manning (2006)
Note: CMEA = Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union)

The 1955 Bandung Conference was the watershed moment in terms of articulating a collective Southern voice. The meeting was attended by 29 newly independent nations in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

1 To put this into perspective, the DAC was established in 1960.
Although it was Bandung’s political message that stood out – i.e. non-alignment in the Cold War and the condemnation of all forms of colonialism and racism – the conference’s Final Communiqué also expressed the urgency of economic development. It noted the nations’ desire for economic cooperation, including through technical assistance. Bandung heralded the beginning of the period some have called the “Bandung era”\(^2\) (Amin 1994; Berger 2004), a period marked by efforts by Third World countries to (1) achieve economic modernization at home via state-led development, and (2) demand greater political and economic equality vis-à-vis developed countries in the international stage. This era saw the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement, the UN Conference on Trade and Development, and calls for a New International Economic Order.

**South-South cooperation in the 21st century**

Southern aid collapsed in 1980s, due mainly to the decline in Arab assistance. Arab donors faced more constrained fiscal spaces owing to declining oil revenues and greater domestic spending (World Bank, 2010). Many other developing countries faced high debt and high inflation. Shut out of capital markets, developing countries increased their dependence on Northern assistance. Aid programs meanwhile came to be vehicles for the imposition of wide-ranging free market reforms in recipient countries. In the 1990s, aid from DAC countries comprised 95% of all international aid (Manning, 2006).

The emergence or reemergence of China, India and other middle-income/developing country donors comes in the context of what many perceive to be the inexorable “rise of the South.” Strong growth is propelling developing countries to greater economic and political significance. Three broad trends stand out. First is economic rebalancing. On the aggregate, developing countries are gaining on the North in terms of relative contributions to global economic activity. Between 1980 and 2010, developing countries have increased their share of global output from 33% to 45%, and from 25% to 47% with respect to world trade (UNDP, 2013). Second is intensifying South-South economic ties. In 2011, South-South trade accounted for 26.7% of world merchandise trade, up from just 8.1% in 1980. Third is increasing influence in international affairs. Developing countries now command, to some degree, a greater voice in global governance alongside the North (e.g. the Group of Eight’s reconstitution into the Group of Twenty). But they have also formed their own coalitions (e.g. the BASIC in UN climate talks) and forums (notably IBSA and the BRICS Summit) that represent alternative poles of power.

Despite the South’s visible rise, old disparities persist, and new ones are appearing. The South is overtaking the North in terms of aggregate economic output, but citizens of the developing world still have significantly lower incomes and standards of human development. Southern growth is uneven; much of it is dominated by the situation of a few emerging players (Brazil, India and China), which are themselves largely dominated by China (Bilal, 2012). Regionally, growth has been concentrated in Asia, with Latin America and Africa behind. Industrial development in emerging economies is propelling growth in poorer, resource-rich countries, but their ties also risk reinforcing traditional patterns of dependency. About three quarters of the world’s poorest (living under $1.25 a day) now live in middle income countries, suggesting that large swaths of people have been left out in the growth process.

### 2.3 South-South flows and official development assistance

SSC flows, alongside ODA, form part of the bigger pool of resources for development called development finance. There are in fact SSC flows that fit quite well with the OECD DAC definition of ODA discussed in Box 1. However, the UN and Southern providers emphasize that South-South cooperation is not ODA. They also insist that SSC does not substitute for, but instead complements, ODA.

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2 This era spans 1955-1975 or 1955-1980.
While SSC and ODA are, at bottom, both development transfers, the social (historic or political) significance that the international community ascribes to these transfers are different. SSC is a demonstration of solidarity between equals and a desire for mutual development. ODA meanwhile represents a moral or historic obligation on the part of developed countries to help poorer countries. (These social ascriptions are, of course, different from the actual motivations for providing aid, either by Northern or Southern countries.)

Thus, ODA carries with it the status of a commitment or responsibility that SSC does not. We see this at work, for example, in the fact that the international community is able to hold Northern donors answerable to accomplishing a number of international commitments with respect to aid, including the longstanding 0.7%-of-GNI target, and the Paris commitments to improve aid quality. This raises a further point. Southern providers are wary of the potential consequences of designating SSC as ODA (and being regarded as “official donors” themselves). There are concerns that doing so will (1) saddle them with responsibilities (e.g. aid management standards) similar to those of the DAC donors; (2) reduce their own receipts of development assistance, if not completely disqualify them as recipients, or; (3) reduce the North’s aid spending overall.

While indeed there are ODA-like SSC flows, SSC flows in general do not fall neatly into the OECD DAC’s categories of ODA, OOF and private flows. Brautigam (2011a) for instance says that Chinese aid that meets the DAC’s definition of ODA is relatively small.

To begin with, some of the larger Southern providers do not use the OECD DAC’s definition of ODA in reporting their external assistance. This is the case with China and Brazil. China, for instance, in its 2011 White Paper, defines external assistance very broadly as consisting of grants, interest free loans, and

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Note that ODA is simply an accounting or reporting category. As a measure of a country’s generosity (as expressed in the concessionality requirement), ODA is not particularly good. Thus a flow that qualifies as ODA is not necessarily “better”.

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concessional loans, without specifying the degree of concessionality or whether or not these flows serve a strictly developmental purpose (Information Office of the State Council, PRC, 2011). According to Brautigam (2011a), China includes costs in its external assistance budget that would not qualify as ODA (e.g. military assistance, loans in support of joint ventures investments) and excludes others that would (e.g. scholarships and assistance to refugees). Brazil meanwhile defines its assistance as federal official flows with a development objective consisting entirely of non-repayable grants (IPEA, 2011). This definition excludes lending that meets the DAC concessionality requirement and thus would have qualified as ODA.

Furthermore, there are SSC flows that cannot easily be classified using the DAC categories. China, for instance, is known to bundle together aid and investment or concessional and non-concessional financing, especially in its operations in Africa. Brautigam (2011a) highlights the case of an oil-backed line of credit extended by the China EximBank to Angola worth $10 billion (clearly a non-ODA instrument), whose first $1 billion tranche was disbursed on projects that had a rather clear developmental/welfare-improving character. The projects financed include irrigation systems, schools, and health centers.

2.4 South-South cooperation and Northern aid: different philosophies and approaches

SSC is packaged in a discourse that distinguishes it from of Northern aid. This discourse highlights the advantages of Southern assistance, on the basis of

- Shared values of recipient and provider, especially non-interference and respect of sovereignty
- Shared interests and aspirations of recipient and provider (e.g. development and greater international voice) owing to shared challenges, past and present (e.g. poverty, colonial and post-colonial subordination)
- Greater relevance and appropriateness of assistance due to economic, geographic, and cultural similarities
- Horizontality of relationships (i.e. cooperation as a partnership between equals)
- Mutually beneficial or “win-win” relationships and outcomes (Vaes & Huyse, 2013).

Saidi and Wolf (2011) argues that aid-giving by China, India, and to a lesser extent Brazil, follow a “development investment” philosophy/model, in which the donors’ economic interests are served as well as those of the recipient. This model was pioneered by Japan in the 1970s and 1980s. It contrasts to the “development assistance” model – which conceives of cooperation as disinterested charity for the needy – associated with Northern donors. The “development assistance” model/consensus prescribes limits to the use of export credits, and favors the untying of aid and its dissociation from commercial flows. The goal of aid is poverty reduction and improvements on targeted basic standards of living (e.g. the Millennium Development Goals). Donor consolidation around this consensus can be seen in commitments to untie aid and greater aid allocations to social sectors. In addition, project aid is being replaced by program aid, which donors have sought to control through the use of policy conditions. Program aid has led to expectations for recipient countries to articulate development or sector plans or strategies that donors can support.

Under the development investment model/philosophy, aid is only one component of a larger financing toolbox aimed at “laying the ground for enhanced bilateral trade and private-sector activity, enabling

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4 The exact wording is “funds invested by the Brazilian federal government, entirely as non-repayable grants, in governments of other countries, in nationals of other countries in Brazilian territory or in international organizations with the purpose of contributing to international development…” (emphasis added). This definition was developed for a survey of its development assistance published in 2011, possibly indicating that such a definition did not exist until recently.

5 These categorizations, Saidi (2007) emphasizes, are simply ideal types; donors do not fall strictly under either category.
governments to reduce the risk of market entry for companies and to provide the necessary infrastructure to reduce operational costs" (Saidi & Wolf, 2011). Thus the focus of funding is infrastructure and productive sectors. Export credits are used widely, as well as hybrid instruments that blur the traditional lines between private flows and official development assistance. Assistance is provided mostly in the form of projects identified or requested by the recipient. China most closely follows this model, followed by India, and to a lesser extent Brazil. Arab donors meanwhile are closer to the charity-based model in terms of motivation, although differ from Northern donors in that they provide significant funding for infrastructure and deliver aid predominantly as projects rather than program assistance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Contrasting approaches of Southern and Northern providers</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Northern aid</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Philosophy of cooperation</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Emphasis on cooperation as charity or philanthropy:</td>
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<td>“development assistance”</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Relationship with other flows</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Greater separation of development assistance from non-concessional and non-official flows</td>
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<td><strong>Modality</strong></td>
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<td>Program aid replacing project aid</td>
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<td><strong>Sectoral focus</strong></td>
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<td>Emphasis on social sectors and governance</td>
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<td>Emphasis on social sectors and governance</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Approach to recipient country ownership</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Identification of priorities</strong></td>
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<td>Strategy-based: national development strategy outlines priority areas for donors, built up from technical discussions</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Tying</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Discouraged but still practiced</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Alignment</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Encourages use and strengthening of recipient institutions and procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Policy conditionality</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Largely practiced</td>
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2.5  SSC in international forums

Currently, there are two main venues for multilateral dialogue regarding international development cooperation, including South-South cooperation. The first is the Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) convened biennially by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The second is the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GEPDC), which sprang directly from the aid effectiveness efforts of the DAC OECD.

The DCF’s creation was mandated by the 2005 UN World Summit. Its main functions include reviewing trends in, and giving policy guidance and recommendations on, international development cooperation. The DCF is a multi-stakeholder body and provides representation for parliamentarians, CSOs, local governments and private philanthropic organizations apart from developed and developing country governments. When the first DCF convened in 2008, the DAC had already convened two high-level forums on aid effectiveness (Rome and Paris), and another one was under way (Accra). Behind the DCF’s founding was the desire of developing countries to address development cooperation issues in a forum that accords them a greater voice and where they stand on equal footing with Northern donor countries. The Group of 77 and many CSOs regard the DCF as possessing greater legitimacy and thus support holding aid negotiations within it. However, the DCF is only a forum and has no mandate to negotiate commitments. Moreover, such a move faces significant challenges. As Molina (2008) says,

> It is unlikely that donor governments will want to give up an institutional framework that they fully control – OECD DAC – to get themselves into another one – the DCF – where they have less. Moreover, transferring these debates to the UN would implicitly mean politicising the aid effectiveness negotiations, which so far donors have tried to keep very “technical” in tone. (They prefer talking about intermediate aid implementation targets, such as coordination or harmonisation, rather than more structural issues such as the power imbalances governing the aid relationships). Beyond political feasibility, there are reasonable questions about how an underfunded and understaffed UN organisation could take up roles on monitoring and analysing aid trends – currently done by the OECD.

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**Box 2 South-South cooperation in the UN System**

The very first multilateral discussions on SSC took place within the UN’s auspices, driven by the support of developing countries. These were focused on technical cooperation. In 1974, the UN General Assembly endorsed the establishment of a special unit within the United Nations Development Program to promote technical cooperation among developing countries (TCDC). This Special Unit was the forerunner of what is now the UN Office on South-South Cooperation (UNOSCC), whose main objective is to promote, coordinate and support South-South and triangular cooperation in the UN system. UN efforts to promote SSC in the 1970s culminated in the 1978 UN Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries, which adopted the so-called Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA). At the time, BAPA was considered an ambitious blueprint for advancing South-South technical cooperation, with the overarching objective of strengthening collective self-reliance among developing countries. BAPA reflected the extent of the South’s influence on the UN’s agenda during the 1970s. In 1980s, this influence receded – along with the international importance of the United Nations – and BAPA was largely forgotten.

The main policymaking body on SSC in the UN system is the High-level Committee (HLC) on South-South Cooperation (formerly the High-level Committee on TCDC until 2003), a subsidiary body of the General Assembly. Its function however is limited to periodic reviews of progress in implementing BAPA and overseeing SSC promotion efforts within the UN System. A General Assembly-mandated High Level Conference on South-South Coopera-
Prior to the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), the main international forum on aid reform was the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF). The WP-EFF organized the HLF processes since Rome and monitored progress on agreed aid reform commitments from Rome to Accra. While it gradually expanded its constituency and coverage of topics, the WP-EFF is rooted in Northern donor countries’ efforts to reform North-South aid. Following HLF-1 in Rome, the WP-EFF was established in 2003 as a subsidiary body of the DAC OECD from the merger of the DAC Working Party on the Financial Aspects of Development Assistance and the DAC Task Force on Donor Practices. From being mainly a donor group, the WP-EFF evolved into a “mutual accountability forum” between donors and recipient countries, reflecting a shift in focus from donor harmonization during HLF-1 to the broader aid effectiveness agenda encompassing the Paris principles from HLF-2. Parity in representation at the WP between donor and developing countries was decided in 2005; however developing countries participated only as aid recipients. It was only after HLF-3 in 2008 that South-South cooperation was on the WP’s agenda. By 2009 developing countries that are both receiving and providing assistance were represented in the WP. The WP-EFF also established a Task Team on South-South Co-operation with a mandate to examine how the aid effectiveness principles could be applied to SSC.

HLF-4 in Busan sought to formally include SSC providers and other development actors into a common framework with Northern donors. The intent was to bring SSC providers and their practices into aid reform discussions as well as to give the reform agenda greater international legitimacy. Compared to Paris and Accra, the Busan outcome document was broader and featured few specific commitments, reflecting a focus on forging broad consensus and accommodating all interests as possible. SSC providers endorsed the Busan Partnership (BP) agreement with the caveat that its provisions apply to SSC only on a voluntary basis. The BP also took out the talks outside the DAC’s auspices by mandating the creation of a Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation as the new platform for international aid dialogue. Despite this, the large SSC providers – Brazil, India and China – have so far kept their distance to the process. Whether or not these providers embrace the GPEDC as the “institutional home” of South-South cooperation remains to be seen.

**Box 3: South-South cooperation in the HLFs**

**HLF3 (Accra, 2008)**

South-South cooperation first gained recognition in Accra. The Accra Agenda for Action,

- Encouraged SSC providers to use the Paris Declaration principles as a point of reference in providing development cooperation;
- Recognized the importance and particularities of SSC and acknowledged the potential for mutual learning;
- Acknowledged SSC as a complement to North-South aid; and
- Recognized the principles of SSC, namely, non-interference in internal affairs, equality among developing partners and respect for their independence, national sovereignty, cultural diversity and identity and local content.

Following Accra, a Task Team on South-South Cooperation (TT-SSC) was created as a platform within the WP-EFF, with the objective of mapping, documenting, analyzing and discussing evidence on the synergies between the SSC and the aid effectiveness principles. The
TT-SSC’s aim of building an evidence base for mapping South-South and triangular Cooperation practices in the context of aid effectiveness was materialized in 110 case stories involving more than 130 countries and organizations.

HLF4 (Busan, 2011)
The Busan Partnership Agreement (BP) brought SSC alongside Northern donors and other development actors under a common framework of development cooperation based on the principles of ownership, focus on results, inclusive development partnerships, transparency and mutual accountability. The BP also

- Qualified that SSC providers’ adherence to its provisions shall only be on a voluntary basis;
- Acknowledged that SSC providers remain developing countries and remain eligible to benefit from aid; and
- Expressed commitment to support knowledge-sharing and mutual learning in South-South cooperation.

All the big non-OECD Southern providers – Brazil, China and India – endorsed the BP.

2.6 State of South-South cooperation: volumes and donors

The absence of consistent and comparable data on development assistance flows across all donor countries (North or South) means we invariably rely on estimates for information on the scale of SSC flows. Many countries do not have a standard reporting for ODA or even definition of what qualifies as development assistance. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Taiwan and Thailand report their ODA flows to the DAC. Brazil, India, China, South Africa and other developing country providers do not. Using estimates from Zimmerman and Smith (2011) and its own statistics on ODA flows, the OECD (2011) puts gross ODA flows from non-OECD countries at US$ 9.3 billion in 2009, or 6.4% of total gross ODA flows. Meanwhile, using data compiled by Walz and Ramachandran (2011) from various sources, SSC from BICS, Venezuela, and the three Arab donors amounts to somewhere between 5% -25% of gross ODA from DAC countries in 2009 (see Table 2).

Table 2: Outflows of aid from selected Southern providers, 2009 or most recent year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Volume (US$ millions)</th>
<th>% of GNI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower estimate</td>
<td>Upper estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>3134</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>25098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1166</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>2171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7808</td>
<td>34244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 We exclude Russia, Turkey, and other countries from the calculation. The upper estimates in the table include flows that resemble private flows.
Arab donors

Development assistance flows from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE account for over 90% of Arab development assistance, with Saudi Arabia routinely accounting for the largest share within the group (World Bank, 2010). In 2011, Saudi Arabia disbursed US$ 4.9 billion in development assistance; the UAE, US$ 719 million; and Kuwait, US$141 million (see Table 3). Arab donors rank among the most generous. According to the World Bank (2010), between 1978 and 2008, the three countries’ aid amounted to an average of 1.5% of their combined GNI. In 2008, Arab ODA-to-GNI ratio was 0.7%, compared to 0.3% among DAC donors. The volume of Arab assistance also displays a broad correlation with oil prices.

Table 3: Disbursements of Arab development assistance
(US$ million, constant 2012 prices)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait (KFAED)</td>
<td>117.72</td>
<td>287.98</td>
<td>231.91</td>
<td>218.66</td>
<td>141.02</td>
<td>149.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1658.36</td>
<td>5063.54</td>
<td>3286.33</td>
<td>3613.89</td>
<td>4973.24</td>
<td>1298.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>2594.07</td>
<td>1287.29</td>
<td>874.22</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>719.87</td>
<td>1069.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD (2014). Note: KFAED = Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development

Arab countries form a distinct sub-group among Southern providers (e.g. Zimmerman & Smith, 2011). These countries have long been engaged in aid-giving for decades and appear comfortable with the donor label. They also have sophisticated mechanisms for coordinating and harmonizing their efforts, notably through the Arab Coordination Group (OECD, 2011).

Arab assistance tends to flow to other Arab countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa (see figure). Among the top recipients of Arab ODA through the years are Morocco, Oman, Yemen, Egypt, Syria and Sudan (World Bank, 2010). Since the mid-1990s however, Arab donors have increased their assistance to other regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa (Burkina Faso, Burundi, and Eritrea) and Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan).

Table 4: Top 5 Recipients of Arab Bilateral ODA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1980-89</th>
<th>1990-99</th>
<th>2000-08</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>15,726</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>12,804</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>6,144</td>
<td>Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>4,498</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>3,632</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from World Bank (2010)
The bulk of the development assistance from Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait over the period 1995–2007 has been provided on a bilateral basis. Bilateral aid accounts for 89% of total ODA offered by these donors. Of the Arab ODA channeled through multilateral sources, some 4% has been transmitted through Arab financial institutions, 4% through the World Bank, 2% through UN agencies, and just under 1% through the African Development Bank (AfDB) (World Bank, 2010).

**“Emerging” donors**
The other emerging donors such as Brazil, China, India and Venezuela distinguish their assistance programs from the DAC donors and the traditional donor-recipient model. Rather, they maintain that their engagement is based on solidarity and mutual benefit. Southern donors often emphasize aid to infrastructure, energy and productive sectors (e.g. agriculture for Brazil). Table 5 presents an overview of Southern providers.

### Table 5: Overview of “Emerging” providers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Modality</th>
<th>Top recipients</th>
<th>Main sectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Mainly project oriented and technical cooperation. Some debt relief.</td>
<td>Mostly Latin America, (Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Cuba, Haiti). Extending to Africa (in Angola, Mozambique, Zambia).</td>
<td>Agriculture and food security, maternal and child health, human rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Mainly technical cooperation and co-financed projects. Some debt relief and large amounts of emergency assistance.</td>
<td>Haiti, Cape Verde, East Timor. Other main focuses are Lusophone and Southern American countries.</td>
<td>Mainly social sectors. Some involvement in agriculture, bio-fuels/ethanol and digital inclusion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Oil deals are essentially balance of payments support. Also some humanitarian assistance through BANDES.</td>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean.</td>
<td>Mainly energy. Also projects in health, education, housing, water, and private sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Bilateral aid. Projects, in-kind, technical cooperation, and debt relief.</td>
<td>Africa (46%), Asia (33%), Latin America (13%)</td>
<td>Economic infrastructure (61%); industry (16%); energy and resources (9%); Agriculture (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Mostly project oriented and technical cooperation (with the exception of more general support to neighbors). Some debt relief.</td>
<td>Bhutan (36%), Afghanistan (25%), Nepal (13%). Approximately 85% to Asia; 15% to Africa.</td>
<td>Rural development, education, health, technical cooperation. Also gives loans primarily for infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Majority through multilateral channels (esp. NEPAD, African Renaissance Fund). Some debt relief.</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community (70%) and other African countries.</td>
<td>Much work through peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction, technical cooperation. Beginning to get involved with infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Walz and Ramachandran (2011)
Note: BANDES = Venezuelan Economic and Social Development Bank
3 South-South cooperation in Africa and Asia-Pacific

3.1 South-South cooperation in Africa

Africa is the main destination of SSC flows from Arab donors and China. Arab donors have a much established presence in Africa, especially in Arab countries in Northern Africa, compared to other donors. China has been providing aid to African countries since the 1950s, but its expanding operations in the continent in the context of Chinese and African growth is of a more recent vintage. African countries are also among the main recipients of Indian and Brazilian SSC. India and Brazil have a smaller presence in the continent, but their assistance is increasing and gaining attention of late. Bolivia, Cuba, Malaysia and Thailand also provide SSC to the region, but in scales that are relatively very small (UNCTAD, 2010).

Some of the SSC providers, particularly with China and India, have established forums and dialogue platforms and are generally supported by high-level official visits. These forums have been venues for African countries and SSC providers to agree on areas of cooperation. The triennial Forum on China and African Cooperation (FOCAC), launched in 2000, has become the platform for dialogue between African countries and China. The meetings are mostly at the ministerial level, although they are often attended by heads of state and government. The latest FOCAC Ministerial Conference was held in Beijing in July 2012. China uses FOCAC as a platform for making commitments to the region. During the 5th FOCAC Summit in July 2012, China announced $20 billion in credit lines over three years to African countries support mainly the development of infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing, and development of small and medium-sized enterprises. India meanwhile launched the triennial India-Africa Forum in 2008. In the 2nd India-Africa Forum Summit in 2011, India pledged to extend $5.4 billion in lines of credit to African countries until 2014.

Table 6: Official flows to African countries by main Southern providers (from various sources)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Value and year(s)</th>
<th>Form of assistance</th>
<th>Source and note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>US$ 46.98 million (2013)</td>
<td>ODA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>US$ 118.63 million (2012)</td>
<td>ODA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The absence of comparable data means an aggregate figure for the magnitude of SSC in Africa cannot be arrived at. Data from various available sources (see table above) suggest that Arab donors and China are indeed the largest providers of SSC in the African continent, with India as a far third. The data also suggests that loans are a significantly larger form of assistance than grants. The degree of concessionality of these loans is generally not known.

With respect to the geographic and sectoral distribution of SSC, some broad patterns stand out. Arab donors tend to provide aid to Arab and North African countries, and Brazil focuses on Lusophone countries. Chinese assistance is often said to concentrate on resource-rich countries such as Angola, Nigeria, and Sudan (e.g. UNCTAD 2010). Among all SSC providers, there is a pronounced focus on the so-called hard sectors (infrastructure, agriculture, energy) rather than social sectors (see tables below).

### Table 7: Major recipients and sectoral focus of SSC in Africa (2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Sectoral focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Resource-rich countries (e.g. Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Sudan and Zambia) are the main beneficiaries. However most countries in the region receive support from China.</td>
<td>Infrastructure, agriculture, industry, health and education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe account for 74% of Brazilian resource allocation for technical cooperation projects in Africa.</td>
<td>Agriculture, livestock, environment, energy, health, education, culture, urban development, professional training and information technology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2 SSC in Asia-Pacific

South Asia

India’s South Asian neighbors are the main destination of Indian assistance. Out of a total of US$6 billion in loans and grants that the Indian government has provided as development assistance from 2000 to 2013, Bhutan received nearly 49%, Afghanistan 8%, Maldives about 3%, Nepal about 6%, Sri Lanka 5% and Bangladesh 4% (IDCR 2014).

In Bhutan, assistance received from India is larger than that from DAC donors. Between 2006 and 2013, India provided the country grants amounting US$2.82 billion, compared to US$ 750 million from DAC donors during the same period (ibid). India fully funded Bhutan’s first five-year plan (1961-66) and continued to be an important contributor to each one since. Bhutan is a unique case in that its economy remains highly dependent on India; India accounts for 75% of its export trade. Below is a quick summary of Indian SSC to selected South Asian countries.

Table 8: Summary of Indian assistance to South Asian countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient country</th>
<th>Main forms of assistance</th>
<th>Sectoral focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Grants, including humani-tarian assistance</td>
<td>Infrastructure, government and administration, food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Training, grants, loans, lines of credit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>Grants and loans</td>
<td>Infrastructure, agriculture, energy, education, health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>Grants, loans, lines of credit</td>
<td>Health, civil society development, infrastructure, disaster relief, telecommunication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Grants, lines of credit, training and scholarships</td>
<td>Infrastructure reconstruction, water resource development, housing, health</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IDCR (2014b)

China also provides assistance to some South Asian countries. It is not known how much aid China gives the South Asian region in general.
Box 4: Chinese official flows to Nepal and Pakistan from media sources

Nepal
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in his January 2012 visit to Nepal announced US$ 119 million in economic and technical assistance to the country. In the visit Nepalese and Chinese officials signed eight agreements on infrastructure development, which includes upgrading and expansion of existing Ring Road of Kathmandu and the construction of Pokhara International Airport. The two sides also agreed to deepen cooperation on border management and law-enforcement capacity-building in order to uphold peace and stability of China-Nepal border areas. Nepal renewed its commitment to one-China policy while re-affirming that it will not allow anti-China activities on its soil.

Pakistan
Various reports say that Pakistan will receive a $6.5 billion loan from China for the construction of twin nuclear power stations in Karachi. It is reported to be largest Chinese financing deal for a single project in the country. The Karachi facilities will add 15% to Pakistan’s energy generation capacity. China Exim Bank will provide the loan to be repaid over 20 years. Pakistan is reportedly the first country in which the Chinese are building nuclear power plants.

Sources: Nepal: Phayul (2012); Pakistan: Bokhari & Crabtree (2014)

Southeast Asia
China, India and Thailand are some of the main SSC providers to Southeast Asian countries. China’s large infrastructure deals with Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos have received the greatest attention. Assistance from the Thailand International Cooperation Agency (TICA) comes mainly in the form of technical cooperation. From 2005 to 2011, 55% of Thai aid flows to the CLMV countries and 6% to the rest of Southeast Asia (TICA 2014). Less information is available about SSC efforts from Malaysia and Indonesia.

Table 9: Examples of SSC flows to Southeast Asian countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Value/form</th>
<th>Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Cambodian-Thai Skill Development Center project</td>
<td>Technical assistance</td>
<td>Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>Agriculture and Forest Development Project at Phone Hong District</td>
<td>Technical assistance</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Development for Thai Language Teaching Curriculum at Yangon University</td>
<td>Technical assistance</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of Foreign Language</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Thai Language Development Center</td>
<td>Technical assistance</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Nepal: Phayul (2012); Pakistan: Bokhari & Crabtree (2014)
Box 4: Chinese assistance to Pacific developing countries

Excerpt from “China makes splashes in the Pacific,” Island Business, June 2013

At a time when traditional donors appear fed up with Pacific governments largely seen as creator of economic mismanagement, China has picked up the pieces and is offering never-to-be-refused financial packages....

In the last seven years for example, Beijing has provided tangible projects in Forum Islands Countries that it has diplomatic relations with. It has offered in-kind support, grants and soft loans.

In Samoa for example, a new state-of-the-art hospital would be officially handed over to the Tuilaepa government in September. The cost of that single project alone is expected to exceed US$100 million when it is completed.

At the same time, it has built a huge office complex for the Prime Minister’s Office right in the heart of Apia. Work has begun on an even larger office complex...

[Tonga] will this year take delivery of two 50-seater aircraft for its domestic routes. Depending on its success, the Nuku’alofa government is planning to obtain two larger additional aircraft, possibly under a soft loan, for the kingdom’s regional network.
Recently, the PNG government incurred the ire of the traditional donors when it borrowed US$500 million in soft loans. This was part of the US$2 billion soft loan facility China announced in 2006.

This year, the Peter O’Neill Government has just concluded a US$6 billion soft loan negotiations to develop PNG’s highways and other support infrastructure. By the time you are reading this article, PNG officials along with representatives from engineering firms vying for the project would be arriving in Beijing to sign on the dotted line so that work can start.

In nearby Vanuatu, the Chinese government has done even more. Apart from providing two passenger aircraft for the Francophone nation’s domestic airline, Beijing also lent the Port Vila government two loans totalling about US$60 million.

Proceeds from these loans were used to build the USP Campus in Port Vila and the Parliament House, also in the capital. But Beijing went an extra mile. It forgave both loans, according to Vanuatu officials.

Source: Sasako (2013)
4 Issues in South-South cooperation

Ownership
South-South cooperation efforts by the so-called emerging donors are packaged heavily in the language of respect for sovereignty and non-interference. These features are important conditions for country ownership. Broadly, ownership requires (1) that recipient countries’ own needs and priorities drive the development partnership (the provision of aid) and (2) that these priorities and policies have support and legitimacy not only within government but also with other stakeholders such as CSOs.

Government ownership
Available literature – which is almost overwhelmingly about Chinese assistance – is generally supportive of the claim that SSC efforts are respectful at least of government ownership. Firstly, Southern providers do not attach explicit economic policy and governance reform conditions to the receipt of their assistance. There are, however, foreign policy conditions or pressures, especially from the large Southern providers. China requires recipients to observe its One China policy. Brazil and India, meanwhile, are said to be using aid to gain support from countries for their bid to gain permanent seats in the UN Security Council (Kragelund, 2010).

Southern assistance is also request-based. Southern donors respond directly to official requests by the recipient country as articulated in high level meetings or submitted to specific donor agencies. India’s ITEC for instance responds to applications for assistance submitted by partner countries (ITEC, n.d.). In China’s case, the most common approach for identifying projects for funding is to negotiate an Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement [with the Ministry of Commerce] or a Framework Agreement [with China EximBank] which involves a grant, or a line of credit with specific terms. Each project financed out of the line of credit will have a separate loan agreement. The Chinese and the [recipient] government sit down together and negotiate a list of development infrastructure projects that will be financed out of the agreement and (usually) built by Chinese companies (Brautigam, 2011b).

The Chinese also do not have “country assistance strategies”, which is common for Northern donors to have (Brautigam, 2011a). These strategies often reflect donor rather than partner priorities. Brautigam (2011b) says that the Chinese have “neither the expertise, nor the inclination, nor the personnel to engage in development strategy planning or write country assistance strategies, for any of the countries where they engage.” Southern donors’ more direct request-based approach stands in contrast to the aid effec-
tiveness tradition’s emphasis on country development strategy documents that are linked to expenditure frameworks and budgets as anchors of partner country ownership (Park, 2010). Furthermore, the delivery of Southern assistance predominantly as completed projects rather than program-based or budget support means Southern donors do not possess the leverage, as Northern donors do, to demand conditions or influence expenditure or policy choices of the recipient government.

Southern donors’ demand-driven approach presents partner countries an opportunity to match funding for projects according to their development plans or strategies. The 2011 African Economic Outlook (AEO) says that Namibia’s engagement strategy is formalized and the assistance provided by emerging partners is integrated into the national development plan (AfDB et al., 2011). Similarly Cameroon’s engagement strategy with emerging partners is framed within the country’s development vision for 2035.

There are concerns, however, that officials are taking advantage of emerging donors’ deep pockets and flexibility to recipient demands to request funding for projects that are highly visible and popular among voters but have questionable viability in the long run. The Chinese for instance have built numerous stadiums in African and other partner countries funded by grants or soft loans. Some of the newly constructed stadiums are facing deterioration and neglect, suggesting that maintenance costs were not properly considered. Brautigam (2009) gives an account of a requested stadium project in Sierra Leone the Chinese initially expressed aversion to – mindful that their aid might have better uses – but then eventually agreed funding at the host government’s insistence. Apart from sports stadiums, other prestige projects that China and other Southern providers have funded include conference facilities, government buildings and presidential residences. It appears that when the political motivations for providing development are strong, the more likely it is that the donor is to fund prestige projects regardless of development priorities (UN ECOSOC, 2008).

Southern providers’ approach to alignment with country systems also contrasts with that of traditional donors. DAC donors have shifted from project to program aid and encourage its ranks to use partner country systems and procedures. Although program aid and budget support are also used, the bulk of Southern donors’ assistance come as project assistance. Funding for projects tends to be disbursed via direct payments to contractors rather than channeled to the recipient government. Turnkey projects are implemented largely independent of the host government. Recipient countries find this method attractive as it is procedurally simple, less bureaucratic, and promotes faster project turnaround. However, though this encourages speedier completion, recipient governments may not always be informed that transactions have occurred, hampering their monitoring of debt and aid flows (UN ECOSOC, 2009). Furthermore, there is a risk that, as well as project quality, country procedures and policies (including human rights and environmental standards) are being compromised in order to achieve fast project completion (Reality of Aid, 2010).

Finally, Southern providers appear to be increasing policy space in countries where they have significant presence, especially those are perceived to be strategically important politically or economically (e.g. resource-rich countries). This can be gathered from a recent research by Greenhill et al. (2013) which consisted of case studies in three countries (Ethiopia, Cambodia and Zambia) that receive sizeable inflows from non-traditional donors. All three countries were found to highly value ownership, alignment and speed, and – especially Cambodia and Ethiopia – are increasingly being assertive with donors. In Ethiopia, according to the authors, “interview evidence suggested that non-DACs were ... valued because they did not
challenge or question the fundamentals of the government’s economic strategy, which is quite heterodox when compared with the usual policy prescriptions of traditional donors” (Greenhill et al., 2013).

Non-DAC donors were also found to be “better aligned with government priorities because of their focus on infrastructure, energy and growth-promoting sectors.” Furthermore, the authors observe that the existence of new donors have allowed Cambodia and Ethiopia to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis traditional donors. For example, Ethiopia has rejected concessional loans from traditional donors that came with cumbersome procedures, and instead took on loans from non-traditional donors that, though less concessional, were disbursed more speedily (Greenhill et al., 2013).

Democratic ownership and civil society participation

Country ownership is democratic when the control that the recipient government exercises over its chosen policies is rooted in the participation of, and accountability to, stakeholders and citizens who are the intended beneficiaries of development. Democratic ownership ensures that the thrusts and outcomes of development policies are pro-poor and human rights-adherent. CSO involvement in the development process is an important component of democratic ownership. Paragraph 22 of the Busan Partnership agreement acknowledged CSOs as essential development actors in their own right. CSOs play a crucial role in promoting government accountability and transparency, in representing the views of the poor and marginalized sectors, and in informing policymaking with specialized knowledge and experience in development.

While there is some evidence for government ownership, there is little to no evidence that CSOs are being systematically involved in SSC efforts. SSC appears very much to be a government-to-government affair. According to the 2011 AEO, emerging donors partnering with African countries “tend to give priority – and with it, ownership over development policies – to the president’s office rather than dealings with line ministries,” in contrast to “traditional partners [who] have generally dealt with ministers and high-level officials.” It adds that “[w]hile the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper era started a process of decentralizing [government] ownership within African countries, the emerging partners may have initiated a reverse process towards centralization” (AfDB et al., 2011).

In a survey of stakeholders in 40 African countries conducted for the same report, respondents were asked to score the degree to which each of six listed stakeholders – among them, non-government organizations (NGOs) – took part in partnerships with emerging providers. NGOs are perceived to have very little involvement (see Figure 2).

6 Referring to the Mo Ibrahim Index, and the World Governance Indicators on (t) corruption and (2) regulatory quality for all 16 Sub-Saharan African countries defined by the IMF as hydrocarbon or mineral-rich. See AfDB et al. (2011).
This perception is echoed in the mapping exercises conducted by CPDE members. The author of the Africa mapping, for instance, observes that in the context of ownership, there seems to be a huge gap in the involvement of citizens through participatory planning, implementation and evaluation. The co-operation seems to focus largely on states. There is little emphasis on the promotion of citizen exchanges, promoting citizen based institutions or academic institutions. Citizens are seen as mere recipient and beneficiaries of development projects and programs of such co-operation (Meja, 2012).

The author of the Asia mapping meanwhile concludes that [there is] very limited recognition of CSO participation in SSC among governments and sub-regional formations in the Asia and Middle East. SSC programs of most government agencies, for instance, limit the terms of development cooperation to intergovernmental cooperation (“Mapping of South-South Cooperation and Triangular Cooperation in Asia,” 2012)

These views are consistent with those that emerged in a recent research for HIVA (Vaes & Huyse 2013), which sought the views of African CSO representatives from different organizations and countries on South-South cooperation in Africa using surveys, interviews and other methods. The authors note that different analyses seems to agree that civil society is only by exception involved in the practice of emerging power’s SSC (in contrast to private and state actors). Participating CSO representatives confirm this impression. They characterise SSC as a state-to-state or exclusively bilateral affair and they can pinpoint very few CSO activities or initiatives with the aim of influencing SSC policy or practice (Vaes & Huyse, 2013).

The study’s survey and interviews point to the limited knowledge of the participating CSOs and of civil
society at large about the issue of emerging donors in Africa. Few CSOs are engaged systematically on SSC as part of their work, and few also indicated that they plan to begin or ramp up their involvement in SSC despite acknowledging that it is an important issue. CSO respondents believed that civil society has an important role to play in ensuring that SSC is better aligned with the needs and interest of African citizens, but cited the lack of transparency, information, and limited capacity for advocacy work as barriers to effective CSO engagement.

In many developing countries much has yet to be done to secure for CSOs institutionalized spaces for dialogue and policy influencing. The 2011 Reality of Aid Report, for instance, found at the time only “a mixed experience with inclusive consultations and few fully inclusive multi-stakeholder bodies for development planning and monitoring” (Reality of Aid, 2011). Of the 32 developing countries examined through case studies, the report found only a few cases of sustained multi-stakeholder involvement in government national development planning directorates. Similarly, evidence collected for the 2013 synthesis by the CPDE Working Group on CSO Enabling Environment finds that inclusion of CSOs and other stakeholders within government bodies mandated to coordinate and/or monitor country development strategies remains the exception rather than the rule (CPDE Working Group on CSO Enabling Environment, 2013). CSOs in developing countries have a variety of relationships with their own governments, ranging from open or hidden tension to cooperation and collaboration (Tomlinson, 2013). How SSC providers engage CSOs in countries they partner with may to a large extent depend on how the governments themselves behave with respect to their CSO counterparts in the development process.

At the policy level, SSC providers at best passing reference to working with CSOs (Vaes, 2013). The 2012 Beijing Declaration of the 5th FOCAC ministerial conference, China and African countries committed to forge closer ties between their non-governmental organizations; however no mention is made about their role in development cooperation (Beijing Declaration, 2012). In the 2011 Addis Ababa Declaration of the 2nd India-Africa Summit, India and African partners express commitment to involve the private sector and civil society to widen the scope of their partnership, but does not elaborate how this is to be achieved (Addis Ababa Declaration, 2011).

The palpable lack of CSO participation and democratic ownership in SSC efforts, combined with clientelistic elite governance and bureaucratic corruption in many recipient countries could spell that the benefits of SSC end up not being widely shared, sustainable, or even pro-poor.

**Tied aid**

Aid from Arab donors is mostly untied, although this does vary across projects. The Arab Coordination Group follows competitive bidding procedures that allow for local suppliers to participate. Preference is often on Middle Eastern or African sources, and bidding can be waived by mutual agreement (UN ECOSOC, 2008).

Outside the Arab donor group, the majority of SSC providers such as China and India substantially tie their aid. For turnkey projects, the donor country contracts home companies to implement the project rather than channel the funding to the partner government. Technical and emergency assistance are usually tied as well (which is also the case for Northern donors). Tied is criticized on several grounds, including limiting local spillover effects, raising unit costs, and in general reducing the effectiveness of aid.
It is argued that the higher costs associated with tied aid is less applicable to SSC providers, who have low capital and labor costs, operate faster, and follow simpler procedures. Technical cooperation by Southern contributors may not only be at lower cost, but also provide more appropriate technical skills and technologies compared to Northern donors (UN ECOSOC, 2008). However Southern aid can have less value for money when Southern contractors provide substandard supplies. Tied aid can also limit technology transfer when a project is implemented entirely by donor country personnel.

There are currently no conscious efforts by Southern providers to untie their aid. Tied aid has been a feature of Northern assistance for decades, but DAC donors in 2001 agreed to untie aid to Least Developed Countries (LDCs). In 2007, the share of bilateral ODA that was still tied for Italy was 36%, 33% for the US, and 30% for Spain (DAC, 2009).

In contrast to Northern donors, "emerging" donors view the tying of aid as legitimate, since their approach is one of development cooperation yielding mutual economic benefit rather than philanthropy (Park, 2010).

**Debt sustainability**

There have been concerns especially among Northern donors that lending by emerging donors is damaging debt sustainability and could trigger debt crises in borrowing African countries. Northern donors also complain that emerging donors are "free-riding" on increased space afforded by Northern-sponsored debt relief initiatives (Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative) to highly indebted African countries. These worries are being fueled by the lack of transparency on lending by Southern donors.

So far these concerns do not appear to be well-founded. For instance, the 2011 AEO reports not finding any rapid increase in debt levels due to borrowing from emerging donors (AfDB et al., 2011). Reisen and Nodye (2008) found little evidence of imprudent lending, as well as of free-riding, noting that the major beneficiaries of lending are non-HIPC resource rich countries (such as Angola, Nigeria and Sudan). Reisen (2007) also says that China contributes positively to African countries’ debt tolerance by stimulating exports, output growth and infrastructure investment.

Southern lenders have also granted large debt reductions to African debtors. In 2010, the Chinese government reported of having cancelled debts owed by 35 African countries amounting to 18.96 billion Yuan from 2000 to 2009 (Information Office of the State Council, PRC, 2010). Similarly, Brazil in 2013 announced the cancellation or restructuring of up to US$ 870 million in debt owed by 12 African countries, including Congo, Tanzania and Zambia. Nevertheless the 2011 AEO warns that relatively resource-poor and low-revenue countries taking on new lending can face significant debt sustainability risks.

The debt situation Tonga in the Pacific stands out. China reportedly owns 60% of Tonga’s total external debt, which in 2012 stood at 40% of the country’s GDP (IMF, 2013; Howard, 2013). The IMF says the country is at moderate risk of debt distress, and warns that its high level of Chinese-denominated debt exposes it to high foreign exchange risk (IMF, 2013). In Tonga and other countries such as Samoa and Vanuatu, high debt levels have prompted concerns that government revenues are increasingly being diverted to pay off loans from foreign lenders, including Southern donors. A report by the Pacific Institute for Public Policy (2013) suggests that high debt levels in the region is being driven by imprudent borrowing by public of-
Officials attracted by easy credit or the political gains that come with highly visible projects. Officials could also be taking on loans in the belief that they will eventually be forgiven.

**Impact on human rights, democracy and good governance**

There are concerns about the human rights implications of South-South cooperation in partner countries, especially those with poor human rights and democratic credentials. The first one relates to the direct impacts of projects backed by Southern official financing. Some of these projects are raising human rights and environmental red flags.

For instance, a trilateral project (backed by Brazil, Japan and Mozambique) called ProSavana, which aims to introduce Brazilian-developed high productivity agricultural models in Mozambique’s Nacala Corridor, is facing opposition from local CSOs for concerns that it will spell dispossessions for small farmers practicing traditional agriculture in the region (Justiça Ambiental! et al., 2013; Verdade, 2014). Human Rights Watch (2011) has reported on poor working conditions, anti-union actions and other abuses faced by workers in four Chinese-run copper mining companies in Zambia. In Ethiopia, the construction of the Gibe III Dam – funded by the state-owned Industrial and Commercial Bank of China – threatens to impact communities along the Lower Omo Valley in Ethiopia and damage Lake Turkana in Kenya (International Rivers, 2013). Chinese official funding is known to have allowed dam projects to push through after initially failing to attract Western funding often due to adverse social and environmental impacts (Bosshard, 2008).

Furthermore, Southern providers’ policy of non-interference is prompting concerns about its possible consequence on efforts to foster human rights, democracy and good governance in recipient countries. Some (e.g. Naim, 2007) hold the view that providing aid no questions asked amounts to supporting corrupt and authoritarian recipients in the South. According to this view, growing Southern aid-giving is affording corrupt and undemocratic governments the option to refuse assistance from Northern donors that insist on progress on human rights and good governance. This criticism is levelled especially against the big Southern lenders, e.g. China, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela.

The story, however, appears to be more nuanced. The premise that Northern institutions never deal with authoritarian and corrupt governments, and that Western conditionality is succeeding in promoting democracy and human rights, is highly questionable (e.g. Brautigam, 2009). In cases where tied assistance is paid directly to contractors, aid money never leaves the donor country, thus removing the opportunity for direct misappropriation – although kickbacks from contractors are still possible (Brautigam, 2009; Saidi & Wolf, 2011). Emerging donors partner with democratic governments as well as authoritarian ones (Berger et al., 2010). The 2011 AEO observes no trend of general deterioration in governance and public goods delivery indicators in African countries due to the presence of emerging partners in the region (AfDB et al., 2011). The picture seems to be that, in terms of fostering democracy and good governance, while emerging donors are not doing that much more harm than their Northern counterparts, they are also not making things better.

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6 Referring to the Mo Ibrahim Index, and the World Governance Indicators on (t) corruption and (2) regulatory quality for all 16 Sub-Saharan African countries defined by the IMF as hydrocarbon or mineral-rich. See AfDB et al. (2011).
In HIVA’s recent study (Vaes & Huyse., 2013), most African CSO respondents viewed Southern donors’ “no-strings-attached” approach favorably. At the same time, they also expressed the same concerns stated above. CSOs have good reason to be worried: the space for civil society in many countries is closing (e.g. Reality of Aid, 2011). Southern donors, especially those aspiring for a more prominent role in global affairs, must take greater responsibility about the wider impacts of their assistance to other developing countries.

Transparency

For provider and recipient countries alike, complete and timely information on aid is necessary for increasing effectiveness, minimizing potential corruption and waste, and establishing accountability. For CSOs, it is a prerequisite for timely response and engagement. However, information about Southern providers’ aid activities is scattered, irregular, incomplete and incomparable.

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE and Thailand report their aggregate data by recipient country and sector; only Kuwait and UAE however report project-level and sector-level data. Aid data from these countries are readily accessible to the public through the OECD website. Aid data from other SSC providers are less accessible. In 2011, China and Brazil each published reports providing at best broad aggregate information about their foreign assistance; India has yet to follow suit. These reports however are lacking in annual, disaggregated data on country, sector, and modality distribution. To get a more complete picture, including annual data and country allocation, one will have to piece together information from various sources, e.g. the donor country’s annual budget, ministry/agency reports, Exim bank reports, statistical yearbooks, etc. – no easy task even for donor country nationals.

One of the problems for improving transparency on aid data by Southern providers is that assistance programs are dispersed across many different ministries and agencies. Several ministries or agencies may be disbursing different kinds of assistance (e.g. the ministry of foreign affairs or commerce on project grants or soft loans, line ministries for technical assistance, and the Exim bank for other loans and export credits) with no overarching institutional structure to have an overview of SSC flows in aggregate. For many Southern countries this means that SSC flows are unlikely to be collected and compiled centrally (UN ECOSOC, 2009). Moreover, there are also more technical problems such as the absence of a definition of what counts as concessional development assistance, and lack of uniformity in the types of data being collected (e.g. period covered, format, and disbursements versus commitments).

Apart from institutional challenges, there are also political constraints. Some Southern donor governments are not particularly known for having a culture of openness and transparency. Southern providers, especially the larger ones, are also wary inviting scrutiny towards their aid-giving. At home where poverty and development challenges remain, these providers do not wish to be seen as spending much needed public money abroad. Internationally, they are not keen on being regarded as donor countries, and wish to avoid being judged against Western aid standards. There are also transparency problems on the recipient side.

7 China’s 2011 “China’s Foreign Aid” (PRC 2011) provides the following data: sectoral distribution of concessional loans (1950s-2009 cumulative); sectoral distribution of complete projects (1950s-2009 cumulative); statistics on cancelled debt (1950s-2009 cumulative); distribution of foreign aid according to regional group and income group (2009). Money values are in US dollars. The most relevant data in Brazil’s report (IPEA, 2011) are: modalities (2005-2009 annual), regional distribution of humanitarian assistance (2005-2009 annual), and contributions to international organizations (2005-2009 annual). Money values in Brazilian reals.
CSO access to aid flow information is usually either partial or unavailable, and seldom covered by information access laws (Reality of Aid, 2011) In some case, there seems to be deliberate secrecy in financing deals on the part of both providers and recipients. The lack of transparency and dearth of information invites corruption, both real and imagined.

**Sustainable development**

Southern providers notably China, India, the Arab donors and their multilateral institutions focus on support for infrastructure development and productive sector investments. Focus sectors include transportation, communications, energy and other infrastructure development. Some Southern providers have also financed prestige projects such as sports facilities and government buildings. Health and education sectors account for about a fifth of Southern development assistance (UN ECOSOC, 2008). Brazilian development assistance is focused on agriculture, industry, education and health (IPEA & World Bank, 2011).

In many developing countries with fiscal and capital market constraints, this emphasis is welcome especially since Northern development assistance has been concentrated in the social sectors at the expense of infrastructure and economic sectors. Southern financing has helped poorer countries address their infrastructure deficits and tap their natural resources. Investment in infrastructure and the economic sectors can generate gains for aid-recipient countries in terms of increased production, trade and export earnings.

There is a concern however that patterns of Southern aid-giving, investment, and trade with poorer developing countries, particularly in Africa, could heighten their economic specialization on raw materials extraction. China and India for instance are known to have an interest in securing natural resources in the region and that resource-rich countries are among their main beneficiaries. They provide large loans to finance investments in the natural resource sector. Currently, Africa’s exports to other developing countries have increasingly been dominated by primary products, and its import from other developing countries has been increasingly dominated by manufactures (UNCTAD, 2010). These broad trends tend to support concerns that Southern finance may increase Africa’s dependence on exporting resources and importing manufactures. The fear is that South-South economic and development relations might perpetuate existing production structures and further stall the continent’s economic diversification and industrialization.

**Figure 3: Structure of Africa’s trade with other developing countries, 1995-2008**

- **A. Exports**
- **B. Imports**

Source: UNCTAD (2010)
South-South cooperation presents opportunities for developing country governments and stakeholders on the receiving end. While Northern development assistance remains the main source of public concessional financing for international development, Southern aid and official financing represents useful additional resources for developing countries to support development priorities. SSC flows mainly in energy, transportation and agriculture are complementing Northern aid flows that concentrate in education, health and water. Combined with Southern providers’ demand-driven and non-intrusive approach in providing assistance, SSC is enhancing government ownership and policy space in partner countries. In some cases, Southern presence is allowing countries to become more assertive with traditional donors. SSC is also leveraging resources and partnerships beyond the traditional notion of development assistance. Furthermore, SSC allows for a more candid approach to pursuing mutual benefit between two countries. SSC prompts rethinking about how to advance development in a more equal and holistic manner.

But there are risks and challenges as well. SSC is enhancing government ownership, but not democratic ownership. Spaces and opportunities for CSOs to engage SSC are inadequate. Tied aid may be limiting technology transfer and spillover effects to the local economy. Breakneck implementation of projects could be coming at the cost of adherence to social and environmental safeguards and standards. Condition-free assistance to governments with poor human rights and governance records risks undermining local democratic and anti-corruption struggles. Easy Southern credit may be winning the support of politicians even for projects of dubious merit, leaving citizens with the burden of servicing loans. The lack of information inhibits CSO engagement, effective assessment, and establishing accountability. Patterns of aid-giving may be locking partner countries into unequal economic relationships. A poor country and a burgeoning economic power may find opportunities for mutual benefit, but their interests are not always aligned.

The challenge for recipient countries is to harness SSC’s benefits and engage its weaknesses. Some of these weaknesses obtain from recipient governments’ own failings, for instance, in including CSOs in development and policy processes and improving transparency in governance. Nevertheless, Southern providers also have a role to play in making their cooperation more effective. Without losing sight of the capacity, political and development challenges they confront, Southern providers must take greater responsibility about the quality and impacts of their assistance. The Busan Partnership agreements and Nairobi outcome document provide them reference points for action, the latter having greater political acceptability between the two. The key insight, however, remains: development cooperation is more effective if founded on democratic ownership and human rights-adherence. The following are some messages and suggested actions for reflection and consideration:
South-South cooperation embraces a multi-stakeholder approach, including non-governmental organizations, the private sector, civil society, academia and other actors that contribute to meeting development challenges and objectives in line with national development strategies and plans.

Nairobi outcome document, para. 19

**On country and democratic ownership**

SSC providers should continue good practices in observing partner country ownership such as respecting government choices, aligning with host country priorities, and non-imposition of reform conditions. However, they should also consider engaging host country CSOs in multi-stakeholder dialogues. CSOs bring value to development cooperation relationships, including specialized knowledge, effective humanitarian response, on-the-ground experience, and ensuring accountability for results. As SSC providers increase their institutional development, they should consider defining the inclusion of CSOs in their policies, including the rationale and modes of engagement.

The responsibility for charting a national development strategy necessarily lies with the program country, not the donor, if the principle of country ownership and sovereignty is to be respected. Recipient countries can exploit the benefits of increasing partnerships with Southern providers by ensuring local ownership of the development agenda. This requires commitment to a home-grown and democratically developed strategy on how partnerships with Southern donors are to be used as part of long-term policies to develop local industry, agriculture, and other sectors that drive sustainable growth (AfDB et al., 2011).

Southern providers and recipient governments should create and support multi-stakeholder formal bodies and broad consultation processes to determine and monitor SSC policies, plans and strategies, with due representation to CSOs, women and marginalized groups. Recipient governments should also take steps to secure an enabling environment for CSOs to be effective development actors.

Mutual accountability of Southern donors and program countries to each other and to their citizens can be enhanced by expanding the range of actors involved in assessing aid and development effectiveness, particularly at the country level. This should include elected national and local representatives, national and grassroots CSOs. Citizens’ audits of SSC undertakings should be supported (Reality of Aid, 2010).

**On human rights, democracy and good governance**

SSC providers must ensure that their aid and lending agencies adhere to human rights, labor, and environmental standards in host countries. Respect for national sovereignty should not be an excuse to ignore human rights violations, environmental destruction, corruption and abuse of power in partner countries. Every country has obligations under international law and international human rights covenants and conventions. Human rights should inform Southern providers’ dialogue and agreements on international cooperation without this leading to aid conditions. Southern providers and recipients should both take steps to implement their human rights obligations and strengthen good governance at home.
On tied aid
Southern providers should consider gradually untying their aid. Southern donors must be both transparent and open with developing country partners with respect to the comparative advantages of goods and services provided through their aid relationships. Whatever advantages that Southern technical or production personnel may have, the recipient governments must have the freedom to apply its country systems and standards to SSC projects as appropriate to their priorities and needs.

On debt sustainability
Southern providers should practice due prudence in their lending operations. Recipients should exercise due diligence before taking on loans. Debts from Southern creditors that are found to be odious or illegitimate should be canceled.

On transparency
SSC recipients should build open and timely access to aid information and transparent accountability mechanisms and processes, protected by legislation.

SSC providers face different institutional and political considerations that affect their willingness and ability to be fully transparent with their aid data. Thus in the short-term it may not be reasonable to demand them to adopt the same standards as DAC donors. A gradual and step-by-step approach is more realistic. It could follow the following steps (Grimm et al., 2011):

1) Initial steps: Assess, test and develop a publication schedule for aid information that SSC agencies already hold in line with the emerging best practice standards.

2) More substantial steps: Publish existing information already held by these agencies, in line with best practice, and facilitate the dissemination and use of this information, particularly by recipient country governments in the first instance.

3) More ambitious steps: Build systems to collect data that is not currently held and invest in the accessibility and use of that information in SSC countries themselves.
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Annexes

Annex 1

Reality of Aid Africa, 2012

Situational Analysis

There have been significant changes in the structure of the development co-operation. South – South Co-operation increasingly playing important role in global trade, finance, investment and governance. These changes have opened up opportunities for further cooperation between Africa, as evidenced by the plethora of new initiatives aimed at fostering political, economic and social relations with the rest of the developing countries.

In the past decade South-South trade has expanded more quickly than North-South trade. South-South investment too has shown unprecedented dynamism. Africa’s total merchandise trade with non-African developing countries increased from US$ 34 billion in 1995 to $97 billion in 2004 and then jumped to $283 billion in 2008.

At the same time the number of “greenfield” foreign direct investment (FDI) projects by investors from non-African developing countries more than tripled from 52 in 2004 to 184 in 2008 (UNCTAD 2010). Investors from the South often have important regional know-how, use appropriate technologies and prove more willing to take business risks in a difficult political environment.

A further indicator of the increased importance of South-South Co-operation is the fact that countries in the South have become an additional source of official development assistance (ODA). While data availability does not permit a comprehensive and reliable estimate of the scale of official flows to Africa from the South, it is estimated that official aid to the region from developing countries was US$ 2.8 billion in 2006. And it has risen substantially since, as China, which is estimated to contribute over 83% of that aid, committed to double its assistance to Africa by 2009. The flows are increasingly channeled to the infrastructure and production sectors of African economies. In terms of scale, China is the most significant source of support to Africa in the infrastructure and production sectors. Available evidence suggests that Chinese infrastructure and public works finance commitments in sub-Saharan Africa rose from $470 million in 2001 to $4.5 billion in 2007 (UNCTAD 2010).

South-South Co-operation continues to gain track among governments in Africa albeit with different intensity. Resource flows within the context of SSC have seen a massive increase despite the dwindling aid flows from the OECD countries. At the political level there are clear initiatives to South-South Co-operation. Political leadership considers South-South cooperation to be more economical and effective. Furthermore there is a feeling among the African governments that the co-operating countries have relevant development experience and technical capacity in the area of cooperation as well as availability of practical know-how. The South-South Co-operation has the potential

1 A “greenfield” investment is an investment in a manufacturing, office, or other physical company-related venture where no previous facilities exist.
to help Africa’s transformation along not only through growing trade and financial flows but by supporting regional infrastructure projects, transferring knowledge and poverty eradication.

While the positive sides of the current South-South dynamism have been registered primarily in the increased inflows of resources, especially to the benefit of African countries, many states face major challenges because of increased dependence on raw materials and the greater pressure of competition from Asian countries in the case of light manufactures. There are however efforts to develop institutions to facilitate and deepen the co-operation across the board and move beyond extractive industries.

Furthermore African countries are yet to fully invest in the South – South co-operation. Most of efforts to improve the co-operation appear to have been left to the stronger partners in the South. They (stronger Southern partners) seem to fully fund and finance the co-operation rather than joint ventures and seem to strengthen the visibility of the provider rather than mutual interest. This scenario has seen African governments particularly those on the recipient side taking less initiative to develop a strong policy, legal and institutional framework that govern and promote their engagement with the co-operation. This weak policy and institutional framework among African countries not only contribute to weaker results but also pose challenge in the co-operation as the provider seems better organised and dominate negotiations and the processes of negotiation.

For African countries the focus narrowed down to providing enabling environment for trade and investment for their counterparts in the South. The provision of budget allocation to South-South cooperation, addressing data and information management challenges on South-South cooperation make it difficult for their engagement and measure the impact of the result of the co-operation.

Furthermore imbalances in economic and political power among the co-operating partners are quickly degenerating into some form of political and economic patronage. Many of the initiatives are largely funded and supported by the provider with the recipient creating space for absorption of investment, knowledge exchange and extraction of minerals and raw materials. In the context ‘two way street’ exchange, remains a mirage. The providers of South – South Co-operation have tended to use project aid, loans and credits with grants being provided mostly for technical co-operation and humanitarian assistance while for many African countries their participation has been limited with the lack of facilitative power. African countries generally lack resources to exchange their experiences with their counterparts beyond their borders. As such little experience exchange takes place between African countries unless it is engineered through a third party of bilateral or multilateral in nature in the context of South – South Co-operation.

In the context of ownership, there seems to be a huge gap in the involvement of citizens through participatory planning, implementation and evaluation. The co-operation seems to focus largely on states. There is little emphasis on the promotion of citizen exchanges, promoting citizen based institutions or academic institutions. Citizens are seen as mere recipient and beneficiaries of development projects and programs of such co-operation. The focus seems to be on providing scholarships to African countries, rather than exchange student programs, curriculum development exchanges etc.

Furthermore, while providers of South – South Cooperation conduct surveys and consultation meetings with poten-

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2 UNCTAD 2010 on South-South cooperation: Africa and the new forms of development partnership shows that trade and investment flows with the South are reinforcing a longstanding trend in which African countries export farm produce, minerals, ores, and crude oil, and import manufactured goods. It says this situation should be reversed while the South-South trend is still in its early stages. A repeat of the traditional pattern will not help African countries to reduce their traditional dependence on exports of commodities and low-value-added goods.
tial collaboration national organizations including the private sector and relevant government agencies, the same cannot be said of the recipient African governments over the same projects. African governments generally clear the way for ‘development projects’, including destroying their properties, involuntary relocation and land repossession.

Mapping of current policy forums in Africa

Whereas the SSC receives the political backing of the political leadership in the continent, there is African led policy forum to provide stakeholders with the support they need to engage this diverse and challenging co-operation. There are investment promotion centers across the continents with a very restricted mandate. There is little evidence to show the existence of ‘stand-alone’ policy forums dedicated for SSCs. Many countries in the continent have attempted to in co-operated to SSC providers within the broader aid effective agenda with little success. Efforts to create national policy fora are yet to be initiated on SSC are non-existent.

At the regional level the SSC policy dialogue forums take place alongside other development financing major conferences. While Platforms such as African Platform on Development effectiveness (APDEV), African Union commission and NEPAD have South – South Co-operation as one of its thematic focus area, it is yet to be fully developed in both content and initiatives. At the global level there is the United Nations Development Co-operation Forum that reviews the global development trends including the South – South Co-operation.

At the initiative of the more economically advance SSC providers outside Africa, there exists several more structured policy forum including, The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), CHINA-AFRICA BUSINESS COUNCIL (CABC), Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit, BRICS Summit, India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), BASIC group comprising Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC), and India-Africa summit.

Keys institutions have also been created to facilitate policy formulation, engagement and dialogue. These include:

The Special Unit for South-South Cooperation

At the global level United Nations has created a special unit for South-South Co-operation to, among other things, mainstream South-South cooperation throughout the international development community by leveraging its global reach as well as its policy and institutional capacities to assist developing countries in strengthening their South-South cooperation capacities. It supports countries’ efforts to manage, design and implement South-South cooperation policies and initiatives through the identification, sharing and transfer of successful Southern-generated development solutions in the south and facilitates countries of the South – emerging, middle income and least developed – to work together to use their wealth of resources, tangible and intangible, in support of national, regional and global development efforts. The unit also acts as the secretariat to the High-level Committee (HLC) on South-South Cooperation, a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, which provides policy directives and guidance and reviews worldwide progress in South-South cooperation. Among the programs run by the special unit include the Global South-South Development Academy, Global South-South Development Expo, South-South Global Assets and Technology Exchange.

CHINA-AFRICA BUSINESS COUNCIL (CABC)
Based in Beijing the China-Africa Business Council seeks to create an enabling environment for China-Africa economic and technical cooperation. It seeks to facilitate deepening of economic relations between China and Africa with regard to investment. It is private sector driven with strong public sector support, and working alongside government ministries. It provides a business advice to assist Chinese and African companies achieve their investment objectives.

It provides information on micro and macro business and economic tailored towards the needs of Chinese and African companies, including: individual market and sector information, trade and investment policies, tariffs and cross border regulations, international investment practice, specialised trade and investment fairs, potential business partners.

CABC has established offices in 5 ‘core’ countries: Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, Mozambique and Cameroon. The offices act as outreach centres and seek to focus on collecting information on the African economic environment and build close partnerships with local government and business entities, Chinese Embassies and investment promotion offices, local industry federations and Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Investment Promotion Agencies and Private Enterprise Foundations.

**The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)**

The forum operates at three levels; the Ministerial Conference, is convened once every three years, and attended by Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers responsible for International Cooperation and/or Financial and Economic Affairs; the Senior Officials Meetings (SOMs), which convenes one year ahead of the Ministerial Conference to discuss follow-up activities. FOCAC has been institutionalized and remains an important platform for collective dialogue and an effective mechanism for enhancing cooperation between China and African countries.

China additionally have key academic and policy based institutional think tanks that facilitate its engagement in South–South co-operation. These include China International Centre for Economic and Technical Cooperation (CICETE) and China South-South Cooperation Network

**Institutional models**

In the south – south co-operation, there is no clear distinction between official and commercial flows. This makes it difficult to classify the co-operation under any particular institutional model. However the co-operation has a mixture of capacity building, technology transfer, research and public – private partnership. Partners engage both at regional and national level depending on the magnitude of the project. In the context of level of engagement, the following have been established to be used by most of the partners under the South – South co-operation banner;

- Regional technical cooperation: involvement of provider government representatives in regional experts meetings organized by the African Union or regional trading blocks
- Technical cooperation: African countries receive technical assistance to develop sectoral programmes or improve existing initiatives.
- Study tour: organisation of a visit to providing to enable an exchange of experiences between African and host government officials.
- Capacity building, technologies transfer, and Public-Private Partnership

The areas of co-operation between African countries and their Southern partners include, infrastructure, construction, agriculture, human resources development, and health and water supply. In This regard, the co-operation has
resulted into major projects in Africa including Kollo Project (Tunisia-Niger), Pan-African E-Network Project (India-African Countries), and Lighten-up Africa Project (China-African countries), SMASSE project (Kenya-Niger), and Growth Triangle Initiative by Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique (ZMM-GT)

**Financing South – South Co-operation in Africa**

Financing efforts that promote South – South co-operation in Africa remain very limited. African countries do not allocate budgets towards the facilitation of South South co-operation unlike their counterparts like China, Brazil and India. The continent heavily relies on the support of the bilateral South – South provider or a multilateral institution such as the UNDP special office for South – South co-operation or the African development Bank. Triangular cooperation has also become one of the tools used to support South – South co-operation.

**South-South Cooperation Trust Fund**

Largely funded by the government of Brazil, the South-South Cooperation Trust Fund (SSCTF) seeks to support African countries in mobilizing and taking advantage of development solutions and technical expertise available in the South. The Fund also seeks to promote South-South partnerships and knowledge sharing among MICs and between MICs and LDCs in Africa. The fund’s focus areas include Agriculture and agri business, health, social development and clean energy. It supports

- Provision of technical assistance in the preparation of policy and sector studies, research and analysis;
- Capacity building and human resources development;
- Organization of seminars, workshops, conferences and consultations and knowledge sharing of experiences and,
- Implementation and piloting of innovative approaches to solve development challenges in Regional Member Countries

**CSOs in the South – South Co-operation**

Civil society participation in the South - South Co-operation has been in their own defined context. This is mirrored in their desire to see a just society for all but more specifically to the poor and the marginalised. Their co-operation is embedded on a human rights based approached to development as such work within the framework of solidarity, justice and mutuality. CSOs focus mostly on the elements that are considered peripheral by the official South – South co-operation. Issues touching on Human rights, Social development, Cultural exchanges, Environmental sustainability, democracy and sustainable employment form the corner stone of CSO South – South Co-operation. CSOs also cooperate on capacity building and development of their own networks.

CSOs as development actors in their own right have equally been at the fore front in promoting and participating in their own south – south co-operation albeit with difficulties. Currently CSOs have different forum for sharing experiences and knowledge on poverty reduction, advocating for human rights, debt cancellation, removal of conditionalties, and fighting human rights abuse.

Focus on issues such as human rights have created tension between CSOs and governments of the day. This has resulted into visiting activist being locked up in police cells or being denied right of entry by the violating country. For example the Southern Africa people’s Solidarity Network – the main host of people summit does face numerous challenges in hosting meetings across the region, because of visa restrictions, and political considerations. In 2007
a host of activists from Zimbabwe were denied entry into Zambia for being a threat to the state of Zambia. This was after being locked up for questioning for several hours. The same experience is repeated at the continental level, where hosting of the African Social Forum - A forum for sharing ideas, experiences and exchanging knowledge on trade, debt, aid, human rights, gender e.t.c create a lot of tension between government and CSOs.

Co-operation between Southern CSOs on debt campaign issues saw many of the African governments receive debt relief, and also reforms in aid conditionalities. AFRODAD with her partners for example worked closely with CSOs in Liberia to push for the cancellation of the country’s debt.

On the capacity building front, co-operation in the context of South – South Co-operation has seen cross pollination of ideas for organisational and program management. IBON international based in the Philippines for example had personnel exchange with the Kenya Debt Relief Network based in Nairobi. The objective was to build the capacity of the personnel with the view of improving program management as well as the institutional capacity in the organisational administration. KENDREN had a gap in organisational program management while IBON international was constrained in understanding the African terrain in the context of work operations. In this regard the two institutions signed an agreement of six months for an exchange program. KENDREN sent its program manager to IBON international while IBON international sent an outreach officer. After six months the two personnel returned to their respective organisations. This contributed immensely to the quality of work. Similar exchanges can be found between AFRODAD based in Zimbabwe and Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development in 2008.

South – South Co-operation in the context of CSOs has seen tremendous growth over the years. However they have continued to operate parallel and in an antagonistic manner to the Official South – South Co-operation. This is largely due to lack of dialogue forum for discussions of critical issues. Furthermore governments in South – South co-operation are yet to see the real value of CSO participation in South – South co-operation. This is particularly so given the prominence given to trade and investment in the co-operation.

Most of the reforms taken to improve the south – South co-operation appear to be geared towards creating enabling environment for trade and investment, and little towards improving social and cultural exchanges. CSOs in the South – South continue to experience disenabling environment for their work through, restriction in the movement of people across the borders as well as legal and regulatory framework for CSO operations in many countries involved in South-South Co-operation.

**Conclusion**

The largest impediment, for the south – south co-operation is limited or no participation of the citizens of the beneficiary countries in needs assessment, project design and implementation. This is further compounded by the lack of frameworks and structures by the providers of south – south co-operation to consult widely beyond the immediate beneficiaries of a project usually the government or the private sector. Furthermore there is little co-ordination South-South Co-operation provides in sector of common interest. The national interest of the provider seems to discourage co-ordination.

At another level the absence of an overall national policy on South-South cooperation make it difficult for African countries to pursue South-South Co-operation in a comprehensive manner. Even with political declaration for the support for South-South Co-operation at the highest political level, legal reforms and institutional and policy framework have not been set up to guide the engagement.
Policy Recommendations

The relationship between Africa and Southern partners in the South-South Co-operation have increased resources available for development. Africa must therefore take the advantage of the opportunities and enhance their engagement in the co-operation.

For African Governments

Mainstream South-South cooperation into national development strategies

South – South cooperation provides new opportunities for the continent to comprehensively address their development challenges. This is largely due to their potential to enhance Africa’s capacity to deal with the challenges of poverty, poor infrastructure, development of productive capacity, food security, energy, financial and economic crises. African countries should adopt a well-defined strategy for South-South cooperation to ensure that it maximises its participation in the co-operation. South-South cooperation needs to be mainstreamed into national development strategies if Africa is to realise these benefits. In this regard African governments should endeavour to ensure that south – south co-operation are aligned to the national development plan.

Develop a strong Policy and institutional framework

The absence of a national policy on South-South cooperation and the lack of mechanisms to coordinate the activities of different implementing agencies make it difficult for African countries to pursue South-South cooperation in a comprehensive manner. Many countries lack a long-term comprehensive policy on South-South cooperation, and appear to be guided by political statements and directives from those in position of power with no policy and institutional framework. Decisions on south – south cooperation based projects are taken at various levels including office of the heads government, ministry of finance and the line ministry with little or no co-ordination among themselves. Furthermore the institutions lack credibility among other stakeholders because of the non-inclusive nature of the co-operation.

This scenario has greatly contributed to the passive nature of Africa’s participation in the current South – South co-operation.

It is therefore important in going forward for the political commitment is backed up by strong policy and institutional framework. The framework must promote democratic ownership, transparency and accountability and development results. Such a framework should be an outcome of an extensive consultation, bringing together representatives of central and local Government, South – South providers, civil society and the private sector. The end result should be a framework that clearly sets out how the Government will participate in the South – South co-operation and ensure that such co-operation will contribute to poverty reduction, and people’s empowerment. The South – South partners should endeavour to give their support, and investment in line with national priorities.

Create Enabling environment for Civil Society Organisations

Civil society organisations continue to assume more responsibilities and gaining greater visibility and influence both at national and regional levels. CSOs are involved in the delivery of human services such as education, health care, credit and economic support, and conflict resolution. Still others are focused on such issues as civil rights for women and minorities, other human rights, environmental protection, democratic governance, corruption and abuse of power. Their mandates also range from monitoring government commitments to spend money on poverty reduction, and fostering the participation of communities in the development process. Through the mobilization of constituents and resources, CSOs can influence national policies and their implementation.
However, despite their growing presence and importance, civil society organizations, have been locked out of the official South – South co-operation especially on trade development program and investment processes. The co-operation seem to acknowledge the existence of only two spheres – the market and the state. As a consequence, the civil society sector’s ability to participate in the South – South policy debates, investment and development programs has been seriously hampered and its potential for contributing to the solution of the problems of the South under the South – South co-operation is often challenged or ignored.

Governments continue to attempt to find ways of controlling and silencing civil society organisations. Most of the NGO Laws seek to constrain and limit the space for civil society, compromise their independence and clampdown on their operations at the national level. This scenario has greatly contributed to suspicion and lack of partnership between CSOs and their governments in the South – South co-operation arrangements. There is therefore the need for Governments across the continent to work with CSOs to develop the relevant legislation and institutional framework that not only anchors CSOs’ legitimacy within the country’s development framework but also maximises their contribution in the development process in their countries.

**Broaden the Ownership of South South Co-operation**

‘We believe strongly that popular participation is in essence, the empowerment of the people to effectively involve themselves in creating the structures and in designing policies and programmes that serve the interests of all as well as to effectively contribute to the development process and share equitably in its benefits’.

*African Charter for Popular participation in development and Transformation (Arusha, 1990)*

unless South – South Co-operation introduces CSO’s input as key stakeholders in the in this co-operation, in Africa it will fall far short of the enunciated African Charter for popular participation in development and transformation where the desire of heads of state in the region to have Africa civil society actively engaged in the process of policy development and implementation in the Africa.

Participation of CSOs in South – South co-operation has the potential of broadening ownership of the co-operation and development projects and programs. It will put people at the centre of the co-operation and address the current gaps which depict the co-operation as full of policies aimed at the people and projects developed in the name of the people. As the ultimate owners and recipients of the goods and services produced by governments of the south, Civil society must become the most critical stakeholders in South – South co-operation and as such ought to be given the opportunity to participate in shaping the policies and programs. Furthermore to ensure effective national ownership of the process and outcomes of the evolving partnerships in the South, African governments should make efforts to get parliaments, the private sector and civil society more involved in the process of negotiations, project design, implementation and evaluation. This will increase transparency and accountability and increase the likelihood that resources will be used in pursuit of national development goals and priorities. It will also reduce public scepticism and give more credibility to the partnerships.

**Keep the public debt to sustainable level**

The increased availability of concessional loans from South – South co-operating partners has increased access to finance for several countries in the region. It is however important that African countries avoid the debt trap that befell them prior to the HIPC initiatives. Countries should borrow mainly for projects that can self-finance themselves at no extra costs to the public. Furthermore it is desirable that African countries develop a comprehensive debt manage-
ment policy and strategy to guide the borrowing and the repayment framework.

Coordinate the support from partners

Africa countries must exercise leadership role in co-ordinating the support of South – south co-operation that flow into their countries. In this regard, it is imperative that governments develop or strengthen existing national aid management policies and coordination frameworks to enhance local ownership of development processes and outcomes. This will further address the transaction costs associated with the multiplicity of partnership initiatives arising from many complex procedures of the South – South provider.

Recommendations for regional and multilateral institutions

(a) Coordinate the capacity development of public institutions that deal with South - South Co-operation particularly those that manage statistics and collection of information on Africa-South cooperation. Failure to use reliable data and information emerging the development finance activities of South – South co-operation has made it difficult for African countries to assess the impact of South – South co-operation in the overall poverty eradication efforts. African regional organizations such as the African Union commission and NEPAD, in collaboration with the United Nations, should develop a database on Africa-South cooperation. This will allow for an identification of best practices for cross learning;

(b) Provide more research support. Despite the increasing engagement of Africa in South – South co-operation, there are relatively very few think tank, academic, and research institutions that guide the continent both at regional and national level on the development effectiveness of their engagement of South – South co-operation. There therefore the need for create and develop national and regional institutions of excellence of South – South co-operation that carry out rigorous and systematic country and regional studies of the impact and sustainability of South – South co-operation activities in the region as well as give African policymakers the information needed to make decisions on cooperation with South – South co-operation providers. In this regard, African regional organizations as well as the United Nations and other multilateral institutions should scale up their support in this area.

(c) Establish financing facilities for South -South cooperation. Regional and multilateral finance institutions should make more resources available for support of South-South cooperation projects and initiatives. Inadequate resources due to poor access continue to inhibit the growth of intra Africa and Africa-South cooperation. Funding instruments in the form of trust fund should be established with national countries making substantial contribution. The funds should largely be directed towards supporting intra - regional co-operation as well as boosting the co-operation of African participation in the South – South co-operation.

References
Tatjana Chahoud (2007); South-South Cooperation – Opportunities and Challenges for International Cooperation German Development institute;
UNDP 2009; ENHANCING SOUTH!SOUTH AND TRIANGULAR COOPERATION:
Study of the Current Situation and Existing Good Practices in Policy,Institutions, and Operation of South-South and Triangular Cooperation
UNCTAD 2010 “South-South cooperation: Africa and the new forms of development partnership
Matrix A – Asia SSC mapping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Agency or Institution</th>
<th>Rationale for Supporting SSC or the policy or knowledge exchange platform, multilateral organization etc</th>
<th>Partners/Recipients</th>
<th>Thematic sectors/areas as covered</th>
<th>Implementation on cycle management, modalities and methodologies</th>
<th>Major Outcomes</th>
<th>CS participation*</th>
<th>Good Practice</th>
<th>Bad Practice</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Thailand International Developmen Cooperation Agency (TICA)</td>
<td>Thailand aims at helping other developing countries achieve sustainable economic and social development through development cooperation by utilizing either her own expertise or the knowledge which was gained from her development partners, or the marriage of the two components.</td>
<td>South Asia (Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan), Southeast Asia (Laos, Central Asia Middle-East (Jordan, Iraq), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Africa (Senegal, Madagascar, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan, Egypt, Mozambique) Latin America and the Caribbean, Asian Economic cooperation framework (ACMECS, GMS,ASEAN-IAI, IMT-GT, BIMSTEC), European Union, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF.</td>
<td>agriculture, health, and education</td>
<td>Modalities of development cooperation partnership: 1) bilateral 2) trilateral 3) regional - Major types of cooperation activities include technical cooperation projects, third country training programme (TCTP), third country expert programme (TCEP) - Focus on technical cooperation for capacity development. Implemented through various activities, ranging from training courses, study tours, and study programmes, to the secondment of experts and volunteers, the provision of equipment</td>
<td>Much of Thailand’s ODA helped promote public health and better education, reduced human trafficking, built roads, dams and power infrastructures, and helped promote regional trade.</td>
<td>One cited case study is the role of Mae Fah Luang Foundation(MFLF) in aiding impoverished hill tribe villagers. The foundation, which is under Royal Patronage, was reported to succeed in poverty alleviation and opium crop elimination.</td>
<td>Thailand is active in engaging various partners, from multilateral organizations, traditional donors, Southern governments, and CSOs for development cooperation.</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td><a href="http://www.jica.go.jp/cdstudy/about/output/pdf/Thailand.pdf">http://www.jica.go.jp/cdstudy/about/output/pdf/Thailand.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Provider of SSC or the policy or knowledge exchange platform, multilateral organization etc

2 Includes mechanisms and policies for cs participation; actual cases of cs participation and impact
and financial support for organizing seminars and conferences
- Supports involvement of “private sector” in development cooperation among the South, by sponsoring various institutions in Thailand such as the Mekong Institute and International Institute for Trade and Development in development programs extended to public and private sector in developing countries

| 2) Asia Foundation | The Foundation collaborates with private and public partners to support leadership and institutional development, exchanges, and policy research. Many of the leading policy and research organizations in Asia have been grantees and partners of the Foundation. In recent years the Foundation has expanded its Modalities of development cooperation partnership:
| Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pacific Island Nations, Philippines, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor Leste, Vietnam | and financial support for organizing seminars and conferences
| | - Supports involvement of “private sector” in development cooperation among the South, by sponsoring various institutions in Thailand such as the Mekong Institute and International Institute for Trade and Development in development programs extended to public and private sector in developing countries
<p>| | governance, law, civil society, women empowerment, education, fair elections, effective and transparent government, governanc, environmental protection, disaster management | NA | The foundation recognizes the important role of CSOs in achieving development objectives. In Mindanao, it acknowledged the effectiveness of working hand in hand with CSOs to resolve challenges to peace and security issues. |
| | | | NA |
| | | | NA |
| | | | <a href="http://asiafoundation.org/">http://asiafoundation.org/</a> |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internationally based policy work with these organizations to explore policy and practice around the issue of development cooperation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Development and Aid Effectiveness: TAF aims to bring together traditional and emerging Asian donors to aid in shaping perspectives and ideas on international development cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Economic Development: supports Asian initiative that enhance economic governance aimed at accelerating and sustaining broad-based economic growth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Elections: TAF encourages free and fair elections in Asia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Environment: ensures environmental sustainability critical to Asia's development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Exchanges: facilitates exchange programs to strengthen US-Asia relations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Governance programs: support local initiatives aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and responsiveness of governance in Asian countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Law Programs: support Asian efforts to protect legal rights of vulnerable groups, strengthen dispute resolution processes, and reform laws.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Regional cooperation: works to strengthen international, international relations, economic reform, philanthropy, justice, access to information, conflict management, domestic violence, gender equity, corruption, and development cooperation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3) Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

| Under the J-SEAM (Japan – Southeast Asian Meeting for South-South Cooperation) scheme, JICA promotes the formulation of South-South cooperation projects such as Third-Country Training and Third-Country Expert over its yearly cycle. Activities include their Annual Meeting for discussion on needs and needs-resource matching among member countries, Project

| Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Lao PDR, Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Timor Leste, India, Bangladesh, China, Mongolia, Pakistan, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia

| - Infrastructure development (Transport and Energy) - Human Resource Development (Public Sector Capacity Building, Labor and Employment, and Higher Education) - Information and Communication Technology

| Modalities of development cooperation:

| 1) bilateral 2) trilateral 3) regional

| Main types of support to SSC:
- Third Country Training Programme (TCTP)
- Third Country Expert Programme (TCE)
- Partnership Programme for SSC

| JICA’s SSC Project Categories:
- Effective use of the resources of developing countries;
- Dissemination of the outcomes of Japan’s technical cooperation;
- Collaboration between

| Formulation of good quality South-South Cooperation projects
- Capacity development through the participatory learning process
- Mobilization of ‘new’ resources: The evolving roles of SSC participants

| - Growing cost for complex coordination; it became difficult for a single donor to justify and bear all costs; One of the limitations of a single-donor regional framework
- Intangible and

| http://www.jica.go.jp/english/operations/ thematic_issues/south/project09.html
http://www.jarc.com.net/?page=iai
http://www.jarcom.net/?page=iai

| Networking and Learning Together: Experiences in South-South and Triangular Cooperation in |
| Formulation Activities (fact-finding missions, study missions, workshops and seminars) and quarterly monitoring of project formulation activities. | Japan and other donors; Support for TCDC; Support for developing countries to become donors (support for 'donorization') Triangular Cooperation Main activities of J-SEAM: Conduct of an annual meeting at the practical level; Dispatch of project formulation study missions Conduct of workshops and seminars to facilitate project formulation; Coordinating activities between beneficiary countries and resource countries to facilitate project formulation | longer-term benefits of capacity development and mutual learning; it became difficult to verify the intangible benefits of capacity development, which take time to be realized; Multifaceted nature of SSC; the perceived benefits of SSC projects differ greatly among stakeholder groups, thus making strategic decisions on triangular cooperation | Asia (A JICA/UNDP Publication, Nov 2009) |

| - Regional economic Integration (Trade in Goods and Services, Customs, Standards and Investments) | - Regional economic Integration (Trade in Goods and Services, Customs, Standards and Investments) | - Regional economic Integration (Trade in Goods and Services, Customs, Standards and Investments) | - Regional economic Integration (Trade in Goods and Services, Customs, Standards and Investments) |
| 4) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP Special Unit on SSC) | UNDP promotes South-South cooperation “as a way of enhancing the exchange of best practices and support among developing countries, regardless of their levels of development.” | JICA, South Korea, India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) Facility | Disaster prevention, water, health, trade and investment | Modalities: 1) Bilateral 2) Regional 3) Trilateral | NA | “The Special Unit and UNDP also work with civil society organizations in advancing South-South cooperation. According to the electronic survey, 37 percent of country offices reported supporting South-South cooperation through non-governmental organizations. A UNDP initiative that deals directly with non-governmental organizations is the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Small Grants Programme (SGP). SGP supports nongovernmental and community-based | The SSC unit has deep experience with engagement of CSOs in development cooperation | - Mismatch among the mandate, resources and implementation strategy of the Special Unit - Lack of clear partnerships strategies to support or strengthen SSC within the United Nations development system or among countries of the South | [http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/about/Background.html](http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/about/Background.html) - Executive Summary of Evaluation of UNDP’s work in SSC [http://web.undp.org/evaluation/documents/cumulative/ssc/chapter2-undp-ssc.pdf](http://web.undp.org/evaluation/documents/cumulative/ssc/chapter2-undp-ssc.pdf) |
| 5) UNEP | The experiences and successes that many countries of the Global South have achieved in environment-related areas can provide valuable impetus, ideas and means for other countries in the South to address similar concerns and challenges; South-South Cooperation can increase the flow of information, resources, expertise and knowledge among developing countries at | India, Sri Lanka, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Nepal, Bangladesh, China | **environment** | Modalities: 1) regional 2) bilateral  
Key activities undertaken by the SSC Coordination Unit specifically to promote the application of SSC arrangements in the work of UNEP:  
- Development and implementation of a UNEP policy guidance to support the systematic integration of SSC approaches in the UNEP programmes of work.  
- Development of a UNEP SSC exchange mechanism to facilitate easy access to and delivery of expertise, technology, experiences, training opportunities, advisory services, methodologies and tools | While UNEP has standing partnerships with governments in the Asian region, it has yet to broaden its modalities of cooperation to engage more actors.  
- There is an implementation gap between stated policy commitments in the Medium Term Strategy, the Bali Strategic Plan and relevant Governing Council Decisions on the one hand and efforts to apply South-South Cooperation |
reduced costs; and technology transfer among developing countries and capacity building in environmentally sound use of technologies and sustainable management of natural resources are key for the development of the south. UNEP is committed to promoting SSC as a means of supporting capacity building efforts in developing countries and countries with economies in transition through systematic partnership-building and the exchange of expertise, experiences, best practices in support of UNEP's capacity building initiatives.

- Holding regular and targeted consultations, discussions, workshops and briefing sessions with UNEP divisions as well as relevant individual staff to promote the adoption and systematic application of the SSC guidelines and the integration of south-specific approaches in the on-going and proposed capacity building activities of UNEP divisions.

- In close cooperation with UNEP Regional Offices and divisions, identifying areas of priority for incorporation of SSC approaches in the UNEP programme of work.

- Liaising and consulting with UNDP Special Unit for South-South Cooperation, other UN agencies, relevant MEA Secretariats, regional cooperation mechanisms and on-going South-South approaches in project activities on the other.

- The outcomes of various relevant South-South Cooperation activities, including workshops, are not institutionalized or reported on after they are completed, through for example, ongoing evaluations, or through the monitoring of outcomes of such workshops and activities.

- There is
Cooperation initiatives to establish strategic partnerships, develop joint activities and synergies in advancing SSC in support of UNEP’s capacity building efforts in the context of the BSP.

- Convening the solution forum on environment and climate change during the annual Global South-South Development EXPO to demonstrate SSC case studies and initiatives that provide successful solutions to problems through effective leadership, innovation, partnerships and replicability.

- Developing and implementing communication and outreach activities comprising regular briefing notes, updates and progress reports on the status of implementation of UNEP’s SSC initiatives and providing regular briefings and updates to also the perception that South–South Cooperation is a relatively more expensive and less efficient undertaking than traditional modes of capacity-building.

- While UNEP is working to become more responsive to country demands and needs, particularly through deeper engagement with UN Country Teams (UNCTs),
CPR sessions, individual diplomatic missions, regional cooperation mechanisms, other UN agencies and other intergovernmental organisations and processes. A website for UNEP's efforts in SSC is part of the SSC exchange mechanism.

- Liaising with regional cooperation mechanisms and donor agencies to leverage complementary technical and financial resources for identified SSC activities.

there still exists some residual challenge(s) of adequate alignment of UNEP's capacity building activities with national priorities and needs, which in turn pose challenges to the delivery of these activities through South–South Cooperation modalities.

As the offices are often isolated from one another, there is a need for greater internal
6) **China**  
China aims to strengthen South-South Cooperation "to optimize the foreign aid structure and ways of cooperation, and increase the technical and economic assistance in projects related to the improvement of people's livelihood and welfare, public facilities and capacity building that could help the developing countries on independent development."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Cooperation Fields</th>
<th>Modalities</th>
<th>Main Forms of Support to SSC</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Russia, Turkey, Philippines, Laos, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Iran, Afghanistan, African countries, Bangladesh, Cuba, North Korea, New Zealand | Agriculture, infrastructure, education, healthcare, industries, science and technology, trade | 1) trilateral (e.g. program with ILO and other southern countries on decent work) 2) regional (e.g. program on ASEAN, African countries) 3) bilateral | - Strongened cooperation in the fields of agriculture, trade and investment  
- Application technology institutions have greatly strengthened their R&D capacities and have mastered matured technology, expertise and equipment. In recent years.  
- There is no explicit mention of CSO participation in major SSC programs and reports | - Lack of transparency  
- Lack of engagement with CSOs on SSC programs | http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/national_dg_space/China.htm |
"Chinese aid is essentially "mutual help between developing countries," providing an alternative to donors who impose political conditions on aid recipients."

| 7) Indonesia | ASEAN countries | Agriculture, human resources, conflict resolution, education, infrastructure | Modalities: 1) bilateral 2) trilateral 3) regional | Indonesian Technical Cooperation Programs (ITCP) which was established in 1981, has continuously offered TCDC Programs to all developing countries. ITCP is a mean to share the Indonesian experience among the developing countries in the effort to develop knowledge, expertise and development vision to address common critical needs and problems in development. Further improve the system of information exchange to facilitate matching of technical capacities and needs, thereby through At present ITCP has covered more than 90 countries and more than 4000 participants of Asia Pacific, Africa and Latin America. | CSO participation on development efforts is recognized by the Indonesian government. A case in point is the active engagement of International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID) in government initiatives | - N/A | - N/A | [http://isstc.setneg.go.id/index.php/about-us](http://isstc.setneg.go.id/index.php/about-us) |
| 8) Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) (South Korea) | KOICA seeks to: | - enhanced knowledge and understanding of strategic capacities and needs, intensifying transfer of knowledge and skills among developing countries. |
| | a) promote the welfare of the peoples of SOUTH ASIA and to improve their quality of life; | |
| | b) to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and to provide all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to realise their full potentials; | |
| | c) to promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of SOUTH ASIA; | |
| | d) to contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another's problems; | |
| | e) to promote | |
| | Africa (Tunisia, Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Egypt, Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Djibouti), Cambodia, Philippines, Laos, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala, Kazakhstan, China, Japan | |
| | Education, Health, Rural development, Governance, IC&T, Industry and energy, Environment and Gender, Disaster relief and reconstruction, MDGs, | |
| | Modalities: | |
| | 1) Bilateral | |
| | 2) Regional | |
| | Methodologies: | |
| | 1) Capacity building | |
| | 2) Training programmes | |
| | Major programs: | |
| | > Initiative for Africa Development (KIAD) | |
| | The initiative aims to support the capacity building of African countries by sharing with them past experiences of development of South Korea pledging to triple official development assistance (ODA) to Africa from the 2005 figures of $39.1 million to $100 million by 2008. | |
| | > International Cooperation Training Centre (ICTC) | |
| | The International Cooperation Training Centre (ICTC) or KOIKA Training Centre was established in to provide capacity building for | |
| | - More than 20,000 people have taken part in the International Cooperation Training Centre since its foundation in 1991 | |
| | - The strengthening of South Korea – Africa partnership has contributed to increasing trade between African countries and South Korea. In South America, the country has initiated a process of approximation with Brazil and Mercosur aiming to create trade opportunities between South Korea and this South American bloc. | |
active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields;
f) to strengthen cooperation with other developing countries;
g) to strengthen cooperation among themselves in international forums on matters of common interests; and
h) to cooperate with international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes.

9) South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

SAARC objectives:
a) to promote the welfare of the peoples of SOUTH ASIA and to improve their quality of life;
b) to accelerate economic growth, social progress and public administration of developing countries. The KOICA Training Centre is the major training facility of KOICA for promoting the development of international training programs and international cooperation programs as well as providing accommodations for until 300 participants.

Main types of SSC support:
- economic, technical cooperation;

Modalities for development cooperation:
1) bilateral
2) multilateral
3) regional

Major programs:
NA

"SAARC Leaders have attached high priority to the promotion of people-to-people contacts in the region to strengthen mutual understanding and goodwill among the peoples of South Asia. While SAARC is an

http://www.saarc-sec.org/Charter/5/
cultural development in the region and to provide all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to realise their full potentials;
c) to promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of SOUTH ASIA; d) to contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another's problems;
e) to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields;
f) to strengthen cooperation with other developing countries;
g) to strengthen cooperation among people Contacts, Poverty Alleviation, Science and Technology, Security aspects, Social development, Tourism

> Food Security Initiatives
Under the aegis of SAARC-FAO collaboration, through expert-level meetings (2003-2005), regional projects on Food Security, Integrated Pest Management (IPM) and Trans-boundary Animal Diseases (TADs) were drawn up. By February 2005, SAARC Member States finalized the Global Framework for containment of the Priority Trans-boundary Animal Diseases (GFTADs) for South Asia.

The First Meeting of the Secretaries dealing with Poverty Alleviation (Colombo, 6-7 August 2006) underscored the need for policy prioritization for better utilization of the budgetary resources so as to have the desired impact on poverty reduction in this important decade. It agreed that sustained efforts were needed, inter alia, to: (a) deepen pro-poor orientation of growth process; (b) enhance inter-governmental Association, successive Summits have emphasized on the importance of promoting people-to-people contacts at all levels outside the State sector. In order to give effect to this concept, a number of initiatives have been taken under the aegis of SAARC."
themselves in international forums on matters of common interests; and

h) to cooperate with international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes.

The Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT) is a growth region drawing upon strong economic complementarities, geographical proximity, and close historical, cultural and linguistic ties.

Subregional cooperation under IMT-GT is an initiative by the governments of the IMT countries to accelerate economic development in less developed provinces. It began in 1993, and has since

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modalities for development cooperation:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) bilateral 2) sub-regional 3) triangular</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Main type of SSC support: technical cooperation

Major program: Implementation Blueprint 2012-2016

Sector strategies:

(i) In transport and energy, the strategy is to enhance the subregion’s connectivity, with particular focus on the priority connectivity corridors; while in energy, the focus will be on the sustainable development of the energy sector and in ensuring security, reliability, and cost-effectiveness of energy

<table>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is no explicit mention of civil society participation in the 2012-2016 implementation strategy

grown to include 32 provinces and states, with population exceeding 70 million.

The IMT-GT consists of:

- 14 provinces in southern Thailand: Krabi, Nakhon Si Thammarat, Narathiwat, Pattani, Phattalung, Satun, Songkhla, Trang, Yala, Chumphon, Ranong, Surat Thani, Phang Nga, Phuket;
- 8 northern states of Peninsular Malaysia: Kedah, Kelantan, Melaka, Negeri Sembilan, Penang, Perak, Perlis and Selangor;
- 10 provinces of Sumatra, Indonesia: Aceh, Bangka-Belitung, Bengkulu, Jambi, Lampung, North Sumatra, Riau, Riau Islands,

 supply.

(ii) In trade and investment, the strategy is to pursue tangible, cost-efficient, and results-oriented action in the areas of regulation, public–private sector collaboration, and the provision of business services in areas where demand exceeds supply.

(iii) In agriculture, the strategy is to promote investments in production, processing, and marketing of agricultural products, with government focusing on reducing or eliminating the constraints to these investments; and at the subregional level, undertaking measures to promote coordination of policies and standards to facilitate production, as well as investment and trade-related initiatives to promote investments in the agriculture supply chain.

(iv) In Halal products and services, the strategy is three-pronged: (i) the development of regulatory processes and standards to maintain Halal integrity; (ii) the development
| 11) UNICEF | There are a number of issues of growing significance and common concern for countries across the region where greater cooperation within a South-South framework will potentially deliver significant Region-wide Child rights, agriculture | Modalities: 1) Regional cooperation 2) trilateral 3) micro or intraregional cooperation Types of cooperation: 1) cost-sharing arrangements 2) joint researches and development projects 3) third-country training programmes | Particularly for South Asia, UNICEF has engaged CSOs such as Asamaan (Nepal) and Mamidipudi Venkataramagaiya Foundation (India) NA NA - Many of the SSC activities have been short-term and had relatively low impact; some agreements and declarations are not available http://www.unicef.org/eapro/South-South_Cooperation_for_Child_Rights.pdf |
benefits for children. Given, for example, the widening disparities that are accompanying progress towards the MDGs, greater effort is required to reach and empower the poorest and most vulnerable children. Sharing knowledge and experiences on dealing with issues of disparity in child outcomes and inequity in public resource allocations would be valuable in helping countries to develop effective policies to address the situation of those in the bottom wealth quintile."

being implemented
- Idea sharing is often confused with the more useful education, training and capacity building, all of which require targeted design, more resources in terms of hours for the trainers and the trainees and some level of immersion.

- Lack of coordination, no data banking, and no systemic data
<p>| 12) Singapore | The Singapore Cooperation Programme (SCP) was established in 1992 to serve as the primary platform through which Singapore offers technical assistance to other countries. Given our limited resources, we share our experience and expertise – in particular, in human resource development and economic development – with other countries in lieu of providing direct financial assistance. | ASEAN countries, Qatar, Jordan, Botswana | economic development, trade and tourism promotion, education, environment and urban development, health care, disaster management and emergency preparedness, information communication technology, land transport and port management, and public | Modalities: 1) bilateral 2) regional 3) trilateral | Main type of cooperation: technical cooperation Programs in support of SSC: - The Initiative for ASEAN Integration - Singapore Cooperation Programme Training Award - Small Island Developing States Technical Cooperation Programme - Post-tsunami Reconstruction Projects - Third-country Training Programmes (TCTP) | Available evaluation of SSC engagements center on partnerships with international and regional bodies such as UNICEF and ADB. | - There is no explicit mention of CSO participation in major SSC programs and reports | NA | NA | <a href="http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/national_dg_space/Singapore.html">http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/national_dg_space/Singapore.html</a> | mining and data analysis regarding SSC or trilateral cooperation; raises the risk of competition and redundancy |
| 13) India | India has one of the oldest programmes of cooperation for development among developing countries, if not the oldest one with four decades of experience since the Indian Technical and Economical Cooperation (ITEC) was established in 1964. Under ITEC and its corollary SCAAP (Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme) 156 countries in Asia, East Asia, Central Asia, Africa and Latin America have benefited from India’s experience in technical and cooperation. | administration, governance and law, agriculture, education and training, public administration, science and technology, environment, infrastructure, trade, social development | Modalities: 1) bilateral 2) trilateral 3) regional | ITEC training programs have contributed to capacity building and human resource development in many parts of the world. As a result of various activities under ITEC programme, there is now a visible and growing awareness among other countries about the competence of India as a provider of technical know-how and expertise as well as training opportunities, consultancy services and feasibility studies. Over the years, the technical and economic assistance programme of Ministry of External Affairs includes civil society organizations in the list of eligible participants for the training programs. | NA | NA | <a href="http://www.itec.mea.gov.in/">http://www.itec.mea.gov.in/</a> | <a href="http://www.ilo.org/partdev/partnerships-and-relations/south-south/WCMS_182923/lang--en/index.htm">http://www.ilo.org/partdev/partnerships-and-relations/south-south/WCMS_182923/lang--en/index.htm</a> | <a href="http://www.insouth.org/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=61:india&amp;catid=31:country-windows&amp;Itemid=86">http://www.insouth.org/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=61:india&amp;catid=31:country-windows&amp;Itemid=86</a> |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ecuador, Kiribati, Brazil, Egypt, Korea(DPRK), Brunei Darussalam, El-Salvador, Kyrgyzstan, Bulgaria, Equatorial Guinea, Laos, Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Latvia, Burundi, Estonia, Lebanon, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania</td>
<td>feasibility studies and consultancy services; (iii) Deputation of Indian experts abroad; (iv) Study tours; (v) Gifting/Donation of equipment; and (vi) Aid for Disaster Relief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Special Commonwealth African Assistance Program (SCAAP)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 158 countries in Asia, East Europe (including former USSR), Central Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean as well as Pacific and Small Island countries are invited to share in the Indian developmental experience in various fields.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) declaration for decent work</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The three countries have reaffirmed their commitment to promote a job-intensive economic recovery, create a framework for sustainable growth, and promote the Decent Work Agenda through horizontal exchanges between developing countries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14) **Canaan Global Leadership**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Palestine, agriculture</td>
<td>Main modality for cooperation: Bilateral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canaan has trained ten local government and NA</td>
<td>No explicit mention of partnership with NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/partner/Existin">http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/partner/Existin</a></td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center (based in South Korea)</td>
<td>Leadership Center is to eradicate poverty and achieve sustainable development through changing the mindset of people (leaders), who then spearhead the change of mindset in their communities. Actual poverty reduction is achieved through projects and programmes that transform people’s lives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 15) Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) | ACMECS was initiated by Thailand in 2003 as an “economic cooperation strategy” with Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar. Vietnam joined in 2004. **Objectives:** - To bridge the economic Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam; Japan, South Korea Agriculture, trade and investment, industry and energy, tourism | Modalities on development cooperation: 1) bilateral 2) sub-regional The emphasis of the partnership focuses on human resource development by sharing and exchanging knowledge and experience among member countries. | During 7 years of implementation more than 200 joint projects have been completed. Trade among members and income generation have increased. Socio-economic disparities have decreased, and transport linkages have been developed. | ACMECS do not explicitly state CSO participation in its major programs | NA | NA |

disparities among members countries and promote sustainable prosperity in the sub-region.  
- To enhance capacity of the personnel and institutions in the member countries and prepare them for global competitiveness.  
- To utilize the complementary strengths to promote balanced development.  
- To transform the border areas of member countries into zones of economic growth, social progress and prosperity, for the equitable sharing of benefits.

| 16) Malaysia | In line with the spirit of South-South Cooperation, Malaysia through the MTCP shares its development | ASEAN countries, SAARC countries, North Africa and West Asian States, Pacific Islands, East and Central Europe, Central Asian | public administration, agriculture development, development |
| One of key programs is ACMECS – Human Resource Development Programme, which seeks to promote cooperation in trade, agriculture and health. | Training courses in human resource development have helped build capacity of people and institutions |

Training courses in human resource development have helped build capacity of people and institutions.

| 16) Malaysia | In line with the spirit of South-South Cooperation, Malaysia through the MTCP shares its development | ASEAN countries, SAARC countries, North Africa and West Asian States, Pacific Islands, East and Central Europe, Central Asian | public administration, agriculture development, development |
| Modalities for cooperation: 1) bilateral 2) triilateral | More than 100 short-term specialised courses are offered by more than 50 MTCP training |
| Main type of cooperation: - technical cooperation | There is no explicit mention of civil society participation in the MTCP |

| NA | NA |

http://www.insouth.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&catid=31%3Acountry-windows&id=64
experiences and expertise with other developing countries. The MTCP was first formulated based on the belief that the development of a country depends on the quality of its human resources. The programme forms part of the commitment of the Malaysian Government towards the promotion of technical cooperation among developing countries, strengthening of regional and sub-regional cooperation, as well as nurturing collective self-reliance among developing countries.

Major programme:
- Malaysian Technical Cooperation Programme (MTCP)

Over 133 countries have benefited from MTCP, especially, from ASEAN, OIC, Commonwealth Countries, G-15 and D-8 countries. The Malaysia's philosophy is to “promoting smart partnerships, regional cooperation such as that of ASEAN-East Asia and a united South-South position”.

Type of Assistance:
- Short-term specialised courses
- Long-term courses (Scholarships)
- Study visits and attachments
- Services of experts
- Socio-economic development projects
- Supply of equipment and materials

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Type of Assistance:
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- Study visits and attachments
- Services of experts
- Socio-economic development projects
- Supply of equipment and materials

Institutions, many of which are centres of excellence for training. Since its launching, more than 25,000 participants from 140 countries have benefited from the various programmes offered under the MTCP.

**17) Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)**

The main goals of the SCO are strengthening mutual confidence and good-neighbourly China, India, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan defense, tourism, trade and economy

Main type of cooperation is technical cooperation

No defined role of civil society in technical cooperation

NA

NA

NA

http://www.insouth.org/index.php?option=com_sobi2&obi2Id=94&Itemid=86
relations among
the member
countries;
promoting their
effective
cooperation in
politics, trade
and economy,
science and
technology,
culture as well as
education,
energy,
transportation,
tourism,
environmental
protection and
other fields;
making joint
efforts to
maintain and
ensure peace,
security and
stability in the
region, to move
towards the
establishment of
a new,
democratic, just
and rational
political and
economic
international
order.

The SCO
member states
occupy a
territory of
around 30 million
189 thousand
square

> Duties of Executive Committee of the Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure

1. Maintaining working relations with competent institutions of the member states and international organisations tackling issues of fighting terrorism, separatism and extremism;
2. Assistance in interaction among the member states in preparation and staging of counterterrorism exercises at the request of concerned member states, preparation and conduct of search operations and other activities in the field of fighting terrorism, separatism and extremism;
3. Joint drafting of international legal documents concerning the fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism;
4. Gathering and analysis of information coming to the RCTS from the member states, formation and filling of RCTS data bank;
5. Joint formation of a system of effective
kilometers, which makes up three fifths of the Eurasian continent, and have a population of 1.5 billion, which makes up a quarter of the planet's population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>17) Asia Pacific 18) Research Network (APRN)</th>
<th>The Asia Pacific Research Network (APRN) was established in 1998 as a result of networking including a number of conferences in 1997, where the objective to channel and focus the efforts of NGO research towards supporting the need for information, education and advocacy of grassroots organizations was recognized by a number of key Asian research organizations or non-government organizations.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17) Asia Pacific 18) Research Network (APRN)</td>
<td>China, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Philippines, Hong Kong, India, Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17) Asia Pacific 18) Research Network (APRN)</td>
<td>Agriculture, water, education, economic development, private sector, labor, women, environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17) Asia Pacific 18) Research Network (APRN)</td>
<td>Modalities on development cooperation: 1) regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17) Asia Pacific 18) Research Network (APRN)</td>
<td>Main type of cooperation: technical cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17) Asia Pacific 18) Research Network (APRN)</td>
<td>Strategies: The APRN supports research initiatives by promoting and providing resources for coordinated researches from its members and by engaging in capacity support on research and advocacy, besides doing seminars to support initiating work and researches across the region. In order to further develop cooperation among its members, the network embarked on coordinated researches beginning 2002 where members developed and APRN had worked along thematic program streams, which have led to the formation of regional and global networks operating independently of APRN, particularly on development finance and debt (Reality of Aid - Asia Pacific), agriculture and rural development (People's Coalition on Food Sovereignty), and water (Water for the People Network).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17) Asia Pacific 18) Research Network (APRN)</td>
<td>APRN itself is a network of civil society groups in the region working on different advocacies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17) Asia Pacific 18) Research Network (APRN)</td>
<td><a href="http://aprnet.org/">http://aprnet.org/</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
with established research departments. Thus, with the goal to develop at least one NGO in each target Asian country that can become a research-information provider by introducing data banking and research as a general service, the APRN was formally established in a conference in 1999. The APRN also set as one of its objectives the identification of common strategies in research-information work and the development of a common research agenda in support of the members’ respective social movements. Since 1999, the APRN has grown to 37 leading research organizations in 17 countries in implemented common research designs. APRN has produced coordinated researches on the impact of globalization on women labor and on the neoliberal subversion of agrarian reform.
Asia Pacific, and is still growing.

19) Asia Monitor Resource Center (AMRC)

As international companies increased their investment in Asia, it became clear that the poor working conditions they brought required an informed response from labour and its supporters. Asia Monitor Resource Centre (AMRC) was part of that response and was founded in Hong Kong in 1976. AMRC has developed over the years, but is still an independent non-governmental organisation (NGO) which focuses on Asian labour concerns. The Centre supports a democratic and independent labour movement.

| China, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Philippines, Hong Kong, India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia | Agriculture, water, education, economic development, private sector, labor, women, environment | Main modality on development cooperation: 1) bilateral 2) regional Main type of cooperation: technical cooperation Activities: AMRC provides information, consultation, publications, documentation, and internships, and conducts research, training, advocacy, campaigns, labour networking, and related services to trade unions, pro-labour groups, related NGOs, academics, researchers, and professionals on labour issues. | NA | NA | AMRC itself is a network of civil society groups in the region working on different advocacies | NA | NA | http://www.amrc.org.hk/node/2 |
promoting the principles of labour rights, gender consciousness, and active workers’ participation in work-related issues.

| 20) Water for the People Network | Water for the People seeks to put forward a “People’s Water Code.” This is an alternative paradigm that promotes people’s inalienable right to water and their collective right to manage this precious resource. As such, WPN is against any form of private, foreign corporate-led control—from the conservation and rehabilitation of water resources to the operation and management of water infrastructures and services. Water for the People Network | Water, private sector | Main modality of cooperation: 1) regional Main type of cooperation: technical cooperation Strategies: 1) IFI Water Watch Alert - This is a quarterly newsletter that monitors IFI-funded water projects in Asia, especially those by the Asian Development Bank. The articles collected here are contributions of organization members and affiliates. People’s Water Resource Management Strategies This is a book series on proven effective people’s water resource management systems. The publication seeks to disseminate these experiences so that other communities and countries may benefit | Outcomes: | http://www.w4pn.org/index.php/about-water-for-the-people-network.html |
asserts that the people's sovereignty on water is the long-term solution to issues and emerging threats surrounding water.

from the experiences and lessons documented.

2) Workshops and Trainings - WPN holds capacity building workshops and trainings on water issues in the region, which also serves as a venue for organizations to share experiences and consolidate water stakeholders. WPN has also developed resources such as training modules to provide a basic reference tool on instruments available for organizations pursuing advocacy/lobby work on the human right to water.

21) Asian Peasant Coalition (APC) - APC fosters close relationship with all democratic and progressive peoples' movement towards gathering their support for the plight of the peasants of the region.

Main modalities of cooperation:
1) regional
Main type of cooperation: technical cooperation
What are the core strategies of APC?
1. Movement building and resistance
   a. Focus on realizing genuine agrarian reform and food sovereignty;
   b. Resisting corporate and state aggression;

APC supports peasant organizations in over 9 countries in promoting genuine agrarian reform

APC supports peasant organizations in over 9 countries in promoting genuine agrarian reform

http://www.asianpeasant.org/content/asian-peasant-coalition-apc
including all forms of landgrabbing;

c. Strengthening the resistance of people’s movement thru the realization of access and ownership to land and ecological agriculture;

d. Strengthening and developing ecological agriculture and regeneration of ecosystems; and

e. Building community resilience to realize climate justice.

2. Strengthening and expansion of the movement

a. Strengthen people’s movement and resistance thru realization of peasants rights

b. People to people exchanges; and

c. Alliance building and consolidation of struggle thru partnership with other people’s movement and organization.

3. Strengthening governance and accountability within APC

| 22) People’s | The People’s Philippines, |   |   |   |
| Coalition on Food Sovereignty (PCFS) | Coalition on Food Sovereignty is a growing network of various grassroots groups of small food producers particularly of peasant-farmer organizations and their support NGOs, working towards a People's Convention on Food Sovereignty. | Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya... | 23) South Asian Network for Social and Agricultural Development (SANSAD) | Aims to catalyze, support and strengthen CSOs in promoting sustainable livelihood, ecological agriculture, food sovereignty, and equitable trade with a focus on the human dignity of poor and marginalized people in South Asia. | India, Nepal, Pakistan Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Civicus, Global Call to Action Against Poverty | agriculture | Main modality of cooperation: 1) subregional  
Main type of cooperation: technical cooperation  
Programs/ interventions:  
SANSAD creates knowledge that contributes to both the speed and quality of poverty reduction, with a focus on assisting those who are trapped in poverty and ecological degradation.  
SANSAD organizes mass campaigns, public debates, advocacy workshops, builds alliances, and forges | NA | SANSAD seeks to support and strengthen civil society in promoting sustainable livelihood, ecological agriculture, food sovereignty, and equitable trade with a focus on the human dignity of poor and marginalized people in South Asia. | NA | NA | http://www.sansad.org.in/about us.htm |
partnerships between civil society and Northern NGO’s with similar objectives, on issues of agriculture, poverty, hunger, food sovereignty and social development.

SANSAD attempts to go beyond activism to analyze policies and advocates at decision-making and implementation levels for policies and programmes in favor of the poor in South Asia.

SANSAD brings together farmers and trade associations, academic institutions, like-minded voluntary organization on a common platform to strengthen advocacy campaigns for policy changes with respect to hunger, poverty, agriculture and trade. SANSAD makes all efforts to involve the rural communities in all advocacy efforts.

SANSAD is continuously developing strategies to defend the livelihood of South Asia’s poor and hungry. SANSAD is developing a Resource Center that will function as a nodal agency for
| 24) Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation (GMSEC) | Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam; ADB | research, documentation, collection, analysis, and dissemination of information and reference materials. | Modalities for cooperation: 1) subregional 2) trilateral - Focus is on technical cooperation and knowledge sharing - Summits tackle activities in human resources development, joint research, and dissemination of information and intellectual assets generated in the region, with an emphasis on complementary linkages between technological and socio-economic development issues. | NA | GMSEC does not explicitly mention role of civil society organizations | NA | http://www.insouth.org/index.php?option=com_sobi2&sobi2Task=sobi2Details&sobi2Id=73&Itemid=68 | NA | NA | http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/gms-overview.pdf |

| 25) Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) | Yemen, Palestine, Algeria, China, Islamic Development Bank, European Investment Bank, Saudi Fund for Development, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Oman, Palestine, Somalia, Bahrain, Algeria, Syria, Yemen | Industry, Infrastructure (transportation, water, energy), mining, agriculture, education, housing, social development | Modalities for cooperation: 1) bilateral 2) regional 3) trilateral Main type of SSC support: grants and loans Activities: The Arab Fund activities are based on a set of | NA | Under its program for Palestine, the Arab Fund provides support to educational institutions (universities and colleges), and institutions and civil society entities concerned with | NA | http://www.arabfund.org/Default.aspx?pageid=198&mid=122 | NA | http://www.arabfund.org/Data/site1/pdf/Annual_Report_2011_E.pdf | http://www.arabfund.org/Default
social
development by
financing public
and private
investment
projects and
providing grants
and expertise.

The principal
purpose of the
Arab Fund is to
contribute to the
financing of
economic and
social
development
projects in the
Arab countries.
To attain this
purpose, the
Arab Fund
provides
financing for
economic
development
projects by
extending loans,
on
concessionary
terms, to
governments
and public
corporations and
enterprises of
member states,
giving
preference to
projects which
are vital to the
Arab World and
principles laid out in the
Establishment
Agreement. Most
importantly its activities
are directed to financing
projects which have
priority in national
development plans. The
process for participating
includes conducting a
through evaluation of a
project's technical and
economic feasibility, and
creating sound legal,
organizational and
technical structures that
guarantee the success of
the project. Furthermore,
beneficiaries must make a
reasonable contribution
to financing of a project.

The Arab Fund ensures
distribution of loans
among member countries,
in accordance with the
established criteria, it
gives priority to inter-Arab
projects which are likely
to promote cooperation
and integration among
member countries. The
Arab Fund establishes
regulations of project
implementation on best
technical and financial
terms as part of its
superlative approach.

education, health
and social
services, in
addition to rural
development,
youth
employment,
rebuilding the
old city of
Jerusalem, and
water and
sewerage
services in Gaza.
Joint Arab projects. It serves as a catalyst for encouraging the investment, directly or indirectly, of public and private capital in a manner conducive to the development of the Arab economy and provides expertise and technical support in the various spheres of economic development.

26) Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development

The Kuwait Fund extends Loans on concessionary term to finance development projects in the developing countries. The Fund also provides technical assistance to finance the costs of the feasibility studies of projects, as well as the training of expertise in the various spheres of economic development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Energy, Environment, Infrastructure, Agriculture, Water, Communication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Comoros, Chad, Yemen, Cuba, Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Sudan, Beni, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, Pakistan, Cote d'Ivoire, Swaziland, China, Togo, Mali, Cape Verde</td>
<td>Modalities for cooperation: 1) bilateral 2) trilateral 3) regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Fund may extend its assistance to different types of entities which include: 1) Central and provincial governments, public utilities and other public corporations. 2) Development institutions, whether international, regional or national.</td>
<td>Kuwait Fund seeks to strengthen civil society participation through the establishment of research centers at the Red Sea University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

nationals of the borrowing countries. In addition, the Fund subscribes in the capital of international and regional development institutions.

3) Corporate entities that undertake projects which are jointly owned by a number of developing countries; mixed or private enterprises that enjoy corporate personality, and are of a developmental nature and not merely oriented towards making of profit.

> Forms of Assistance
- Direct loans or the provision of guarantees.
- Joint or parallel financing with other international, regional or national development finance institutions.
- Making of grants-in-aid to finance technical, economic and financial studies whether in relation to projects financed by the Fund or otherwise. Such studies may be of such types as pre-investment surveys, studies for the identification of investment opportunities and projects, feasibility studies, project preparation, sectoral studies and the like.
- Advisory services in relation to technical,
| **27) Tunisian Agency of Technical Cooperation (ATCT)** | Created in 1972, the Tunisian Agency for Technical Cooperation is one of the instruments for the implementation of the national policy of technical cooperation. As a non-profit organisation, the ATCT was created from Tunisia’s will in mobilizing its human and institutional resources and know-how for the service of international cooperation. | financial, economic and legal aspects of projects or programs or development policies, or in relation to institution building in the field of development. - Subscription to the capital, or contribution to the resources of development finance institutions. - Subscription to the capital of eligible developmental enterprises. | Togo, Nigeria, France, African countries, FAO, JICA, EU, CIDA, WB, African Development Bank, JICA | environnement, agriculture, education, water, private sector development, gender, communication | Modalities for cooperation: 1) bilateral 2) trilateral 3) regional | More than 70 projects have been carried out in the framework of triangular cooperation for the benefit of developing countries mainly Arab and African countries. These projects concerned various fields such as reproductive health, agriculture, fisheries, vocational training, telecommunications, human resources management, banking, | There is no explicit mention of CSO participation in its technical cooperation programs | NA | NA | http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/afr1143.doc.htm | http://www.ctc-health.org.cn/file/06110807TunisiaEN.pdf | http://www.tunisie-competences.net.tn/default.aspx?id=230&Lg=2 |
| 28) Qatar | “South-South Cooperation derives its importance from the fact that sustained economic growth since the late 1980s has led an increasing number of developing countries to become regional centres of economic dynamism.”  
“Such importance also stems from the fact that the countries of the South can work together.” | “South-South Cooperation derives its importance from the fact that sustained economic growth since the late 1980s has led an increasing number of developing countries to become regional centres of economic dynamism.”  
“Such importance also stems from the fact that the countries of the South can work together.” | Modalities for development cooperation:  
1) bilateral 2) trilateral 3) regional  
Main types of cooperation include financial assistance and technical cooperation with developing countries  
Qatar has two main agencies involved in SSC:  
1) Department of International Development  
- Proposes the State's policy in the field of development and human assistance to support | NA | NA | There is no explicit mention of CSO participation in its development cooperation programs | NA | NA | http://www.ipsn.ews.net/2007/12/development-qatar-pledges-to-promote-south-south-cooperation/  
http://english.mofa.gov.qa/eng/art.cfm?dep_id=64 |
together in solidarity to secure and share in gains from the emerging new international trade geography, and design and implement strategies to ensure that the dynamism evident in the new geography of international economic relations is sustained and has a positive multiplier effect throughout the South.” – Amb. Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser

| economic and social development in developing countries in coordination with the competent parties. |
| - Organizing and directing development assistance in conformity with the State's priorities and international resolutions and recommendations in this regard; among other relevant function |
| 2) Department of International Technical Cooperation |
| - Identifies all the needs of government bodies in the country as well as technical cooperation activities offered by the United Nations and its competent organs and other Arab and international organizations in accordance with the set plans and programs and undertaking their implementation. |
| - Conducts researches and studies related to technical cooperation with international, regional and Arab organizations and bodies in coordination with the competent parties in the country |
| 29) Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) | Established in 1992 and entrusted with the responsibility of implementing Turkey's development cooperation policy, TIKA is also responsible for coordinating Turkey's development cooperation with national actors, as well as with international organizations and bilateral donors. TIKA is also accredited to collect and report ODA statistics of Turkey. TIKA's mission is to contribute to poverty eradication and sustainable development in partner countries. At the heart of this effort lies Turkey's own expertise and experience. Turkey shares its own expertise | UNDP, East and West African countries, Pakistan agriculture, health, culture, trade and investments | Main modality for development cooperation: 1) bilateral 2) trilateral Forms of SSC support: Official Development Assistance, technical cooperation Main operational activity of TIKA is technical cooperation for development of institutional capacity and human resources in partner countries. This is accomplished by providing training and advisory services in the fields where Turkey has a comparative advantage in terms of know-how and experience. These services are complemented by donations for capacity building. Another component of TIKA activities is the financing of infrastructure projects such as irrigation, sanitation and transportation projects, as well as, the construction or renovation of schools, hospitals, architectural objects of cultural heritage, etc. TIKA also extends humanitarian | NA | There is no explicit mention of CSO participation in its technical cooperation programs | NA | NA | http://www.insouth.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=69: turkey&catid=31: country-windows&Itemid=86 http://www.tika.gov.tr http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-development-cooperation.en.mfa |
and experience by tailoring them to fit specific needs and development priorities of partner countries.

Key projects:
- Agricultural Cooperation and Training Program For East and West African Countries
- Turcology, large scale project aimed at widening reach of Turkish language
- Various infrastructure projects (energy, telecommunications, reconstruction projects)
- Support to manufacturing sectors

30) Saudi Arabia

Almost all of Saudi Arabian ODA is provided bilaterally (95%), mainly in the form of loans, with a large share poured into other Arab countries. But in recent years, assistance to South Asia, particularly Pakistan and Bangladesh, and to East Asia is growing. China, for instance, has received roughly 15% of new Saudi Fund Over 130 countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe Women, children, health, education, agriculture Modalities on development cooperation:
1) bilateral 2) regional
Main types of SSC support:
1) official development assistance
Main programs/projects:
- AGFund
AGFUND supports sustainable human development efforts targeting the neediest in developing countries, particularly women and children, through support of the efforts strongly

No explicit mention of civil society engagement in its projects.

NA
NA
NA
commitments since 2003 (it previously did not receive any).13 The Saudi Fund, which plays a relatively minor role in distributing Saudi Arabian ODA but still accounts for a substantial share of total Arab aid flows, claims that only 50% of its aid now goes to Arab states.14

| 31) Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND) | UNDEF, Ford Foundation, Oxfam, Social Watch, UNDP, Norwegian People’s Aid, Action Aid, Civicus, Heinrich Boll Foundation, Global Call to Action Against Poverty | Trade, labor, health, economic development | Modalities on development cooperation: 1) subregional 2) multilateral | NA | ANND encourages participation of various NGOs in the subregion for development cooperation | NA | NA | http://www.annnd.org/index.php |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| The Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND) is a regional network working in 11 Arab countries with 8 national networks (with an extended membership of 200 CSOs from different backgrounds) and 30 NGO members. ANND was established in 1997 and its | | | | | | | | | |
| The AAAID was established in 1976 in Khartoum, Sudan with the primary objective of assisting in the agricultural development of the Arab world. The Authority has a number of projects in African countries. | | | | | | | | | |
headquarters is located in Beirut, Lebanon since 2000.

ANND aims at strengthening the role of civil society, enhancing the values of democracy, respect of human rights and sustainable development in the region. ANND advocates for more sound and effective socio-economic reforms in the region, which integrate the concepts of sustainable development, gender justice, and the rights-based approach.

| Collaborating among themselves and with partners in order to strengthen the capacity of Arab philanthropy to fulfill its vision. |
| Objectives: |
| - Establish strategic partnerships among foundations and with stakeholders from other sectors of society. |
| - Improve the professional capacity and conduct of Arab foundations. |
| - Enhance access to relevant information and best practice in the field of philanthropy. |
| - Build transparent, accountable and socially responsible conduct of foundations. |
| - Promote an American University of Cairo, Egypt World Congress of Muslim Philanthropists (WCMP), Worldwide Initiatives for Grantmaker Support (WINGS) |
| Activities: |
| - Improving professional conduct of Arab foundations to help them become leaders and role models in their respective countries. |
| - Allowing Arab foundations to voice their aspirations and grievances concerning future of the region. |
| - Promoting well-being of citizens in the Arab region.” |
| 33) Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) | The Gulf Cooperation Council, or GCC, is a loose political and economic alliance made up of six Gulf states. It aims to boost economic cooperation between members and, through collective security, to guard against any threat from neighbouring states and from Islamic extremism. Members: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates | media, environment, security, economy, public administration, trade, research | Modalities on development cooperation: 1) bilateral 2) regional 3) trilateral Types of SSC support - foreign grants/loans - technical cooperation Main programs: > Military cooperation The GCC States seek to build up their defence forces according to a common conception. In this context, they have unified operational procedures, training, and military curricula. They also endeavour to accomplish compatibility of their military systems. Moreover the armed forces of the GCC States carry out joint military "Among the important achievements in the military field is the creation of the Peninsula Shield Force in 1982, which incorporates the credibility of the GCC will. Another important achievement was the resolution taken during Kuwait summit in 1997, which entailed to link the GCC Member States with a military communication network for early warning." | No explicit mention of civil society participation | NA | NA | [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/gcc.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/gcc.htm) |
| 34) GIZ | The services delivered by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH draw on a wealth of regional and technical expertise and tried and tested management know-how. As a federal enterprise, we support the German Government in achieving its objectives in the field of international cooperation for sustainable development. We are also engaged in international education work around the globe. | Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan Overall: more than 130 countries worldwide | economic development and employment promotion; governance and democracy; security; reconstruction, peacebuilding and civil conflict transformation; food security; health and basic education; and environmental protection, resource conservation and climate change mitigation | Modalities for development cooperation: 1) bilateral 2) regional 3) trilateral Main types of SSC support: -Loans and grants -technical cooperation Major SSC program: > Three-Party South-South Cooperation, Central Asia - program aims to raise the position of Central Asian countries in the foreign trade category of the World Bank EDB report by 25 places. Its rating remains a relatively low 156, however this is partly tied to the country's landlocked geographic location. | "Between 2008 and 2011 Kyrgyzstan improved its rating in the foreign trade category of the World Bank EDB report by 25 places. Its rating remains a relatively low 156, however this is partly tied to the country's landlocked geographic location." | There is no specific mention of civil society participation in the SSC program for Central Asia. "A strong coalition was built up between the lead ministry and the donors. There were clear common objectives and indicators based on reliable economic studies. Each party's particular strengths and role were defined. A feeling of interdependency and synergy was fostered. Cooperation became interesting, even fun, for the professionals involved who work together to take on an exciting, shared projects. Several local partners and even some private businesses had vested interests in keeping the old system running. Trade administration procedures that are transparent and user-friendly were seen as a direct threat. Additional evidence of interdependence and synergy was the number of documents, cost and time required for export and import. | "Several local partners and even some private businesses had vested interests in keeping the old system running. Trade administration procedures that are transparent and user-friendly were seen as a direct threat. Additional evidence of interdependence and synergy was the number of documents, cost and time required for export and import. | [http://www.oecd.org/aidfortrade/47405883.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/aidfortrade/47405883.pdf) | [http://www.giz.de/en/SID-EAC6B786-5ECB74DB/aboutgiz/profile.html](http://www.giz.de/en/SID-EAC6B786-5ECB74DB/aboutgiz/profile.html) |
35) Central Asia Cooperation Organization (CACO)

The purpose of CAEC, former name of CACO, was limited to foster the economic cooperation between the four Central Asian republics and create a single economic space. When established in February 2002, CACO has been given a broader challenge. Often ministries would not want to share information or would not trust information coming from elsewhere.

scope of cooperation. CACO aims at the enhancing “the development of the economic integration in the region, the perfection of the forms and mechanisms of expansion of the political, social, scientific-technical, cultural and educational relations” between member states.

production, industrial cooperation, creation of a single transport and communication system and the area of fuel-energy resources.”
### Matrix B – Asia SSC mapping

Table of SSC country recipients in Asia and areas of cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Education and Culture</th>
<th>Environment (sustainability, disaster risk management)</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Social sectors (labor, women, youth, etc.)</th>
<th>Trade &amp; livelihood</th>
<th>Industry &amp; Mining</th>
<th>Infrastructure (transport, water, energy)</th>
<th>Public sector and security</th>
<th>Science and Technology (R&amp;D)</th>
<th>Cross-sector</th>
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<td>Philippines</td>
<td>The Asia Foundation</td>
<td>CIPS (with Colombia and Kenya), UNEP</td>
<td>Canaan Global Leadership Center, KOICA, APC, PCFS</td>
<td>ILO, The Asia Foundation, APRN, AMRC</td>
<td>China, The Asia Foundation</td>
<td>China, JICA</td>
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<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Malaysia (ASEAN-Mekong Basin Development)</td>
<td>KOICA, TICA, APC, PCFS, GMSEC</td>
<td>JICA, TICA</td>
<td>APRN, AMRC</td>
<td>China, The Asia Foundation, Malaysia (MTCP, with ASEAN and Japan), TICA</td>
<td>TICA, GMSEC</td>
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<td>APRN, AMRC</td>
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<td>Central Asia</td>
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<td>Kazakhstan</td>
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<td>GIZ, CACO</td>
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<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<td>Uzbekistan</td>
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Annex 2

Asia Mapping:
Mapping of South-South Cooperation (SSC) and Triangular Cooperation (TrC) in Asia

October 2012

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACMECS</td>
<td>Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFESD</td>
<td>Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMRC</td>
<td>Asia Monitor Resource Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANND</td>
<td>Arab NGO Network for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Asian Peasant Coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>APRN</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Research Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATCT</td>
<td>Tunisian Agency of Technical Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACO</td>
<td>Central Asia Cooperation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMSEC</td>
<td>Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBISA</td>
<td>India, Brazil and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMT</td>
<td>Indonesia Malaysia Thailand Triangle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITCP</td>
<td>Indonesian Technical Cooperation Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOICA</td>
<td>Korea International Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFAED</td>
<td>Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCFS</td>
<td>People’s Coalition on Food Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAARC</td>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>TICA</td>
<td>Thailand International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>TIKA</td>
<td>Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>WPN</td>
<td>Water for the People Network</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INTRODUCTION

- Objectives of the mapping exercise
  - To identify existing institutional mechanisms for SSC/ TrC among governments and civil society groups in the Asian region which are not covered by the current SSC/ TrC database
  - To identify the level and type of CSO participation in the mapped SSC/ TrC arrangements
  - To come up with recommendations on how to make SSC/ TrC in the region more inclusive on the level of CSO participation

- Mapping approach, scope and limitation

Two matrices were used to map out existing SSC and TrC mechanisms in Southeast Asia, East Asia, South Asia, Middle East, and Central Asia. Matrix A focuses on the various government agencies, international NGOs, subregional and sectoral networks that are engaged in SSC/ TrC. Development partners were identified, with particular emphasis on the role of civil society groups in the cooperation. Matrix B, meanwhile, listed down the countries in the entire Asian region which benefit
from SSC/ TrC and the partners which provide support to specific sectors (agriculture, education, industry, environment, etc.).

Relevant information for the matrices were gathered primarily through internet search of websites of government agencies/ CSO networks engaged in SSC/ TrC. In some instances, data available online however was not sufficient to describe the level of CSO engagement in SSC/ TrC among governments in the Asian region. Moreover, the list of profiled agencies/ CSO networks is not conclusive due to the vast scope of the mapping and the limited available time for the exercise. As for the CSO engagement in SSC/ TrC, the mapping focused on CSO networks facilitating cooperation among different Asian CSOs, instead of going through the profiling of each Asian CSO engaged in such CSO networks. It should also be noted that the SSC mapping is an ongoing exercise, and that the results presented herein serve as starting point.

The mapping exercise did not include SSC arrangements which are already profiled by the Task Force on South-South cooperation (http://www.southsouthcases.info/casosasia/), as well as the international NGOs already profiled by INSOUTH (http://www.insouth.org/index.php?option=com_sobi2&catid=2&Itemid=68).

MAJOR FINDINGS

Platforms and modalities on SSC

- Various cross-border cooperation platforms among Southern governments and civil society groups, mostly on trade and technical cooperation, exist in the Asia and Middle East region. Sub-regional mechanisms are in place for inter-governmental cooperation for Southeast Asia (ASEAN), South Asia (SAARC), Central Asia (CACO) and the Middle East (GCC).
- Civil society groups have also organized themselves at the regional/ sub-regional level into CSO networks that provide technical support and capacity development on a number of fields, such as agriculture, health, and social development.
- There is however a limited number of platforms where governments supporting SSC and civil society groups interact and collaborate to achieve development goals. Platforms for government-CSO partnerships in the region are also not institutionalized.
- Interestingly, traditional donors are working within trilateral arrangements for SSC. China, for instance, has forged a partnership with the International Labor Organization (ILO) to promote the decent work agenda in neighboring countries. In Central Asia, GIZ has put in place a sub-regional platform for cooperation among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to improve trade and business competitive rankings in the sub-region.
- Development cooperation appears to be more consolidated among civil society groups and governments in the Middle East, in comparison to Southeast Asia where mechanisms are fragmented and overlapping.
- UN bodies that are active in promoting SSC in the region are: ILO, UNDP, UNICEF, and UNEP

Rationale for supporting SSC

- Most government agencies supporting SSC emphasize its commitment to support economic development in other Southern countries in the region through financial assistance and technical support.
- As for cross-border civil society platforms, support for SSC is aimed at contributing to the achievement of development objectives and promoting the rights and welfare of different marginalized sectors.
Sectors covered by SSC

- Sectors in the region where SSC mechanisms are present include: agriculture, health, education and culture, trade and investment, social development (labor, gender, youth), infrastructure (water, energy, transportation), public administration and defense, and environment.
- Among the sectors, most SSC platforms cater to agriculture, infrastructure as well as trade and investment. There is very limited cooperation to support national industrialization programs of Southern countries in the region.

Civil society participation in SSC

- Civil society activity supporting SSC is vibrant and expanding, and is institutionalized via creation of regional/ sub-regional networks that foster knowledge-sharing and technical cooperation on various fields.
- There is however very limited recognition of CSO participation in SSC among governments and sub-regional formations in the Asia and Middle East. SSC programs of most government agencies, for instance, limit the terms of development cooperation to intergovernmental cooperation.
- But despite the limited space for engagement, CSO networks managed to come up with strategies to sustain regional/ sub-regional CSO coordination and policy stakeholder lobbying. The results of these strategies are evident in the series of continuing research meetings, consultations and crafting of policy proposals among their members from various countries in the region.

Monitoring and evaluation

- While various SSC platforms exist, only a few of them have carried out SSC program monitoring and evaluation. Most government agencies in the region do not have published annual reports on major SSC programs/ projects. Multi-lateral organizations meanwhile often have project-specific evaluations, but not overall assessment of SSC support in the region.
- Assessments of SSC support, if carried out, are based on specific quantitative outcomes and are not anchored on specific development indicators, such as promotion of human rights, social development, gender equality, among others.
# MAPPING OF CSO INVOLVEMENT IN THE PACIFIC AS PART OF THE SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION

Pacific Islands Association of Non-Government Organization (2012)

## Matrix A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Agency or Institution</th>
<th>Rationale for Supporting SSC</th>
<th>Actors Involved/ Recipients</th>
<th>Thematic sectors/areas covered</th>
<th>Implementation on cycle management, modalities and methodologies</th>
<th>Major Outcomes</th>
<th>CS participation</th>
<th>Good Practice</th>
<th>Bad Practice</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional Rights Resources Trainers (RRRT)</td>
<td>Provides human rights training, technical support, and policy and advocacy services tailored specifically for the Pacific region.</td>
<td>Fiji, Kiribati, Cook Islands, Vanuatu, Tonga, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu.</td>
<td>Legal Sector</td>
<td>Consisting of highly qualified team of legal and community development trainers design and deliver comprehensive, sustained, quality training programmes tailor-made for all levels of government and civil society, from MPs to rural community-based advocates, from social workers to judges.</td>
<td>Promotion and enforcement of human rights in the Pacific.</td>
<td>Supported advocacy and training to the Kiribati Government and local civil society organizations on CEDAW lead to the Government ratifying the Convention in early 2004.</td>
<td>To strengthen the capacity of policy makers to adopt and apply human rights principles and good governance practices;</td>
<td>To strengthen the capacity of civil society and marginalized groups to advocate, assert, monitor and defend human rights and good governance - with special focus on the poor, women and children.</td>
<td>One minor glitch is that RRRT has since become part of the intergovernmental when it joined the Secretariat of the Pacific Community and has lost its CSO advocacy approach.</td>
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<td>Running training workshops for Community Paralegals, the judiciary, lawyers, medical practitioners, teachers and police on human rights and gender equality issues, community-based women and men on their legal rights, government departments and personnel on human rights issues and CEDAW.</td>
<td>Taking rights-based approach</td>
<td>Training of the judiciary has led to growing support for human rights and a significant increase in the application of human rights conventions in courts in a number of Pacific Island countries.</td>
<td>Provided technical support to the</td>
<td></td>
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3 Provider of SSC or the policy or knowledge exchange platform, multilateral organization etc
4 Includes mechanisms and policies for cs participation; actual cases of cs participation and impact
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNDP</th>
<th>The Pacific Centre works in the areas of Crisis Prevention and Recovery; Democratic Governance; and MDG Achievement and Poverty Alleviation and is part of the Asia Pacific Regional Centre (APRC) in Bangkok.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands Government in developing a Bill of Rights within the country’s proposed new Constitution, which also includes a clause for the establishment of a Human Rights Commission.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRRT has worked in collaboration with Women, HIV and Climate change and Human Rights CSOs Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre (FWCC), Fiji Women’s Rights Movement FWRM), Soqosoqo Vaka-Marama (SVM), Fiji Council of Social Services (FCOSS), Pacific Islands AIDS Foundation (PIAF) in building their capacity and helping them make their cases to UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rights support and services to its partners in promoting good governance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP Pacific Centre assists in the funding and training of CSOs with other government partnerships in their area of work.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a UN organisation, there are times when the bureaucracy disallows them from ‘flexibility and responsiveness’ to CSO issues that may have not been planned or anticipated but they too have been able to provide.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Pacific Centre

- Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau,
- MDG Achievement and Poverty Reduction
- Technical assistance, research and capacity development with CSO organizations for HIV policy formulation and progress monitoring (GIPA and representation in High Levels meetings, UNGASS, HLM, CSW)
- Research, policy dialogue and advocacy for evidence based targeting of HIV responses in relation to mobility, gender and human rights.
- Strengthened capacities of stakeholders to develop & implement MDG-based NSDS which integrate environment, energy, climate change, poverty indicators, HIV & gender, to use costing and budgeting tools and to integrate
- The UNDP Pacific Centre assists in the funding and training of CSOs with other government partnerships in their area of work.
- Promoting UNDP priorities with partners and seeking to provide them with timely and up-to-date advice on development challenges, building on comparative experience and knowledge inside and outside of UNDP. This is done through producing country and regional reports, policy briefs, applied policy research
- As a UN organisation, there are times when the bureaucracy disallows them from ‘flexibility and responsiveness’ to CSO issues that may have not been planned or anticipated but they too have been able to provide

http://www.undppc.org/fj/index.cfm
Policy and technical support to institutionalize the MDG NA/Costing methodology in the Pacific by developing a core group of experts in 1-2 PICs through South/South Cooperation for sustainability.

Support to PIFS and Pacific civil society to: a) disseminate the outcome of the Accra HLF on aid effectiveness and b) improve implementation of the Paris Principles for better development outcomes and MDG achievement.

Support to gender responsive budgeting through: a) research and baseline analysis; b) Sub Regional/Regional workshops to strengthen capacities and institutionalize methodologies and c) support to UNDP CO to pilot implementation of GRB in 3 PICs.

Support to PIFS and Pacific civil society to: a) disseminate the outcome of the Accra HLF on aid effectiveness and b) improve implementation of the Paris Principles for better development outcomes and MDG achievement.

the MDGs into NSDS

PHDRs produced with Pacific relevant themes for human development advocacy to reduce poverty and inequalities

Regional and national responses developed that enable access of people on the move to HIV services and innovative initiatives implemented that reduce the vulnerability of women, girls and mobile populations to HIV

Appropriate policies & strategies to mitigate the impact of regional integration on vulnerable groups designed and implemented

Private sector capacities and mechanism enhanced to support

papers and codification exercises of lessons learnt for the three UNDP Pacific Offices (Suva, Apia and Port Moresby) and through them the 15 Pacific Islands Countries.

Promote regional cooperation and coordination or provide impetus for focused country-based activities which includes regional or sub-regional workshops, training and conferences.

support through lobby and advocacy
| **UNICEF Pacific** | **Mandated by the** United Nations General Assembly to advocate for the protection of children’s rights, to help meet their basic needs and to expand their opportunities to reach their full potential. | Education, health, justice, social welfare and community development. | Development of educational policy and programming nationally, drawing from a human rights-based approach to ensure equitable provision of quality education Development and integration of early childhood | Child Friendly Schools in Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, which will enhance all aspects of children’s development including health and sanitation, retention at school, a whole-of-school approach for children’s learning, disaster risk preparedness and citizenship duties. | This initiative provides the real-time data and voices from the most disadvantaged communities in selected most vulnerable PICs. Innovative approaches are being used to ensure children complete basic education and achieve learning outcomes, addressing the holistic development of the | http://www.unicef.org/pacificislands/index.html |
**UNWomen**

Established by General Assembly resolution on system wide coherence, with a mandate to assist Member States and the United Nations system to progress more effectively and efficiently towards the goal of achieving gender equality and the empowerment of women.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNWomen</th>
<th>Established by General Assembly resolution on system wide coherence, with a mandate to assist Member States and the United Nations system to progress more effectively and efficiently towards the goal of achieving gender equality and the empowerment of women.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Has a regional outlook but currently is concentrating its programming to those priority countries identified in its Regional Strategy, Papua New Guinea, Marshall Islands, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Kiribati have been selected as priority countries for special and intensive programming for the UN Women Pacific Sub-Regional Strategy, 2008-2013.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Advancing women’s political participation and good governance, to ensure that decision-making processes are participatory, responsive, equitable and inclusive.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provides policy advice, technical assistance and funding to governments, UN agencies and civil society partners.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Expanding women’s voice, ownership and participation.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Supports the administration of grants from the UN Trust Fund to End Violence Against Women.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ending violence against women.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Researching implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in the Papua New Guinean Highlands and Bougainville as well as providing support to individuals and NGOs such as Kup Women for Peace in Papua New Guinea.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Strengthening implementation of women’s peace and security agenda.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>During MDG scoping missions in Vanuatu and Solomon Islands, UN Women in the Pacific advocated for the full participation of national women’s machineries within the MDG indicators process.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Enhancing women’s economic empowerment.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supports women to reshape conditions at both ends of the economic spectrum — from boosting women’s participation in economic policy-making to supporting efforts to provide women and their communities with practical skills needed for securing sustainable livelihood.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Making gender equality priorities central to national, local</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>The National Women’s Machinery in Vanuatu is providing key guidance to mainstream gender into the process and to develop specific gender equality initiatives to achieve the MDGs through all the MDG Thematic Task Force Groups. These groups have been tasked with conducting a needs assessment within all sectors to identify relevant interventions.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Programs do not have one that looks after women living with HIV (WLHIV) Ending of Violence for WLHIV (EVAWLHIV) or women with HIV partners As a UN organisation, there are times when the bureaucracy disallows them from ‘flexibility and responsiveness’ to CSO issues that may have not been planned or anticipated but they too have been able to provide support through lobby and advocacy.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong><a href="http://www.unwomenpacific.org/">http://www.unwomenpacific.org/</a></strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Labor Organization (ILO)</td>
<td>The ILO is the international organization responsible for drawing up and overseeing international labour standards. It is the only 'tripartite' United Nations agency that brings together representatives of governments, employers and workers to jointly shape policies and programs promoting decent Work for all.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Power Association (PPA)</td>
<td>The PPA is an inter-governmental agency and member of the Council of Regional Organizations in the Pacific (CROP) to promote the direct cooperation of the Pacific island power utilities in technical training, exchange of information, sharing of senior management and engineering expertise and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Pacific Tourism Organisation (SPTO)</td>
<td>The South Pacific Tourism Organisation is the mandated inter-governamental body for the tourism sector in the region, with the mission to &quot;Market and Develop Tourism in the South Pacific&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Agency or Institution</td>
<td>Rationale for Supporting SSC</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Island Forum Secretariat (PIFS)</td>
<td>&quot;The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat is an intergovernmental organisation which aims to strengthen regional cooperation and integration and represent Members' interests. The organization plays a role in harmonising regional positions on various political and policy issues, the Secretary General of the Forum Secretariat chairs the Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific (CROP).&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
among the various intergovernmental regional organisations to work toward achieving the common goal of sustainable development in the Pacific region. CROP comprises the heads of the intergovernmental regional organisations in the Pacific.”

“Where CROP sees the need, it establishes specific working groups with clear terms of reference to address important emerging or ongoing priority issues of a cross-cutting nature.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asia Pacific University of the South Pacific</th>
<th>[USP]</th>
<th><a href="http://www.usp.ac.fj">www.usp.ac.fj</a></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme [SPREP]</td>
<td><a href="http://www.sprep.org">www.sprep.org</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Pacific Board for Educational Assessment [SPBEA]</td>
<td><a href="http://www.spbea.org.fj">www.spbea.org.fj</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Pacific Travel [SPT]</td>
<td><a href="http://www.south-pacific.travel">www.south-pacific.travel</a></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of the South Pacific [USP]</td>
<td><a href="http://www.usp.ac.fj">www.usp.ac.fj</a></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

to schools in the Pacific region
- Strategy to strengthen education planning in the region – Feasibility study
- Benchmarking Education Quality for Results in the Pacific
- Monitoring & Evaluation to Track Performance in Education in the Pacific
- Open schooling as a strategy for second-chance education
- Assessing and monitoring literacy numeracy and life skills
- Literacy Conference and Strategy
- ICT in Education in the Pacific region
- Sport in Education
- Pacific Culture & Education Strategy 2010 – 2015
- The Pacific Strategy on Disability 2010 – 2015
- Early Childhood Care and Education in the Pacific
- Regional Education

and Samoa
- Mapping of curriculum completed for Fiji, Kiribati, RMI and Tonga.
- Responding to requests from countries to assist in developing sex education curriculum. (E.g. Catholic Education Board, Samoa)
- Pacific participation in the International Consultation on homophobic Bullying in Education Institutions in Dec 2011
- A report on analysis from the national AIDS strategic plans on HIV and young people produced, including a review of 11 PICs

China's acceptance of non-PIFS principle of democracy and continued work with certain PICs who all benefit from Chinese Aid with very little known about Aid effectiveness and how these Aid is going to be paid back and the consequences which has the possibility of China being the major funding and driver of the future of PIFS, especially in the context that China is known to be very harsh to those that don't honour agreements with them as have been reported in Africa.
<p>| Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) | The goal of HDP is to contribute to the mission of the Social Resources Division, which is: &quot;To maximise the development&quot; | Community Education and Training Centre (CETC) | The HDP has a particular focus on bringing gender, youth, culture and | The Human Development Programme, in collaboration with the UNFPA and AusAID, is currently carrying out a three | Work with governments, non-government agencies and communities to promote more balanced and | Pacific Youth Bureau | Pacific Women’s Bureau | In the HIV |
|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential of Pacific Island people in health, culture and information and enhance the empowerment of women and young people.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Its mission is “To support Pacific Island countries and territories with the design and delivery of social policy, programmes and services.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The programme will focus on the following objectives for the five-year period 2008-2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 1 To assist the adoption and implementation of an integrated approach to social policy, programmes and services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 2 To build national-level capacity to respond to human and social development needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 3 To develop and strengthen networks and partnerships and improve coordination of social and human development programmes and services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 4 To strengthen knowledge and community education to the forefront of development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Programme aims to nurture an all-inclusive approach across all sectors to maximise the development potential of the entire community and help people achieve a better quality of life. The promotion of cultural industries is a key priority of the department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The study follows the Samoa Family Health and Safety Study (SFHSS) which was funded by UNFPA and implemented by SPC in 2001. Samoa represented Polynesia, and Micronesia and Melanesia are represented by Kiribati and Solomon Islands respectively. The Pacific studies are part of a WHO multi-site survey on gender-based violence, which has been conducted in ten countries across sixteen survey sites and will ultimately allow for comparisons between countries. Research on child abuse, conducted in cooperation with UNICEF, is a component of the current studies in Kiribati and Solomon Islands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The study follows on the Samoa Family Health and Safety Study (SFHSS) which was funded by UNFPA in 2001 and implemented by SPC, which is a people-centred development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve data and statistics on human development issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undertake research on emerging issues such as gender-based violence and child abuse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide training to strengthen community-based approaches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist with regional and international events such as the Festival of Pacific Arts and the Pacific Youth Festival.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
approaches for improved human development

component of the larger Pacific Multi-site Study on the effects of violence against women on family health and safety. The Multi-site Study is based on a WHO study design that was modified to suit the Samoa situation yet allowed comparison with similar studies in other parts of the world. Samoa represented Polynesia, one of three sub-regions in the Pacific. Under this current project, the two other sub-regions, Micronesia and Melanesia, are represented by Kiribati and Solomon Islands respectively.

South Pacific Geo-Science Commission (SOPAC)

The mission of the SPC is "to help Pacific island people position themselves to respond effectively to the challenges they face and make informed decisions about their future and the future they wish to leave for the generations that follow." The goal of the Applied Geoscience and Technology Division is to apply geoscience and technology to realise new opportunities for
| **Pacific Islands Development Programme (PIDP)** | The Pacific Islands Development Program (PIDP) conducts a broad range of activities to enhance the quality of life in the Pacific islands. The founding mission of PIDP, established in 1980, is to assist Pacific islands leaders in advancing their collective efforts to achieve and sustain equitable social and economic development consistent with the goals of the Pacific islands region’s people. | **Further information required from this Institution and especially if there policies, mechanisms and methodologies including good and bad practices and the involvement of Civil Society in their policies, Programs and Activities** | **Further information required from this Institution and especially if there policies, mechanisms and methodologies including good and bad practices and the involvement of Civil Society in their policies, Programs and Activities** | **Further information required from this Institution and especially if there policies, mechanisms and methodologies including good and bad practices and the involvement of Civil Society in their policies, Programs and Activities** | **Further information required from this Institution and especially if there policies, mechanisms and methodologies including good and bad practices and the involvement of Civil Society in their policies, Programs and Activities** | **Further information required from this Institution and especially if there policies, mechanisms and methodologies including good and bad practices and the involvement of Civil Society in their policies, Programs and Activities** | **Further information required from this Institution and especially if there policies, mechanisms and methodologies including good and bad practices and the involvement of Civil Society in their policies, Programs and Activities** |

Improving the livelihoods of Pacific communities.
The Pacific Islands Law Officer Network (PILON) is a network of senior law officers from Pacific island countries. It provides a forum for addressing law and justice issues common to countries within the Pacific region. Meetings are usually attended by Attorneys-General, Solicitors-General and senior Crown Counsel or representative of each. Although PILON is an independent body it has close relationships with regional and international organisations. Pacific island countries face common challenges in the law and justice field. The network focuses on legal issues that are not addressed in other Pacific Member countries of PILON are:
- Australia
- the Cook Islands

The Pitcairn Islands was welcomed as a PILON member country in 2011 following Members’ consideration of an application for membership at the 30th Annual Meeting.

The Legal Sector

The database is divided into technical assistance in specific sectors or areas of law. Within these sectors, where possible, the type of assistance available is categorized as either:
- Legislative Assistance
- Workshops/Training
- Exchange or Mentoring opportunities.

The key recommendations endorsed for PILON were to:
- change the name of the organisation from PILOM to PILON to reflect the information-sharing role of the organisation
- establish a permanent Secretariat for PILON. In the interim the Secretariat will be hosted by the Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department
- commence work on establishing the permanent Secretariat to be located at the Forum Secretariat in Suva, Fiji
- establish a Steering Committee, which will build on the reform of PILON undertaken so far
- adopt an issue-based agenda for future meetings, with a focus on key issues arising for law officers in the region and shifting the focus away from country reports
- meetings of the

The meeting endorsed the development of a Strategic Plan, including the following areas:
- law and justice sector capacity building, training, mentoring and continuing education
- good governance measures in coordination with the work of regional organisations and member countries including legislative developments

Regional organisations have official observer membership:
- The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
- The secretariat of the pacific community
- The secretariat of the pacific regional environmental Programme
- The pacific islands forum fisheries agency
- The international committee of the red cross
- The pacific legal information institute
- The university of the south pacific
- The commonwealth secretaries
- The Pacific international maritime law association
- The united nations office on drugs and crime

Key issues members discussed approaches to a lack of capacity in law offices in the region, legislating to tackle sexual and gender-based violence, legal implications of climate change, human rights relating to prisoners and legal arrangements to protect fisheries. Members also discussed the formation of the Pacific Prosecutors’ Association, practical implications implementing the Hague Conference conventions, the impact of technology on the practice of law, maritime security, private military security companies, the Commonwealth Secretariat prosecution training and disclosure obligations survey and admission to practice.

http://www.pilonsec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=50&Itemid=14
PILON aims to provide a forum where these issues can be discussed and progressed at a regional level. Through PILON, communication and cooperation between law officers in the Pacific region is enhanced.

The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention (WCPFC) is an agreement between Australia, China, Canada, Cook Islands, European Union, Federated States of Micronesia, and the United States. The WCPFC Convention draws on many of the provisions of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. The WCPFC Convention seeks to address problems in the management of high seas fisheries.

Further information required from this institution and especially if there are policies, mechanisms.

Further information from this institution.

http://www.wcpfc.int/conservation-and-management/measures
| **international fisheries agreement** that seeks to ensure, through effective management, the long-term conservation and sustainable use of highly migratory fish stocks (i.e. tunas, billfish, marlin) in the western and central Pacific Ocean. Conservation and management measures that are developed under the terms of the Convention apply to these stocks throughout their range, or to specific areas within the Convention Area.

The area covered by the Convention covers almost 20 per cent of the Earth’s surface (see Convention Area map). Although the western boundary of Micronesia, Fiji, France, Japan, Kiribati, Republic of Korea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Chinese Taipei, Tonga, Tuvalu, United States of America, Vanuatu. Participating Territories American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia, Tokelau, Wallis and Futuna Cooperating Non-member(s) Belize, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Ecuador, El Salvador, Indonesia, Mexico, Senegal, St Kitts and Nevis, Panama, Thailand, Vietnam.

[UNFSA] while, at the same time, reflecting the special political, socio-economic, geographical and environmental characteristics of the western and central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) region.

resulting from unregulated fishing, over-capitalization, excessive fleet capacity, vessel re-flagging to escape controls, insufficiently selective gear, unreliable databases and insufficient multilateral cooperation in respect to conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks. A framework for the participation of fishing entities in the Commission which legally binds fishing entities to the provisions of the Convention, participation by territories and possessions in the work of the Commission, recognition of special requirements of developing States, and cooperation with other Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMO) whose respective areas of competence overlap with the WCPFC reflect the unique geo-political environment in agencies including other regional fisheries management organisations. The broad objectives of these relationships are to promote cooperation and collaboration in areas of mutual interest. Current organisations with which formal relations are maintained include:

- Secretariat of the Pacific Community in respect of the Oceanic Fisheries Programme (SPC-Off)
- Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA)
- The International Scientific Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in the North Pacific Ocean (FOC)
- Secretariat for the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP)
- Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC)
- inter-American Tropical

and methodologies including good and bad practices and the involvement of Civil Society in their policies, Programs and Activities

WCPFC8-2011-IP-09-Matrix-TCC7-Recommendations.pdf

http://www.wcpfc.int/relations-with-other-organisations

http://www.wcpfc.int/search/apachesolr_search outcomes?page=1
notionally extends to the east Asian seaboard, it is understood that the Convention Area does not include the South China Sea. In the east, the Convention Area adjoins, or overlaps, the area of competence of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission. The southern boundary extends to 60 degrees south and the northern boundary extends to Alaska and the Bering Sea.

Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA)

The Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) strengthens national capacity and regional solidarity so its 17 members can manage, control and develop their tuna fisheries now and in the future. Based in The Pacific Island Forum Fisheries Agency has 17 members, including many small island developing states. FFA members, with varying levels of development and other cultural and social differences, exercise their common concern for the state of Fisheries Sector. Fisheries management at FFA provides policy and services to its members to build national capacity and regional solidarity for the sustainable management of tuna in the Pacific. This includes legal expertise, principles and projects around Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management. Primary goals are to address overfishing of yellowfin and bigeye tuna, improve licensing revenue and to more fully integrate themselves into the tuna production chain through joint-venture fishing efforts[3] and onshore, tuna-related investments (see Tuna Commission (IATTC) & Commissio n for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)).

http://www.ffa.int/fisheries_management
http://www.ffafisheriesmanagement.org
Honiara, Solomon Islands, FFA's 17 Pacific Island members are Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. FFA was established to help countries sustainably manage their fishery resources that fall within their 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). FFA is an advisory body providing expertise, technical assistance and other support to its members who make sovereign decisions about their tuna resources and tuna stocks in the region through membership of FFA. As members, they shape the policy direction of fisheries management, control and development across the region and receive expertise and support to manage tuna within their own waters. 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participate in regional decision making on tuna management through agencies such as the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). Since 1979, FFA has facilitated regional cooperation so that all Pacific countries benefit from the sustainable use of tuna – worth over $3 billion a year and important for many people's livelihoods in the Pacific.

| (FORSEC) undertakes programmes and activities that support, or implement, decisions made by the Forum Leaders. The Forum Secretariat is also the base of CROP. The Secretariat is based in Suva, Fiji. |
|---|---|---|
| South Pacific Regional Environmental Programme (SPREP) | The South Pacific Regional Environmental Programme's (SPREP) charter is to strengthen the capacity of Pacific island members to plan and manage their own national environment |
national programmes and to enhance regional cooperation to deal more effectively with issues that are transboundary in nature or which require interventions at the global level. The work of the organisation covers nature conservation, pollution prevention, climate change and economic development.
focuses on providing assistance to its 20 member countries in three key programme areas: Ocean and Islands Programme, Community Lifelines Programme and Community Risk Programme. The role of the Pacific Islands Development Programme (PIDP) is to provide professional services and research information to Pacific Island governments. The organisation is based at the East-
West center in Hawaii is involved in the following five major activity areas:

- Secretariat of the Pacific Islands Conference of Leaders, United States/Pacific Island Nations Joint Commercial Commission Secretariat, research, education and training.

The South Pacific Tourism Organisation (SPTO) is mandated to promote the Pacific Islands as a tourist destination.
The SPTO's objectives, through tourism are: strengthening regional cooperation; contributing to sustainable development; promoting global awareness of the region; enhancing the resources of the region; and promoting the cultural diversity of the region.

University of the South Pacific

The University of the South Pacific (USP) provides tertiary education to the Pacific region. USP has 12 Member Countries and three
<p>| Melanesia Spear Head Group (MSG) | The Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) is an intergovernmental organization, composed of: • Fiji • Papua New Guinea • Solomon Islands • Vanuatu • as well as the FLNKS of New Caledonia. | Trade Sector. established to foster and accelerate economic development through trade relations and negotiations are held regularly between the members' leaders to consider the progress and developments of the agreement. After a revision in | One of the key features of the MSG is the Melanesian Spearhead Group Trade Agreement, a sub-regional preferential trade agreement. The Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) and the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) Secretariat signed a Memorandum of MSG Leaders' Declaration on Environment and Climate Change. The Leaders of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) have agreed to act together for the | One of the current major criticisms of the MSG is that it is made up... |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>the four Melanesian states</th>
<th>It was founded as a political gathering in 1983. On 23 March 2007, members signed the Agreement Establishing the Melanesian Spearhead Group, formalizing the group under international law. It is headquartered in Port Vila, Vanuatu.</th>
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<td>provide a political framework for regular consultations and review on the status of the Agreement, with a view to ensuring that trade both in terms of exports and imports is undertaken in a genuine spirit of Melanesian Solidarity and is done on a most favoured nation (MFN) basis.</td>
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<td>established to foster and accelerate economic development through trade relations and provide a political framework for regular consultations and review on the status of the Agreement, with a view to ensuring that trade both in terms of exports and imports is undertaken in a genuine spirit of Melanesian Solidarity and is done on a most favoured nation (MFN) basis.</td>
<td>Understanding (MOU) to enhance collaborative efforts between the two regional entities, both of which are charged with providing their members with advisory, capacity building and research services. Under the MOU, the two organisations will forge a partnership to collaboratively address the varied issues faced by their membership. The MOU also formalises a shared commitment by the organisations to seek innovative solutions to these issues. The agreed areas of partnership under this MOU are the following: - develop joint programming in areas of mutual interest such as culture and the arts, labour mobility, trade and economic development, and disaster risk management; - collaborate to provide joint support to members on conservation and sustainable management and people of Melanesia and sign the &quot;MSG Leaders Declaration on Environment &amp; Climate Change&quot; at the Leader’s Summit on the 30 March 2012 at the Vale ni Bose Complex in Suva, Fiji. They declared that the Leaders of the Melanesian Spearhead Group; the Republic of Fiji, the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, the Republic of Vanuatu and the Front de Liberation Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS) of New Caledonia recognise the critical importance of a healthy environment for the long term livelihoods of the people of Melanesia. The Leaders further acknowledged the need for MSG to take significant steps to ensure the management and conservation of their unique ecosystems and biodiversity including tropical forests, river systems, mountain and coastal ecosystems and marine resources;</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005, it covers 180 articles free of fiscal duty.</td>
<td>of a group of PICs that want to reinterpret development accordin to their leaders wish; leaders that have reservations in abiding with the well established and evidence informed Governance principles of ‘accountability, transparency, inclusive participation and responsiveness to the needs of the people that make Melanesia’.</td>
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http://www.msgsec.info/index.php?option=com_content&view=section&layout=blog&id=6&Itemid=162
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Melanesia_Spearhead_Group
development of natural resources; • facilitate the promotion of sustainable energy; • support capacity development in economic infrastructure such as transport and information and communications technology; • strengthen capacities in statistical analysis and interpretation to improve policy formulation for sustainable economic and social development; • undertake research in areas of common interest to members; • integrate approaches for more coordinated efforts to achieve objectives at both national and regional levels; • establish and facilitate forums for staff in both organisations to share, discuss, develop, implement and monitor programmes of mutual interest; • attend and participate in meetings of each others’ governing bodies and/or
| IPPF | International Planned Parenthood Federation | IPPF works in 172 countries to empower the most vulnerable women, men and young people to access life-saving services and programmes, and to live with dignity. | Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, New Zealand, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu | Health and Social Welfare Sector | Direct delivery of sexual and reproductive health services and education programmes, international advocacy, intervention in disasters and emergencies, and the development of pan-national projects in response to specific needs: this is the work of IPPF and its Member Associations. | IPPF aims to improve the quality of life of individuals by providing and campaigning for sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) through advocacy and services, especially for poor and vulnerable people. The Federation defends the right of all people to enjoy sexual lives free from ill health, unwanted pregnancy, violence and discrimination. IPPF works to ensure that women are not put at unnecessary risk of injury, illness and death as a result of pregnancy and childbirth, and it supports a woman’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy legally and safely. IPPF strives to eliminate relevant sectoral meetings, and support capacities in trade-related areas such as biosecurity and standards. | IPPF partners with many organizations around the world, from leading sexual and reproductive health and rights advocates, to UN agencies and governments, to philanthropic foundations and the private sector. Typically, partnerships target specific issues or distinct audiences. Our joint efforts produce world class advocacy, research and programmes in the field of health and rights. IPPF persuades governments and decision makers to promote sexual and reproductive health and rights, to change policy and to fund programmes and service delivery. IPPF supports a woman’s right to choose and to access safe abortion services. IPPF is at the forefront of efforts to ensure that a comprehensive response to HIV is situated within a larger sexual and reproductive health framework. | http://www.ipf.org/about-us |
sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and to reduce the spread and impact of HIV and AIDS.

The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) is a partnership between the people and Government of Solomon Islands and fifteen countries of the Pacific.

RAMSI arrived in Solomon Islands in July 2003 at the request of the Solomon Islands Government. Since then, much has been achieved and Solomon Islands are continuing on its path to recovery.

Fifteen Pacific countries that contribute to RAMSI –

- Australia
- Cook Island
- Federated States of Micronesia
- Fiji
- Kiribati
- Marshall Islands
- Nauru
- New Zealand
- Niue
- Palau
- Papua New Guinea
- Samoa
- Tonga
- Tuvalu
- and Vanuatu.

a great deal of work has been done to strengthen the systems and processes of the Solomon Islands Ministry of Finance and Treasury. This work has covered a wide range of areas, including the reduction of the country’s debt (from over 100% of Gross Domestic Product to below 30% over seven years), assisting the Ministry to improve business conditions and opportunities in Solomon Islands, and the reform of state-owned enterprises and other essential service industries, including electricity, water and telecommunication.

Supporting the long-term strengthening and law and order capabilities of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force.

Strengthening Solomon Islands justice and correctional systems.

Improving financial management practices, increasing revenue, and supporting economic growth that creates a more prosperous Solomon Islands.

Helping the Solomon Islands Government improve the way it works, to ensure it better serves the people of Solomon Islands.

Supporting the growth of a strong, independent media that represents the interests and information needs of Solomon Islanders.

Solomon Islands has made a tremendous amount of progress since RAMSI was first invited in 2003. Endorsed by the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and the Solomon Islands’ Parliament, RAMSI’s focus on arrival was to stabilise a country that had experienced significant conflict. The challenges and opportunities facing Solomon Islands now, almost ten years later, are very different. Today, Solomon Islands needs more normal, long-term development assistance, rather than the post-conflict type of assistance provided by RAMSI.

RAMSI’s regional nature is its core underlying strength with the mission benefiting from the diverse cultures and experience of the contributing members. Over the past nine years, thousands of police, military and civilian personnel from across the region have served with RAMSI and worked side by side with Solomon Islanders.

Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat

The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands

RAMSI is a regional activity under the Biketawa Declaration supported by all members of the Pacific Islands Forum. It is being lead by Australia and New Zealand. It was put together following the invitation

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More info needed

http://www.ramsi.org/about.html
http://www.ramsi.org/the-team/participating-countries.html
http://www.ramsi.org/our-work.html
http://www.ramsi.org/about/transformation.html

"The Role of RAMSI in the Solomon Islands"
<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (PECC)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Objectives</strong></th>
<th><strong>PECC Role</strong></th>
<th><strong>Institutional Members</strong></th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>It regularly develops and advocates regional policy initiatives to aid in the stable economic development of the region.</td>
<td>Providing a secure environment to support the work of the RAMSI Participating Police Force and Royal Solomon Islands Police Force. Helping Solomon Islanders combat corruption and malpractice. Helping to improve the rights and opportunities of women across Solomon Islands. Ensuring Solomon Islanders - no matter where they live - can learn more about the role of RAMSI in Solomon Islands.</td>
<td>PECC has 26 member committees. Each member committee comprises tripartite, senior representatives from business, government and academic circles. They initiate and/or participate in PECC work program, while having their own activities. <strong>Full Members:</strong> Australia</td>
<td><strong>Aims to serve as a regional forum for cooperation and policy coordination to promote economic development in the Asia-Pacific region, based on the following premises:</strong> 1. PREMISES The respective strengths of business and industry, government, academic and other intellectual circles can be better focused to promote the acceleration of economic growth, social progress. <strong>Institutional Members:</strong> Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) <strong>Growth in the Asia-Pacific this year is expected to increase slightly to 3.7 percent from last year’s 3.5 percent. Looking ahead to 2013, growth will be much the same at 3.9 percent.</strong> More info needed</td>
</tr>
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c and other intellectual circles.

All participate in their private capacity and discuss freely on current, practical policy issues of the Asia Pacific region.

| Brunei Darussalam | Canada | Chile | China | Colombia | Ecuador | Hong Kong, China | India | Indonesia | Japan | Korea | Malaysia | Mexico | Mongolia | New Zealand | Peru | The Philippines | Singapore | Pacific Islands Forum | Chinese Taipei | Thailand | The United States | Vietnam |
|--------------------|--------|-------|-------|---------|---------|------------------|------|------------|-------|-------|----------|--------|----------|-------------|------|------------------|-----------|----------|-----------------|--------|

**TASK FORCES**

- Task Forces are the primary mechanisms for PECC work program.
- Each work group is composed of representatives from member committees and,

- services
  2. At the border, realizing the benefits from services liberalization
  3. Improving the governance of services

- scientific and technological development and environmental quality in the region. Trade, joint ventures, mutual aid and other forms of linkage, when developed in a spirit of partnership, fairness, respect and genuine cooperation, strengthen the foundation needed for a prosperous, progressive and peaceful Asia Pacific region.

**HISTORY**

PECC's first meeting (PECC I), which was then called "the Pacific Community Seminar", was held in September 1980 in Canberra, Australia, at the initiative of Mr. Masayoshi Ohira and Mr. Malcolm Fraser, then Prime Ministers of Japan and Australia. The Seminar was attended by 11 economies (Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and the United States) and Pacific Island states (Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Tonga). Typically, each delegation
where applicable, other invited institutions and/or individuals.

Representatives of the Asian Development Bank, PBEC and PAFTAD were also present. The Canberra meeting called for the establishment of an independent, regional mechanism to advance economic cooperation and market-driven integration. A vital characteristics of the new body, asserted there, was its independent, unofficial status which would permit it to address economic issues and measures free from constraints of formal governmental policies and relationships. It, hence, agreed on the need for an informal process involving business and independent research institutions alongside governments.
### Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) on progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian Nations.

1. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter;
2. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields;
3. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the educational, professional, technical and administrative spheres;
4. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilisation of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and communications facilities and the raising of the living standards of their peoples;
5. To promote Southeast Asian studies; and
6. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international organisations.

#### ASEAN Member States
- Indonesia
- Malaysia
- Philippines
- Singapore
- Thailand
- Brunei
- Burma
- Cambodia
- Laos
- Vietnam
- Papua New Guinea
- Timor-Leste
- Bangladesh
- Nepal
- Bhutan
- India
- Maldives
- Sri Lanka
- Thailand
- Myanmar
- Thailand
- Vietnam

ASEAN Member States have adopted the following fundamental principles, as contained in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) of 1967:
1. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations;
2. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion;
3. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;
4. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner;
5. Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and
6. Effective cooperation among themselves.

### External Relations

**External Relations include:**
- Australia
- Canada
- China
- European Union
- India
- Japan

#### Consumer Protection
- Australia
- Canada
- China
- European Union
- India
- Japan

#### Custom
- Australia
- Canada
- China
- European Union
- India
- Japan

#### Industry
- Australia
- Canada
- China
- European Union
- India
- Japan

#### Intellectual Property
- Australia
- Canada
- China
- European Union
- India
- Japan

#### Service
- Australia
- Canada
- China
- European Union
- India
- Japan

#### Small & Medium Enterprises
- Australia
- Canada
- China
- European Union
- India
- Japan

#### Trade Issues
- Australia
- Canada
- China
- European Union
- India
- Japan

#### Financial Services
- Australia
- Canada
- China
- European Union
- India
- Japan

#### Intellectual Property
- Australia
- Canada
- China
- European Union
- India
- Japan

#### Standards & Conformance
- Australia
- Canada
- China
- European Union
- India
- Japan

### ASEAN-UNDP Sub-regional Programme

The ASEAN-UNDP Sub-regional Programme in 1977 was expanded to the ASEAN-United Nations Development Programme in 1977. In 1977, UNDP was designated an ASEAN Dialogue Partner, the only multilateral aid organisation to be accorded this status. ASEAN-UNDP ties were further strengthened with the launching of the ASEAN-UNDP Sub-regional Programme in 1977. The ASEAN-UNDP Sub-regional Programme in 1977.

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and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves.

- ROK
- New Zealand
- Russia
- United States
- UNDP
- Pakistan

that aimed to better assist ASEAN with its regional cooperation and integration efforts. In the subsequent quarter century, UNDP has continually provided assistance to ASEAN through its initial attempts at regional economic cooperation, with the move towards 'open regionalism' built around the ASEAN Free Trade Area agreement, in adjusting to and mitigating the negative effects of the severe financial crisis starting in 1997. UNDP has also provided significant support to the institutional development of the ASEAN Secretariat. Efforts are now underway to strengthen the effectiveness of UNDP ASEAN cooperation in facing new challenges to the region.

From the beginning, the ASEAN-UNDP sub-regional programmes (ASPs) provided the basis for the dialogue relationship between ASEAN and UNDP. The mechanism for dialogue was

Cultural Community. Each pillar has its own Blueprint, and, together with the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) Strategic Framework and IAI Work Plan Phase II (2009-2015), they form the Roadmap for and ASEAN Community 2009-2015.

ASEAN CHARTER
The ASEAN Charter serves as a firm foundation in achieving the ASEAN Community by providing legal status and institutional framework for ASEAN. It also codifies ASEAN norms, rules and values; sets clear targets for ASEAN; and presents accountability and compliance. The ASEAN Charter entered into force on 15 December 2008. A gathering of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers was held at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta to mark this very historic occasion for ASEAN. With the entry into force of the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN will henceforth
structured along the UNDP framework for regional/inter-country programmes, which generally operate on five-year cycles. The ASEAN-European Union (EU) dialogue relations were formalised when the 10th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM), held on 5-8 July 1977, agreed on ASEAN’s formal cooperation and relationship with the European Economic Community (EEC), which included the Council of Ministers of the EEC, the Permanent Representative of the EEC countries and the EEC Commission. The ASEAN-EU dialogue relations were institutionalised with the signing of the ASEAN-EEC Cooperation Agreement on 7 March 1980. The dialogue relations have since rapidly grown and expanded to cover a wide range of areas including political and security, economic and trade, social and cultural and development cooperation. In effect, the ASEAN Charter has become a legally binding agreement among the 10 ASEAN Member States.
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<tr>
<th>Education and Culture</th>
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<th>Energy</th>
<th>Gender including Youth</th>
<th>Cross sector</th>
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Matrix B/1

- FIJI
The objectives of the Parties to PICTA are to support sustainable development activities, with a particular focus on the Pacific and Asian regions. Our expertise and capacities cover a wide range of applied science-based assistance to support the sustainable management of marine and freshwater resources and environments, increasing community and economic resilience to natural hazards, and understanding and adapting to the impacts of climate extremes, variability and change. Fiji: Climate network upgrades for Fiji Meteorological Service. Energy assessment for four islands in the Pacific.

The major objective of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation is the provision of policy advice to the Government regarding the formulation and implementation of its foreign policies. This is done through proactive engagements to maintain and expand friendly relations with other countries and through our participation in regional and international organisations to which Fiji is a member. In a nutshell, the Ministry represents Fiji’s national interests to the world. Fiji is a member of the United Nations and its specialized agencies such as the ILO, FAO, WHO, UNDP, ITU, IFAD and WMO. It is also a member of a number of international and regional organisations such as the Pacific Community, the Pacific Islands Forum, the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), SPC work in the Pacific region and recognising the desirability of a clearly established framework for trade under conditions of fair competition in the Pacific region, the FICs agreed to strengthen trade and fostering and improving the trading links among the FICs. Believing that an expansion of trade will bring economic and social benefits and improves the living standards of all the peoples of the Pacific region and recognising the desirability of a clearly established framework for trade under conditions of fair competition in the Pacific region, the FICs agreed to strengthen trade and fostering and improving the trading links among the FICs.
1. USP since inception has been committed to fulfilling the challenge of providing the highest possible quality of education and research while addressing the changing circumstance and needs of the Pacific region.

2. PIAN GO FCROSS, a body celebrating cultural diversity, work to sustain itself, as a vibrant organisation. It exists to provide a focal point for Fiji’s Civil Society Organisation and supports people centered development and well-being.

PACE-SD is a partner in making those commitments a reality.

PACE-SD’s commitment is to:

- Strengthen human and technical capacity for climate change, environmental, renewable energy and sustainable development challenges throughout the region.

- To build partnerships from individuals and communities

PICTA are to strengthen, expand and diversify trade between the PICs through the elimination of both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade between the Parties in a gradual and progressive manner, under an agreed timetable, and with a minimum of disruption. The overall objective is to promote and facilitate commercial, industrial, agricultural and technical co-operation between the Parties and further the development and use of the resources of the Pacific region with a view to the eventual creation of a single regional market among the Pacific Island economies in accordance with the respective social and economic objectives of the Yasayasanosa Island group.

Yesayasanosa Island group. Development of a sustainable and low-cost waste treatment system for coastal villages on the coral coast of Viti Levu, to protect villagers from water-bourne pathogens and significantly reduce nitrogen loads to coastal waters.

Impact assessment, institutional analysis or training to support the sustainability of resource management.

There is a strong focus in the work on producing real outcomes, particularly to advocate for more sustainable use of natural resources at the national level and to support behavioural change at the user level. There is also an emphasis on the wide distribution of findings to different audiences. Findings are disseminate through personal presentations at

Institution, in partnership with The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, has undertaken a new project entitled Kizuna (Bonds of Friendship), which will provide fully funded two-week study tours to Japanese and American youth between June 2012 and March 2013. The purpose of the program is to promote understanding about the current situation in Japan and recovery efforts after the earthquake and tsunami that occurred on March 11, 2011. Additionally, Kizuna will encourage greater understanding between the youth of Japan.

http://www.niwa.co.nz/our-science/pacific-rim/our-services
http://www.foreignaffairs.gov.fj/about-us/overview
initiatives of the community, fostering strength and self-sufficiency of local organisations.

partnerships to national and international partnerships that address climate change and sustainable development issues based on scientific understanding and principles.

To operate with honesty, transparency, respect and integrity as effective regional partners and collaborators.

To increase the awareness of policy makers and the general public about the current resource intensive development that threatens environmentally and culturally sustainable development in the Pacific Islands.

2. PREEN is a professional body of like-minded individuals working together to promote and mainstream the use of economics in

Parties.

PICTA Trade in Goods

The FIC Leaders and Ministers have continuously renewed their commitment to PICTA. There are currently seven FICs, namely the Cook Islands, Fiji, Niue, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu that have implemented the necessary domestic arrangements and announced their readiness to trade under the provisions of PICTA. The remaining FICs continue to progress their implementation of PICTA.

The FICs Parties to PICTA that have announced readiness to trade under PICTA commenced benefiting from PICTA preferences

community, national and international meetings, reports and pamphlets in different languages, television and radio broadcasts and documentaries, and the United States and foster long-term and ongoing interest in one another by providing firsthand experiences with the culture of the other.
environmental management within the region. Established in September 2009, PREEN will serve as a forum for Pacific resource and environmental economists. Since 1 January 2007.

7 http://www.iucn.org/about/union/secretariat/offices/oceania/oro_initiatives/oro_initiatives_pceg/oro_initiatives_pceg_preen/

9 http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/economic-governance/regional-trade-1/picta/
<table>
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<tr>
<th>TONGA</th>
<th>USP</th>
<th>USP since inception has been committed to fulfilling the challenge of providing the highest possible quality of education and research while addressing the changing circumstances and needs of the Pacific region.</th>
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<td>Tonga has a National Energy Policy and Plan from 2010 – 2020 coordinated by Committee of Regional Organisations of the Pacific (CROP), Energy Working Group, comprising Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (FORSEC), Pacific Power Association (PPA), Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC); South Pacific Regional Environmental Programme (SPREP); University of the South Pacific (USP); and the United Nations Development Programme (Suva).</td>
<td>FAO was founded in 1945 with a mandate to raise levels of nutrition and standards of living, to improve agricultural productivity, and to better the condition of rural populations. Today, FAO is one of the largest specialised agencies in the United Nations system and the lead agency for agriculture, forestry, fisheries and rural development. An intergovernmental organisation, FAO has 187 member countries plus one member organisation, the European Community. In crisis situations, FAO works in conjunction with the World Food Programme and other humanitarian</td>
<td>PIAF</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. SPC</td>
<td>To support sustainable development within the Pacific, SOPAC has become increasingly involved in the economic analysis of natural resources in recent years. Economic analysis has been or is being conducted across Tonga.</td>
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<td><a href="http://www.tonga-energy.to/?p=939">http://www.tonga-energy.to/?p=939</a></td>
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</table>
all three technical programmes: Community Risk, Community Lifelines and Oceans and Islands. The work takes the form of economic or financial feasibility assessments, economic impact assessments, institutional analysis or training to support the sustainability of resource management. There is a strong focus in the work on producing real outcomes, particularly to advocate for more sustainable use of natural resources at the national level and to support behavioural change at the user level. There is also an emphasis on the wide distribution of findings to different audiences. Findings are disseminated through personal presentations at community, national and international agencies to help people rebuild their lives. The FAO is also a source of knowledge and information, providing behind the scenes assistance to help people help themselves.

The objectives of the Parties to PICTA are to strengthen, expand and diversify trade between the FICs through the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade between the Parties in a gradual and progressive manner, under an agreed timetable, and with a minimum of disruption. The overall objective is to promote and facilitate commercial, industrial, agricultural and technical co-operation between the Parties and further the development and use of the resources of the Pacific region with a view to the eventual creation of a single regional market among the Pacific Island economies in accordance with the respective social and economic objectives of the Parties.

**PICTA Trade in Goods**

The FIC Leaders and Ministers have

meetings, reports and pamphlets in different languages, television and radio broadcasts and documentaries. Continuously renewed their commitment to PICTA. There are currently seven FICs, namely the Cook Islands, Fiji, Niue, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu that have implemented the necessary domestic arrangements and announced their readiness to trade under the provisions of PICTA. The remaining FICs continue to progress their implementation of PICTA.

### Guam

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<td>The PAC Network is part of the Pacific Territories Grant, funded by the National Endowment for the Arts. The Network, in partnership with Pacific Resources for Education and Learning, works to increase organizational capacity and collaboration among Pacific Arts Councils. The grant focuses on the three Pacific Arts Councils located in American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and Guam. The Pacific Territories Grant strives to accomplish</td>
<td>Pacific Centre for Environment and Sustainable Development, University of the South Pacific (USP) Set-up in 2001, with the brief to work with all sections of the university, government agencies, regional and international organizations and NGOs, in promoting environmentally sustainable development.</td>
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<td>Pacific Islands Energy for Sustainable Development (PIESD)</td>
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Three major goals in and among the Pacific Arts Councils:
• Increasing organizational capacity and communication through technology
• Creating and planning activities that foster collaboration
• Increasing organizational capacity by providing educational experiences. 20

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<td>PIAF</td>
<td>PICTA</td>
<td>The Forum Island Countries (FICs) agreed to foster and strengthen trade in the Pacific region through the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA). Believing that an expansion of trading links among the FICs will bring economic and social benefits and improve the living standards of all the peoples of the Pacific region and recognising the desirability of a clearly established and secure framework of rules for trade under conditions of fair competition in the Pacific region, the FICs have over the years progressed the implementation of PICTA. The objectives of the Parties to Develop postharvest technologies to facilitate the revival of agricultural produce and products in Samoa.</td>
<td>Scientific Research Organization of Samoa (SROS)</td>
<td>Pacific Islands Energy for Sustainable Development (PIESD)</td>
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accomplish three major goals in and among the Pacific Arts Councils:
- Increasing organizational capacity and communication through technology
- Creating and planning activities that foster collaboration
- Increasing organizational capacity by providing educational experiences.\(^\text{23}\)

PICTA are to strengthen, expand and diversify trade between the FICs through the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade between the Parties in a gradual and progressive manner, under an agreed timetable, and with a minimum of disruption. The overall objective is to promote and facilitate commercial, industrial, agricultural and technical co-operation between the Parties and further the development and use of the resources of the Pacific region with a view to the eventual creation of a single regional market among the Pacific Island economies in accordance with the respective social and economic

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The FIC Leaders and Ministers have continuously renewed their commitment to PICTA. There are currently seven FICs, namely the Cook Islands, Fiji, Niue, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu that have implemented the necessary domestic arrangements and announced their readiness to trade under the provisions of PICTA. The remaining FICs continue to progress their implementation of PICTA. 27

### The Pacific Islands Forum

(Previously the South Pacific Forum) is comprised of the heads of government of the 16 independent island nations of the Pacific. It’s secretariat, ForSec, executes the requirements of the Heads of Government as set forth during annual meetings. ForSec provides the lead coordination role in the region. The Secretary-General of ForSec is the permanent Chair of the Council of Regional Organizations for the Pacific.

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<tr>
<td>The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) assists its 16 National members with the sustainable development and management of their fisheries. FFA advises on marine boundary delimitation, legal, technical and economic issues, monitoring and surveillance of foreign fishing activity, human resource and institutional strengthening, applied fisheries research, policy assessments and organization and representation at international fisheries meetings.32</td>
<td>PIAF Improving the quality of life for people living with HIV and AIDS in the Pacific and ensuring that HIV positive people play a central role in HIV33</td>
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<td>The South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC) was established in 1972 and assists its members in the assessment, exploration and development of their nearshore and offshore mineral and other marine non-living resources, provides baseline data for coastal engineering and development, hazard evaluation, hydrography and survey activities, Geographic Information Systems, the environmental effects of physical modifications to the coast, fresh water and...</td>
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(CROP) and the Division of Development and Economic Policy serves as the CROP secretariat. ForSec's mission is to enhance the economic and social well-being of the people of the Pacific islands, in support of efforts of national governments.\footnote{http://www.unescap.org/mced2000/pacific/background/regorg.htm#pif}

Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) provides technical support to the Pacific Islands Forum and its members. The heart of SPC is its integrated Work Programme. This powerful combination of diverse disciplines offers a unique approach to the development of the region's LAND-BASED, MARINE-Based and SOCIAL.

The objectives of the Parties to PICTA are to strengthen, expand and diversify trade between the FICs through the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade between the Parties in a gradual and progressive manner, under an agreed timetable, and with a minimum of disruption. The overall objective is to promote and facilitate commercial, industrial, agricultural and technical cooperation between the Parties and further the development and use of the resources of the Pacific region with a view to the eventual creation of a single regional market among the Pacific Island economies in accordance with the respective social and economic objectives of the region.\footnote{http://webapps01.un.org/dsd/partnerships/public/partnerships/164.html}

resources. The focus of the Work Programme is now technical assistance, education and training, delivered through courses, workshops and seminars at the in-country, sub-regional and regional levels. However, the Commission still has strong applied research components, particularly in its Oceanic Fisheries and Agriculture Programmes. Health, Marine Resources, Forestry, Statistics, Demography, Women, Culture, Youth, Rural Technology, Economics, Media Centre, Maritime, Community Education Training Centre, Agriculture, and Renewable Energy.31

31  http://www.unescap.org/mced2000/pacific/background/regorg.htm#pif

Parties.

PICTA Trade in Goods

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34  http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/economic-governance/regional-trade-1/picta/
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<tr>
<td>The University of the South Pacific (USP) with 12 member nations, provides tertiary education and undertakes scholarly and applied research. It assists member nations with educational matters and has branch campuses in most of its member countries.</td>
<td>The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) assists its 16 National members with the sustainable development and management of their fisheries. FFA advises on marine boundary delimitation, legal, technical and economic issues, monitoring and surveillance of foreign fishing activity, human resource and institutional strengthening, applied fisheries research, policy assessments and organization and representation at internationial fisheries meetings.</td>
<td>PIAF Improving the quality of life for people living with HIV and AIDS in the Pacific, and ensuring that HIV positive people play a central role in HIV</td>
<td>The South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC) was established in 1972 and assists its members in the assessment, exploration and development of their nearshore and offshore mineral and other marine non-living resources, provides baseline data for coastal engineering and development, hazard evaluation, hydrography and survey activities, Geographic Information Systems, the environmental effects of physical modifications to the coast, fresh water and sanitation issues.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>PIAF: Improving the quality of life for people living with HIV and AIDS in the Pacific; and ensuring that HIV positive people play a central role in HIV</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Australias and Nauru are working together to reform the utilities sector in order to provide reliable and cost-effective services to Nauruans. Nauru relies entirely on diesel-powered generators and desalination plants to produce electricity and clean drinking water for the community. Assistance is being focused on sustainable access to electricity and clean water in particular, through more effective governance of the sector and improved maintenance practices.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economical Development (Trade)</td>
<td>The South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC) was established in 1972 and assists its members in the assessment, exploration and development of their nearshore and offshore mineral and other marine non-living resources, provides baseline data for coastal engineering and development, hazard evaluation, hydrography and survey activities, Geographic Information Systems, the environmental effects of physical modifications to the coast, fresh water and sanitation issues.</td>
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<td><strong>SPC</strong></td>
<td><strong>The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA)</strong></td>
<td><strong>PIAF</strong></td>
<td><strong>PICTA</strong></td>
<td><strong>PIEFS</strong></td>
<td><strong>Pacific Islands Energy for Sustainable Development (PIESD)</strong></td>
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<td>The Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) is a regional technical development agency that works in partnership with its member countries and territories. SPC work programmes aim to develop the technical, professional, scientific, research, planning and management capability of Pacific Island people and directly provide information and advice, to enable them to make informed decisions about their future development and well-being.</td>
<td>The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) assists its 16 National members with the sustainable development and management of their fisheries. FFA advises on marine boundary delimitation, legal, technical and economic issues, monitoring and surveillance of foreign fishing activity, human resource and institutional strengthening, applied fisheries research, policy assessments and organization and representation at international fisheries meetings. For specifics on negotiations for high seas fisheries, click here.</td>
<td>Improving the quality of life for people living with HIV and AIDS in the Pacific, and ensuring that HIV positive people play a central role in HIV</td>
<td>The Forum Island Countries (PICs) agreed to foster and strengthen trade in the Pacific region through the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA). Believing that an expansion of trading links among the PICs will bring economic and social benefits and improve the living standards of all the peoples of the Pacific region and recognising the desirability of a clearly established and secure framework of rules for trade under conditions of fair competition in the Pacific region, the PICs have over the years progressed the implementation of PICTA. The objectives of the Parties to PICTA are to</td>
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and research while addressing the changing circumstances and needs of the Pacific region.

strengthen, expand and diversify trade between the FICs through the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade between the Parties in a gradual and progressive manner, under an agreed timetable, and with a minimum of disruption. The overall objective is to promote and facilitate commercial, industrial, agricultural and technical co-operation between the Parties and further the development and use of the resources of the Pacific region with a view to the eventual creation of a single regional market among the Pacific Island economies in accordance with the respective social and economic objectives of the Parties.

PICTA Trade in Goods

The FIC Leaders and Ministers have continuously renewed their commitment to
There are currently seven FICs, namely the Cook Islands, Fiji, Niue, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu that have implemented the necessary domestic arrangements and announced their readiness to trade under the provisions of PICTA. The remaining FICs continue to progress their implementation of PICTA. 53

**UNESCO** works to create the conditions for dialogue among civilizations, cultures and peoples, based upon respect for commonly shared values. It is through this dialogue that the world can achieve global visions of sustainable development encompassing observance of human rights, mutual respect and the alleviation of poverty, all of which are at the heart of UNESCO’S mission and activities. The broad goals and concrete objectives of the international community – as set out in the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – underpin all UNESCO’s strategies and activities. Thus UNESCO’s unique **UNDP** partners with people at all levels of society to help build nations that can withstand crisis, and drive and sustain the kind of growth that improves the quality of life for everyone. On the ground in 177 countries and territories, we offer global perspective and local insight to help empower lives and build resilient nations. World leaders have pledged to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, including the overarching goal of cutting poverty in half by 2015. UNDP’s network links and coordinates global and national efforts to reach these Goals. Our focus is helping countries build and share solutions to the challenges of: Poverty Reduction and Achievement of the MDGs Democratic Governance Crisis Prevention and Recovery Environment and An important constraint to implementing sustainable agriculture and forestry practices is the limited number of crops and products that our communities rely on for income generation and for their general livelihoods. Identifying and promoting currently minor agriculture and tree crops and products that have the potential to enhance the income of farmers and communities will provide a vital contribution towards the implementation of sustainable practices by our people. Through the EU-funded FACT Pilot Project, direct assistance is being provided to selected partner enterprises in both forestry and agriculture to enhance their exporting capacities. **“To be the leading health workforce academic education and research institution in the Pacific Region”**

The Fiji School of Medicine is aspiring to be a center of Excellence in quality health education, training and research, serving the communities of the Pacific.

It will be the aspiration of all prospective regional health students to be educated at the Fiji School of Medicine, which will produce graduates who are sought after by the health profession for their skills, achievements and attributes. The Fiji School of Medicine will be an institution that is sensitive to the unique needs of the
competencies in education, the sciences, culture and communication and information contribute towards the realization of those goals.  

| Energy for Sustainable Development | Pacific and will be mindful of cultural and environmental issues that affect the lives of the communities of the Pacific and as proactive members of this wider community, staff and students will act as responsible change agents in the provision of health services. FSM will serve as an authoritative, reliable and internationally accredited resource center for Health professionals in the Pacific. As the pioneering health training tertiary institution in the Pacific, FSM will continue to improve its standards and serve the people of the region in a socially responsible manner. |

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The leadership of FSM, as custodians of a proud history, protects the interests of the School and is fully accountable in its fiscal and operational management of the institution.

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**POLICE**

**MILITARY**

- This was a policy developed by the Australian government that was the platform for the security cooperation in the pacific. This policy was to create safety mechanism to address civil unrest within our pacific countries.
- PICs are the providers in terms of resource persons
- The mechanism is supported by the multilateral organization under the Biketwa Declaration in October, 2000. This was accepted by the Pacific Island Forum as a declaration.
- Civil societies in our PICs plays an important role as the long term structural action to maintain peace and order by having regionalism.
- The rationale behind the agreement of the Biketawa Declaration is to provide security to the pacific in terms of instability arising from PICs
Countries that directly benefited apart from the 14 member PICs were Solomon Island and Kiribati in terms of security intervention provided by the security cooperation south pacific.

Most pacific island countries that is included in the PIF

The method used in SI was through intervention by the joint forces to provide security and ensure the safety of the civil society.

Creating stability to the country

By voicing out their concern publicly thus calls for an intervention to the situation.

It is a good practice and not a bad one.

Fiji is still been suspended by the Pacific Island Forum due to the illegal take over by the Frank and his administration.

**TRADE**

**PACER :**

*Policy and knowledge exchange platforms*

The PACER agreement also includes a commitment from Australia and New Zealand to assist the PICs with improving trade facilitation, for instance by helping to improve customs procedures.

The PACER provides for free trade to be established gradually among Forum members, in line with the “stepping stone” approach preferred by the FICs – i.e. as the name suggests the Agreement sets a framework for free trade in the region to be established at the appropriate “pace”, reflecting the differing development status of the Parties.

Initially a free trade area may be established among the FICs. Later, free trade arrangements may be negotiated between the FICs and Australia and New Zealand. The PACER contains a number of provisions relating to the timing of negotiation for free trade between Australia and New Zealand. These provisions are designed to assure Australia and New Zealand that they will not be disadvantaged relative to other trading partners in their trade relations with the FICs.

The PACER also provides for negotiation on the establishment of other elements of a single-regional market. It does not however contain any provisions relating to the timing of these negotiations. These matters will be negotiated only as and when the parties are ready to do so.

The PACER also provides for establishment of a programme of trade facilitation measures, designed primarily to benefit the FICs.

It contains requirements for the provision by Australia and New Zealand of financial and technical assistance, for the development and implementation of the trade facilitation programmes.

The PACER provides for annual reviews of the operation of the Agreement, and all aspects of trade and economic cooperation among the parties. General reviews of the PACER are to be held at three-yearly intervals.
**Note:**
The PACER agreement is not a trade agreement in itself, but contains a “trigger” clause that requires the PICs to consult with Australia and New Zealand with a view to negotiating a free trade agreement should they commence "formal negotiations for free trade arrangements which would include one or more developed non-Forum country", or if formal negotiations fail, by 2011 at the latest.


**Multilateral organizations:**
WTO, Pacific Island Forum Secretariat

**Government providers and recipients**

**Civil society participation**

**Rationale for supporting SSC**
- Framework agreement to deepen trade and investment liberalisation in the broader Pacific on a step by step basis

**Countries benefiting from the support**
- Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, PNG, Samoa and Solomons

**Thematic sectors/areas covered**
- Government Departments, Government Protocols and Procedural Processes, Local and Small Business Enterprises benefiting from the PACER arrangement

**Implementation cycle management, modalities, methodologies**
- The PACER agreement also includes a commitment from Australia and New Zealand to assist the PICs with improving trade facilitation, for instance by helping to improve customs procedures.
- The PACER provides for annual reviews of the operation of the Agreement, and all aspects of trade and economic cooperation among the parties.
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Major outcomes from a CSO perspective

• The Agreement sets out that any Free trade arrangements negotiated among Forum members must be consistent with the objectives and guiding principles laid down in the PACER. These include an undertaking to use “best endeavours” to follow international best practice in formulating trade rules.
• The legal relationship between the PACER and the PICTA is spelt out in the PACER. It provides that the FICs may liberalise trade among themselves and integrate their economies before they enter into reciprocal free trade arrangements with Australia and New Zealand. This is what has been described throughout the negotiations as the “stepping stone” approach.

Civil society participation

Good practices (innovative approaches to facilitate multi-stakeholder dialogues, democratic ownership, transparency and accountability to human rights for example)

• The PACER agreement also includes a commitment from Australia and New Zealand to assist the PICs with improving trade facilitation, for instance by helping to improve customs procedures.
• The PACER provides for annual reviews of the operation of the Agreement, and all aspects of trade and economic cooperation among the parties. General reviews of the PACER are to be held at three-yearly intervals.
• Initially a free trade area may be established among the FICs. Later, free trade arrangements may be negotiated between the FICs and Australia and New Zealand. The PACER contains a number of provisions relating to the timing of negotiation for free trade between Australia and New Zealand. These provisions are designed to assure Australia and New Zealand that they will not be disadvantaged relative to other trading partners in their trade relations with the FICs.
• It does require negotiation with Australia and New Zealand “with a view to the establishment of free trade arrangements” in the event that FICs commence negotiations for free trade arrangements with other developed countries. Slightly lower level obligations are imposed on the FICs if they enter a free trade arrangement with most non-developed countries.
• Although it does deal with trade issues, the PACER is not itself a free trade agreement. I.e. it does not legally require the reduction of tariffs between the Parties.
• The Agreement sets out that any Free trade arrangements negotiated among Forum members must be consistent with the objectives and guiding principles laid down in the PACER. These include an undertaking to use “best endeavours” to follow international best practice in formulating trade rules.
• The legal relationship between the PACER and the PICTA is spelt out in the PACER. It provides that the FICs may liberalise trade among themselves and integrate their economies before they enter into reciprocal free trade arrangements with Australia and New Zealand. This is what has been described throughout the negotiations as the “stepping stone” approach.
The PACER requires all Parties to keep each other informed about trading arrangements among themselves. Thus the FICs will need to keep ANZ informed about implementation of the PICTA, while Australia and New Zealand are required to keep the FICs informed about developments within CER.

The PACER expressly states that it does not affect rights and obligations under existing Agreements. Thus the FICs’ rights and obligations under existing Agreements will remain in force. WTO – (Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Solomon Islands). All Forum members who are WTO members remain bound by their obligations as WTO members, including their obligations towards each other. On the other hand FICs who are not members of the WTO do not become subject to any WTO obligations as a result of joining the PACER. However they do benefit from a requirement that parties to the PACER who are WTO members must provide other parties with no less favourable treatment than they are obliged to provide to other WTO members in respect of sanitary and phytosanitary matters, customs procedures, and standards and conformance. For WTO members all this means is that the same treatment already provided to 140 countries must be provided to all Forum members.

Bad practice

- PACER PLUS

  - Policy and knowledge exchange platforms on SSC
  - Policy:
  - Knowledge Exchange Platforms: Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meetings, Forum Trade Ministers Meeting
  - Multilateral organizations supporting SSC
  - WTO, Pacific Island Forum Secretariat
  - Government providers and recipients of SSC
  - Recipients: Governments, and countries of aforementioned government departments and ministries.
  - Civil society participation in SSC
  - Development Services Exchange (DSE) Solomons, Pacific Island Private Sector Organisations (PIPSO)
- **Rationale for supporting SSC**
- The Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus negotiations offer an opportunity to help Pacific Islands Forum countries benefit from enhanced regional trade and economic integration.

- **Countries benefiting from the support**
  - Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

- **Thematic sectors/areas covered**
  - The *long-term opportunity* to create jobs, enhance private sector growth, raise standards of living, and boost economic growth in Forum Island Countries has impacts on Education, Health, Infrastructure, Social Services, etc.

- **Implementation cycle management, modalities, methodologies**
  - Pacific Islands Forum Leaders launched negotiations on PACER Plus at Pacific Islands Forum Leaders meetings.

- **Major outcomes from a CSO perspective**
  - A new regional trade and economic agreement provides the *long-term opportunity* to create jobs, enhance private sector growth, raise standards of living, and boost economic growth in Forum Island Countries.
  - Negotiations will include elements of trade capacity-building and trade development assistance designed to strengthen Forum Island Countries’ ability to trade.

- **Civil society participation**
  - Development Services Exchange (DSE) Solomons, Pacific Island Private Sector Organisations (PIPSO)
  - Good practices (innovative approaches to facilitate multi-stakeholder dialogues, democratic ownership, transparency and accountability to human rights for example)
Negotiations will include elements of trade capacity-building and trade development assistance designed to strengthen Forum Island Countries' ability to trade. Australia has provided substantial funds for Forum Island Countries to commission independent research on PACER Plus and for training of Forum Island Country trade officials to strengthen their capacity in respect of the PACER Plus negotiations. Australia has provided funding for officials from Forum Island Countries to attend PACER Plus meetings and is also helping to fund the Office of the Chief Trade Adviser which provides independent support and advice to Forum Island Countries on PACER Plus matters.

Bad practice

Less Developed countries example, Solomon Islands, stand to lose out if the country, its people and services are not strong enough to compete with a flood of imports under PACER-Plus. Time is needed for such needed developments to take place.

More developed countries like Australia and New Zealand may stand to benefit more from this agreement than the weakest or smallest nations.

A lot of trade ministries or departments in the Pacific do not have a large number of staff, so once there are a couple of major negotiations and the Doha round as well, there’s always a risk of departments being overwhelmed, on top of other trade issues the departments have to deal with.

PICTA

Policy and knowledge exchange platforms on SSC

The legal relationship between the PACER and the PICTA is spelt out in the PACER. It provides that the FICs may liberalise trade among themselves and integrate their economies before they enter into reciprocal free trade arrangements with Australia and New Zealand. This is what has been described throughout the negotiations as the “stepping stone” approach.

The PACER states that it does not confer any rights or obligations on Australia and New Zealand under the PICTA.

The PACER requires the PICTA to be established in accordance with the objectives and guiding principles of the PACER.

The objectives and guiding principles of the PICTA provide only general guidance and reflect some of the special issues facing the FICs.

Multilateral organizations supporting SSC

WTO

Government providers and recipients of SSC

Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu

Civil society participation in SSC
Rationale for supporting SSC

The PICTA is a free trade Agreement among the FICs, which will gradually, over the next 10 years, lead to the establishment of a free trade area (FTA) - an agreement whereby the members agree to eliminate barriers to trade among themselves, while maintaining their individual barriers against imports from the outside world. This removal of barriers to trade primarily involves the reduction of tariffs to zero on substantially all of the products traded.

Countries benefiting from the support

- Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu

Thematic sectors/areas covered

- Education benefits from increased revenue due increased trade, infrastructure, private sectors, health sectors, etc.

Implementation cycle management, modalities, methodologies

- The PICTA provides for the progressive phasing out of tariffs on trade among the FICs. Tariffs of developing FICs will be reduced to zero by 2010, and by 2012 for small island states and least developed countries, except in the case of “excepted imports” (the “negative list”), for which tariffs are to be reduced to zero by 2016.
- Trade barriers other than tariffs, such as quotas, must be eliminated immediately on trade between the FICs
- Tariffs must be reduced only on imports from other FIC members of the PICTA. Tariffs on imports from other countries, including Australia and New Zealand, and any FICs that do not join the PICTA, will not be affected.
- Does not require removal of any internal taxes or charges “national treatment” ie. such taxes and charges relating to trade of goods (as well as laws, regulations etc) must be applied equally to domestically produced goods and goods from PICTA partners.

Major outcomes from a CSO perspective

- Freer trade amongst the FICs, as a result of the PICTA, will hopefully encourage specialization and greater efficiency in FIC economies. FICs will increase their exports to other FICs of products in which they can be competitive, and will increase their imports of goods, which are being produced competitively by other FICs, reducing prices. The resulting increase in trade will reflect enhanced efficiency and improved consumer welfare in the FIC economies, leading hopefully to the overall creation of jobs. It is also hoped that the creation of a regional market will encourage increased investment in FICs. Many FICs currently struggle to attract investment because of their small domestic market. However, the opportunity to reach the regional market of 6m people, at zero tariff rates, may encourage investment that was hesitant before.

Civil society participation
Development Services Exchange (DSE) Solomons, Pacific Island Private Sector Organisations (PIPSO)

**Good practices (innovative approaches to facilitate multi-stakeholder dialogues, democratic ownership, transparency and accountability to human rights for example)**

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- The PICTA provides for the progressive phasing out of tariffs on trade among the FICs. Tariffs of developing FICs will be reduced to zero by 2010, and by 2012 for small island states and least developed countries, except in the case of “excepted imports” (the “negative list”), for which tariffs are to be reduced to zero by 2016. Trade barriers other than tariffs, such as quotas, must be eliminated immediately on trade between the FICs.
- It is a country’s sovereign right to set its own tariffs. However, by signing and ratifying a treaty under international law, the Parties to the Agreement are stating that they agree to abide by its provisions, which in the case of the PICTA, clearly states the tariff reduction obligations. Failure to abide by the tariff reduction schedule will substantially harm its reputation in the international arena. As with most trade agreements, there will be no specific enforcement body policing the Agreement. The Parties themselves will monitor each other to ensure that reductions are being made. If a country is not abiding by its obligations then the other Parties can call it to consultations, to resolve the problem. If this is not successful then there are provisions for dispute settlement (see below) eventually leading to a revocation of any preferences given to the offending Party.
- The provisions on excepted imports (the “negative list”) allow a longer period to phase out the tariffs on goods from the “sensitive industries”. Products to be included on the “negative list” must be specified at the time of signing the Agreement, and the reasons for doing so must be given. The PICTA contain rules as to which products can and cannot be included on the “negative lists”. There is no provision for permanent exclusion of any product from the PICTA.
- It is hoped that all disputes will be solved by consultation between the Parties, but if necessary the PICTA has a dispute settlement procedure that moves successively through stages of consultation, mediation and legally binding independent arbitration. At the first two stages a time period is provided after which a party may require the dispute to move to the next stage if the dispute has not been resolved by then. At the end of the process, the arbitrator will make an award one way or the other. If this is not followed the aggrieved Party may revoke any preferences given to the offender up to level equivalent to the damage caused by the matter under dispute.

**Bad practices**

- Unfortunately, the level of trade among FICs is low, due to the constraints of geographical location and poor transport links. Even with the FTA it will be difficult to overcome these constraints, and by itself the FTA may deliver only small benefits to the FICs initially.
- The small size of the expected benefits could be argued to be a disadvantage of the PICTA initially. There will be some administrative costs associated with the operation of the PICTA, even though the PICTA has been designed with a view to minimising those costs as far as possible. Some increased imports under the PICTA may displace more efficient imports from non-member countries. This is the trade diversion effect associated with an FTA.
- Adverse social impacts can arise from “adjustment costs” associated with the removal of tariff barriers. In some cases inefficient FIC businesses may find it difficult to compete with businesses in other FIC partners. Those involved in these businesses may have to look for other avenues of employment, and may suffer unemployment and/or a loss of income at least temporarily. There may be a disruption to their way of life and this may place some burden on their communities to provide them with temporary support. Because the economic effects,
including adjustment costs, of the PICTA are expected to be small, at least at first, these social impacts are also expected to be small. Generally in FTAs such impacts are smaller than the impact of other aspects of economic and technological change. They will also be balanced by increased opportunities opening up for other businesses in each FIC, which should lead to creation of employment, and a net overall benefit.

MSGTA

- **Policy and knowledge exchange platforms on SSC**
  - Platforms: Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) Trade and Economic Officials’ Meeting
  - Pacific Islands Forum – Of which Fiji is suspended from
  - The 9th MSG Trade & Economic Officials meeting was held in Papua New Guinea on 29 and 30 November 2000. This meeting saw the acceptance of the expansion of the MSG Product Schedule tariff headings from four digit to six digits, thereby facilitating MSG trade by removing the ambiguity in product identification at Customs points of entry. The agreement is General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) consistent and has been approved and accorded recognition by the World Trade Organization (WTO) Committee on Regional Arrangements to be compatible and meeting the requirements of Article 24 of the GATT/WTO Agreement.

- **Multilateral organizations supporting SSC**
  - MSG, WTO, UNESCAP, IMF, UNDP

- **Government providers and recipients of SSC**
  - Recipients: Governments, and countries of aforementioned government departments and ministries.

- **Civil society participation in SSC**

- **Rationale for supporting SSC**
Melanesian Spearhead Group Trade Agreement, a sub-regional preferential trade agreement established to foster and accelerate economic development through trade relations and provide a political framework for regular consultations and review on the status of the Agreement, with a view to ensuring that trade both in terms of exports and imports is undertaken in a genuine spirit of Melanesian Solidarity and is done on most favoured nation (MFN) basis.

- **Countries benefiting from the support**
- Fiji and Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands (New Caledonia joined as an observer.)

- **Thematic sectors/areas covered**
- Tourism, Education

- **Implementation cycle management, modalities, methodologies**
- Negotiations are held regularly between the members' leaders to consider the progress and developments of the agreement. After a revision in 2005, it covers 180 articles free of fiscal duty. The MSG Trade Agreement was signed in 1993 by Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.

- **Major outcomes from a CSO perspective**
- Fiji joined the MSG Agreement (1993) in 1998 and is required to eliminate its tariffs within 9 years and since 2006, Fiji provides duty free to all goods originating from MSG countries except those that are expressly excluded in the Agreement. These include Chapter 22 - Beverages, Spirits and Vinegar, all products except items described in HS Tariff code 2201, 2202, and 2209; Chapter 24 - Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes; Chapter 27 - Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous mineral waxes; and Cane sugar HS Code 1701.1100. The MSG Agreement was revised in October 2005 to adopt a negative list approach to liberalisation on trade in goods. The negative listing approach means that all products, except those on the negative list, are deemed to qualify for preferential tariffs. Fiji has no negative list. The Agreement has less onerous rules of origin (change in 4-digit HS classification) than PICTA.

- **Civil society participation**
- Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (French: Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste, FLNKS)

- **Good practices (innovative approaches to facilitate multi-stakeholder dialogues, democratic ownership, transparency and accountability to human rights for example)**
• The WTO, and the non-discriminatory "Most Favored Nation" principle it enshrines offers equal rights to market access concessions made to larger countries that Fiji was not able to negotiate on its own. This increased and secure market access allows exporters to boost production and likewise revenue and employment.

• The 9th MSG Trade & Economic Officials meeting was held in Papua New Guinea on 29 and 30 November 2000. This meeting saw the acceptance of the expansion of the MSG Product Schedule tariff headings from four digit to six digits, thereby facilitating MSG trade by removing the ambiguity in product identification at Customs points of entry. The agreement is General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) consistent and has been approved and accorded recognition by the World Trade Organization (WTO) Committee on Regional Arrangements to be compatible and meeting the requirements of Article 24 of the GATT/WTO Agreement.

SPARTECA

SPARTECA is a non-reciprocal trade agreement between the 14 FICs and Australia and New Zealand. It came into effect in 1981 and provides duty-free access to all products from the FICs (with the exception of sugar by Australia). The general rules of origin under SPARTECA are very complex and onerous and the FICs want these rules to be reviewed to improve market access to Australia and New Zealand. SPARTECA may be superseded by a reciprocal (PACER-Plus) Agreement.

Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)

Fiji and PNG are the only Pacific ACP States (PACPS) that initialled the Interim EPA in 2007. The EU provides duty and quota free access on all products except for sugar and rice, which are subjected to longer transitional periods. Fiji agreed to liberalise just over 84% of its imports from the EU over a period ending in 2023. Other benefits of the interim EPA include improved sectoral rules of origin, especially for fishery products (canned fish), agro-processing and textiles. However, the de-listing of Fiji’s eligibility to export any fishery-related products until its Competent Authority complies with the EC’s stringent sanitary and phytosanitary regulations has hindered Fiji from fully utilising this market access. Fiji’s sugar exports will also be adversely affected by the 36% cut in EU sugar prices by 2009 as a result of domestic EU reforms and this is estimated to lower Fiji’s export receipts by €42.8 million in 2009.

Currently, the PACPS and the European Commission are negotiating a comprehensive EPA, which is expected to be finalised in 2009, provided all the issues of interest to both parties are resolved.
PRIVATE SECTOR

LABOUR

IPEC’s TACKLE Project: ILO International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) Tackling Child Labour Through Education (TACKLE) Project. Being implemented only in Fiji and PNG and funding for this is made by the European Commission.

Pacific Global Jobs Pact Project for Labour Governance and Migration:

- Policy and knowledge exchange platforms on SSC
- The project is implemented within the IPEC’s tripartite social dialogue framework but its innovation is reflected in the extension of the government platform to include both the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Education as key partners. TACKLE thus has an important focus on mainstreaming child labour within the national education systems.

Multilateral organizations supporting SSC
- ILO – International Labor Organization

Government providers and recipients of SSC
- Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Education
Civil society participation in SSC

Rationale for supporting SSC

IPEC's TACKLE Project: To fight child labour in 12 countries across Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific group of states (ACP). The objective of TACKLE is to contribute to the withdrawal of children engaged in child labour and to prevent further entry of children into employment by offering alternative education and training opportunities and thereby contributing towards poverty reduction. The project aims to provide guidance in formulating new or improved existing legal and policy frameworks on child labour and education in the partner countries and to ensure their effective implementation and application; promote the development of institutional capacities of ministries and other relevant bodies for concrete action to fight child labour; promote advocacy and awareness-raising concerning child labour issues; and increase dialogue and strengthen networks on child labour and education in coordination with stakeholders, social partners, and civil society.

Pacific Global Jobs Pact Project for Labour Governance and Migration: the Pacific Global Jobs Pact Project for Labour Governance and Migration promotes the ratification and implementation of the governance conventions on tripartite consultation, labour inspection and employment policy to build the capacity of Pacific constituents to ratify and apply core, governance and maritime conventions within their countries.

Countries benefiting from the support

Fiji, Vanuatu, PNG,

Thematic sectors/areas covered

Labour equality, Human Rights Issues, Education, Legal Frameworks, Standards or Work Practices, Health (In workplaces)

Implementation cycle management, modalities, methodologies

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ministries and other relevant bodies for concrete action to fight child labour; promote advocacy and awareness-raising concerning child labour issues; and increase dialogue and strengthen networks on child labour and education in coordination with stakeholders, social partners, and civil society.

- **Pacific Global Jobs Pact Project for Labour Governance and Migration:** This assistance on the governance and maritime conventions is provided through the preparation of gap analyses, the delivery of workshops and the provision of advice on law reform.

- **Major outcomes from a CSO perspective**
  - IPEC’s tripartite social dialogue framework but its innovation is reflected in the extension of the government platform to include both the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Education as key partners. TACKLE thus has an important focus on mainstreaming child labour within the national education systems.
  - TACKLE comprises four clearly defined outputs:
    1. Country level legal framework prepared or strengthened where already in existence
    2. Strengthened institutional capacity leading to improved ability to formulate and implement child labour strategies
    3. Targeted actions to combat child labour designed and implemented
    4. Improved advocacy and dissemination of good practices to enhanced knowledge base and networks on child labour and education

- **Civil society participation**

- **Good practices (innovative approaches to facilitate multi-stakeholder dialogues, democratic ownership, transparency and accountability to human rights for example)**
  - Once a country has ratified an ILO Convention it is obliged to report regularly on progress to implement the related standards incorporated in it. The ILO Country Office for South Pacific Island Countries provides training and advice to governments on complying with their reporting obligations and to workers and employers on contributing effectively to the reporting process.

- **Bad practice**
  - Does not yet include other South Pacific Countries, but mainly focused PNG, Fiji, Vanuatu, Kiribati and Samoa.

**CHILDREN**

- Policy and knowledge exchange platforms on SSC

- All of the countries in East Asia and the Pacific have ratified the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, a comprehensive human rights treaty which requires State Parties to make the world safer, healthier and more respectful of children's rights. The Convention sets out universal principles and standards for the status and treatment of children across the globe, and ensures that the specific rights outlined in the body of the Convention have the status of international law.

- Multilateral organizations supporting SSC

- UNICEF, UN Committee on the Rights of the Child

- Government providers and recipients of SSC

- Cook Islands, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, French Polynesia (Tahiti), New Caledonia, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Samoa, Marshall Island (RMI), FSM, Palau

  Recipients are the children in these countries who will benefit from principles and standards that their countries will be required to implement in their countries to make it more safer, healthier and more respectful of children's rights.

- Civil society participation in SSC

- Women’s Crisis Centre (Fiji), Pacific Women’s Network, Samoan Victim Support Group Sydney (SVSG Sydney)

- Rationale for supporting SSC

- All of the countries in East Asia and the Pacific have ratified the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, a comprehensive human rights treaty which requires State Parties to make the world safer, healthier and more respectful of children’s rights.

- Countries benefiting from the support

- All South Pacific Countries
Thematic sectors/areas covered

- Health Sectors, Education Sectors, Legal System – Child protection laws
- Implementation cycle management, modalities, methodologies

Nations that ratify this convention are bound to it by international law. Compliance is monitored by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, which is composed of members from countries around the world. Once a year, the Committee submits a report to the Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, which also hears a statement from the CRC Chair, and the Assembly adopts a Resolution on the Rights of the Child. Governments of countries that have ratified the Convention are required to report to, and appear before, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child periodically to be examined on their progress with regards to the advancement of the implementation of the Convention and the status of child rights in their country. Their reports and the committee’s written views and concerns are available on the committee’s website.

Major outcomes from a CSO perspective

- To make the world safer, healthier and more respectful of children’s rights in relation to the specific area of work a particular CSO in a country is responsible for.
- Civil society participation
- Women’s Crisis Centre (Fiji), Pacific Women’s Network, The Tuvalu National Council of Women, Samoan Victim Support Group Sydney (SVSG Sydney)

Good practices (innovative approaches to facilitate multi-stakeholder dialogues, democratic ownership, transparency and accountability to human rights for example)

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- Nations that ratify this convention are bound to it by international law. Compliance is monitored by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, which is composed of members from countries around the world

MARITIME
Basically the (RMP) is the regional maritime program that covers policies and mechanism that needs to be implemented into the maritime industry
This program is supported by government departments and CSO like SPC
Civil society in this programs are indicators
The programs have few objectives to establish such as effective national policy and human resource capacity
Mostly all pacific countries that are recipient to SPC
This program establishes the core framework that will provide the network between pacific countries
Is that this program is being included in the strategic plan of all CSO dealing directly with Maritime industry
Civil society should see that this program has serve its purpose
Good practice

FISHERIES

CFP is a foreign concept and was introduced to the pacific for sustainability
It is a multilateral approach where all government fisheries department are the main supporting body and also recipients of funds to establish such policies in the pacific
By benefiting from the sustainability of fisheries product and securing of the market
This policy was developed to create awareness on the importance of maintaining good products and the welfare of workers and its clients
Nearly all pacific countries have benefited from this common policy
The thematic areas covered are the CSO and government departments
By adapting to this policy to each fisheries department and CSO dealing with fisheries
The protection and preservation its natural and human resources
By benefiting from its product (fisheries products)
Good practice

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
The UNWOMEN agency implemented in the twelve member countries the program of Ending Violence against Women and Male Advocacy program by cross-sharing pacific knowledge. This Regional Training workshop creates behavior change to our pacific men that women should be recognized in society and provided the equal opportunity as men.

This program is a joint initiative of NGOs, FBOs and government departments to raise awareness on VAW.

Mainly NGOs are the recipient in terms of funding allocations to raise awareness in the pacific. And to empower women to stand up and be bold about their right to be respected in society.

Civil society is the indicator of how successful the program in terms of minimizing the level of violence against women.

The rationale to support this program of Ending Violence Against Women (EVAW) and Male Advocacy program are that it helps men in society to minimize violence inflicted to women in our various Pacific Countries.

Most Pacific Island Countries have benefited from this programs through the funding provided by UNWOMEN and has provided employment opportunity for contract workers around the Region.

It covers a wide range of areas such sexual offences to physical and emotional violence to women and children.

The method used to implement the both programs was either by workshop and drama of experiences of violence in different forms.

Is the significant changes noted and highlighted by the civil society in terms of consistent behavior change.

Civil society is the indicator of how well and successful the program is and the impact it has brought in terms of EVAW in general
Annex 2

Pacific Mapping:
Mapping of Intergovernmental and Civil Society SSC

Pacific Islands Association of Non-Government Organization
2012

1 INTRODUCTION

This is the report of the Mapping of Intergovernmental and Civil Society involvement in the South-South Cooperation as part of CSOs’ research on SSC, as well as contribution to the Building Block on South-South Cooperation.

The report includes the conduct of research, the challenges, a brief overview of major and additional findings, conclusion and recommendations with more detailed Matrices A and B that tabulate the mapping exercise.

The exercise is incomplete as is, for new CSOs continue to be established as current CSOs go into liquidation owing to various factors like funding, local issues and the international development agenda. As such, the mapping exercise will have to be on-going and cannot be accepted as completed at any one time. In addition, there are additional information that has to be received from National Liaison Units and various other CSOs.

2 PURPOSE

The purpose of this report is to submit what has been made available to PIANGO in the conduct of this exercise given the time allowed for the mapping exercise to be completed.

This mapping exercise could be completed as an on-going exercise which is updated as and when the information comes in from the various NLUs and other CSOs that are not part of the NLUs and PIANGO.

3 CHALLENGES

Some of the challenges to the mapping exercise include:

a. Development partnerships between governments, intergovernmental and CSOs are mostly donor funded in the Pacific. The donors include mostly Australia who is now a huge donor in the Oceania region, followed by New Zealand; both of who are South-South providers. Besides these two major donors, the UK is usually a bog donor given its past relationships with the Pacific Island States most of whom were members of the British empire and now still cling on to the Commonwealth. Outside the UK, there is this new partner in the European Union and then there are notable programs funded by the France, the Germany and the Netherlands in that order of priority. Whilst governments get to enjoy continued funding through their treasuries and intergovernmental institutions are well established with the donors and have years of development memory and experience, CSOs do not enjoy the same funding security. As such, new CSOs are established and current ones go into liquidation and this makes it difficult to have a list of CSOs involvement in development. Instead, the need to map so as to who does what has to be an ongoing exercise.

b. In addition to the challenge addressed above, donors oscillate between bilateral and regional funding which results in new regional organizations sprouting now and again and current regional and local CSOs closing office.

c. The age of when all CSOs would come under an umbrella body in each Pacific Island Country (PIC) has gone and there are local National Liaison Units (NLUs) that have minimal membership number of CSOs in
country. When such exercises as this mapping exercise that requires to list CSOs and who is doing what, the time required for compilation is extensive and needs to be an on-going exercise.

d. One of the major players in human development, as humans are the only animal with a spirit, is the who does what in terms of spiritual development as the spirit is part of the being so as the being part of the spirit. The spiritual component of development in the Pacific Islands must contribute to effectiveness and efficiency of the development services they deliver.

4 CONDUCT OF RESEARCH

The only component of the research that was able to be completed to some degree was desk review and internet search of the websites of intergovernmental institutions and their partner CSOs. This however is not conclusive as not all CSOs have websites and for those that have, most are outdated for not many donors are interested in funding the communications and media components of CSOs. One such example is PIANGO that does not have a full time professional looking after this very important facet of development work.

In terms of ‘Government to Government’ SSC, the Melanesia Spearhead Group (MSG) made up of Papua New Guinea, Solomons and Fiji have entered into a trade agreement there which includes several arrangements where they relax tax and tariff amongst themselves. Even though New Caledonia is a Melanesian Pacific island country as well it would not qualify under the SCC as it is a colony of France. Another SSC ‘Government to Government’ arrangement which also falls under “intergovernmental” is the employment of Pacific Islanders in the several regional organizations in which they offer technical assistance to the rest of the Pacific Islands. The Fiji Government is known to be providing Technical Assistance to some countries of the Pacific but the exact details of these will be known after physical visit is made to the Government offices and possibly the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS).

There is one new development partner in the Pacific that is actually replacing or competing with the Northern donors like the UK and EU and this is China. Even though Asia countries like Japan and Taiwan have been traditional Asian partner in the Pacific, China comes with a commitment and a volume which in some instance, successfully displaces Australia and New Zealand. A quick visit to the Pacific Island shows how many Government buildings have been built through Chinese cooperation and the repercussions of such a cooperation, if there are negative ones is unknown.

Research was conducted through the assistance of volunteers who are members of a Faith Based Organization Youth Group (Wesley Butt Street Youths) who are students at the University of the South Pacific. The volunteers were able to access the internet and extract what information there was for the purpose of mapping.

It is hoped that for the purpose of networking and continued contact with the NLUs and even CSOs that are not members of the local NLUs for coordination and strengthening of CSO service delivery in development in the Pacific.

5 MAJOR FINDINGS:

a. Policy and knowledge exchange platforms on SSC

i. The days of ‘Policy and knowledge exchange’ is new as even though most such institutions have mentioned ‘the establishment of partnerships’, most still prefer to carry out their policies based on their interpretation of the knowledge they make of development issues and formulate their activities and programs from such an interpretation of facts that provide such a knowledge that influences their policies.

ii. As such, platforms to share policies and knowledge are not as vibrant as they should be and this is a major hindrance to development for it is the same people of the Pacific that is being developed yet through opposing views and policies that go against maximizing the effect of aid in development as some could be used to denounce the others or to promote different approaches to development that maybe acceptable if not for the services deliverers criticism of others as not- effective or slanted development partners.
iii. These in turn clearly illustrates how the “human rights based approach to development” is something that intergovernmental institutions and CSOs mention and refer to readily but understand very little of and as a result hardly practice them for it has to be mandatory for policy and knowledge to be exchanged at various platforms for SSC. For otherwise, the developments will still be driven not by the owners/recipients of development but by the developers themselves and therefore will be recorded by indicators record the activities carried out and not the rights recognized or the responsibilities assumed.

b. Multilateral organizations supporting SSC

The UN Family, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC?) are the major multilateral organizations that are leaders in this area. They operate as separate entities in the Pacific and also come together as one in other themes.

c. Government providers and recipients of SSC

Governments of the PICs, though their membership of PIFS, the University of the South Pacific (USP) and SPC are providers and recipients of SSC. In some instances they fund some of these organizations and benefit from the products and services from these institutions. One of the examples is when they send Pacific islanders to their University which they themselves own and fund, they get to benefit through qualified and skilled citizens that gained the knowledge and skills locally and without spending their money in other Universities and training institutions outside the Pacific.

d. Civil society participation in SSC

Civil society participation is substantial, growing and on-going. Even though governments continue to claim that they have the mandate from the people, democracy has developed to a great extent where the governance principles of responsiveness to growing and new situations and needs require an active and ongoing exchange between government and the constituencies. Citizens often speak though CSOs for CSOs come with the passion, commitment and mandate to keep government on their toes as part of the accountability and transparency of government to its people and this is facilitated by CSOs.

However and with governments that restrict the registration of NGOs to those only that support them and de-register and threaten those that challenge their accountability and transparency, CSOs in the region have been hesitant and therefore do not enjoy full participation in development to bring about maximum aid effectiveness

Furthermore, CSOs have to be better funded to attract the caliber and quality of staff that are capable of playing their role effectively and not be reduced to on the surface activism but in-depth and on-going analysis and criticism of development policies of government and intergovernmental institutions.

6 ADDITIONAL FINDINGS:

a. Rationale for supporting SSC

The SSC is more meaningful and relevant to the Pacific as people of the South are closer to them in terms of location and culture. Initiatives from the SSC will be more contextualized to the needs and issues of development in the South, especially in terms of climate and weather conditions and sustainability of resources.

b. Countries benefiting from the support

Currently, all countries in the Pacific¹ are somehow benefiting from the SSC even at a time when the concept has not been understood and utilized fully.

¹ Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Samoa, Solomons, Tahiti (French Polynesia), Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea (PNG).
c. Thematic sectors/areas covered
There are various sectors and they are listed as per Matrix B of the mapping exercise.

d. Implementation cycle management, modalities, methodologies
These vary from country to country, thematic areas and intergovernmental institution. Some specific mentions are at the end of Tables at Matrix B

e. Major outcomes from a CSO perspective
Monitoring and Evaluation is a new component of CSO work and has been made part of funding criteria when CSOs are able to conduct an M&E work plan and Log frame of their programs.

One of the realizations is that when it comes to outcomes and impacts, attribution of the outcome to certain development partners even the CSO is problematic. However, that people associate readily CSOs and that they work closer and passionately with each other is well established

f. Civil society participation
Civil society participation is still minimal as whilst there may be several existing CSOs, CSOs in the Pacific come from a background where they were activists and watchdogs that only criticize government to one which would work with intergovernmental to keep governments transparent, accountable and responsive to what is now a development partner. For these reasons, CSOs in the region may not be readily accepted yet as genuine development partners but watchdogs of Government work. What this means is that during the transition where CSO are going to be accepted more readily as development partners, then their participation will continue to grow

There is a regional organization of regional CSOs which is called PRINGO (Pacific Regional Islands Non Government Organization) The members are: Pacific Concerns Resource Centre (PCRC), Pacific Islands News Association (PINA), Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre (FWCC), Greenpeace, Pacific Foundation for the Advancement of Women (PACFAW), Pacific Disability Forum (PDF), Foundation of the Peoples of the South Pacific International (FSPI), Pacific Islands Association of Non Government Organizations (PIANGO). These CSOs at one time thrived when "Regionalism" was the buzz word but recently, a lot of SSC donors so as others from outside SSC have decided to go bi-lateral where the donors themselves go Government to Government.

g. Good practices
Human Rights work in the region is almost always donor-funded with CSOs playing a huge role in terms of “innovative approaches to facilitate multi-stakeholder dialogues, democratic ownership, transparency and accountability to human rights for example”. Even though the Constitutions of the Pacific all have a human rights provision if not chapter, human rights is almost always seen as foreign. One good example is Tonga that currently that has a Constitution dating back to 1875 which Article one guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms to everyone in Tonga, with its reasonable limitations and exceptions.

This capacity will need to be built though proper funding of CSOs to attract the quality of staff required of a genuine development partner putting aid at its maximum utilization.

h. Bad practice
Despite the CSOs regular use of phrases like “Good Governance”, and the “Human Rights Based Approach”, CSOs do not often apply these locally within the CSO establishment. It is when CSOs practice these international buzz concepts that we can see how they lack the capacity, experience and enthusiasm to be good practitioners of governance and the human rights based approach. However, a new regional CSO by the name Dignity Pacific is understood to be working with Australia as a witness to the SSC to conduct training, lobby advocacy into the application of good governance and the human rights based approach in their planning, operations and monitoring and evaluations.

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2 Innovative approaches to facilitate multi-stakeholder dialogues, democratic ownership, transparency and accountability to human rights for example
7 MATRICES

Results from the Mapping Exercise are attached as annexes Matrix A and Matrix B to this report

8 CONCLUSION

This mapping exercise was conducted with the maximum of speed and commitment to be able to have it submitted at the required due date. It has shown not only some of the areas of CSO involvement but has also been able to make comments on the nature of involvement. As such, the mapping exercise could be termed as incomplete but it has to be accepted as well that given the several challenges in the Pacific, the mapping exercises will have to be an ongoing exercise as CSO development is part of the development in the Pacific islands

9 RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that this report is accepted as sufficient for the purpose of the exercise with the Matrices A and B as providing the details. It is recommended further that this is an on-going exercise with quarterly updates required of NLUs as part of their report back to PIANGO at every quarter.
## Annex 4

### ITUC Mapping:

### 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project title</th>
<th>Lead organization</th>
<th>Partner organization(s)</th>
<th>Region or countries benefiting from the support</th>
<th>Thematic sectors/areas covered</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>End date</th>
<th>Rationale for supporting SSC</th>
<th>Implementation cycle management, modalities, methodologies</th>
<th>Major outcome from a trade union perspective</th>
<th>Innovative approaches</th>
<th>Lessons learnt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exchanging experience between Indonesia and Cambodia trade union</td>
<td>KSBSI</td>
<td>Cambodia trade union, CLC</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Sharing of Indonesia experience to establish a trade union confederation in Cambodia, how to strengthen union, membership, suitable structure, union governance and transparency</td>
<td>March 2009 – December 2010</td>
<td>Because Indonesia has, to some degree, same experience with Cambodia in term of long time under military dictatorship, leading in manufacture and garment sector, has ratify 8 ILO core conventions, similarity in member that majority are youth workers.</td>
<td>First, CLC determined what subject they wanted to learn from KSBSI Indonesia, then they visit KSBSI in Jakarta with all federation top leaders. We had debate about KSBSI policy making, design of program, monitoring, accountability, and responsibility toward members. After few months it was KSBSI’s turn to visit Cambodia union with 3 federation</td>
<td>Both KSBSI and CLC learnt from this experience. KSBSI learnt about how to deal with new democratic government in Cambodia. While CLC learned from KSBSI how to establish a democratic and strong union confederation. Also how to run garment sector and how to determine the minimum wages.</td>
<td>We shared to CLC about how to make a plan in long term to be independent financially, at least for daily operational cost of union. We also encouraged CLC to include gender equality in decision making of union. Other things is how strategy to lobby social partner in order to participate in</td>
<td>It is evidence that SSC can work productively if the chosen partner has common similarity to other partner south. But since the SSC has budget consequences, the north partner should effectively choose which project the budget could bear. Thanks to CNV Netherlands which helped us on this SSC with</td>
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<tr>
<td>Innovativeness strategies – IIWE programme 2012-2014</td>
<td>IIWE (ACV-CSC)</td>
<td>CDT – Confédération Démocratique des Travailleurs du Maroc</td>
<td>Morocco, Niger, DRCongo, South Africa, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Haiti, Brazil, Colombia</td>
<td>Gender, Informal economy, Domestic workers, Violations of rights, Environment &amp; climate change</td>
<td>Challenges related to gender, informal economy, domestic workers, violations of rights, environment and climate change are different/big more pressing in the South compared to in the North. Many organisations in the South are working on these themes, and have developed strategies which are worth to be shared on a larger scale.</td>
<td>Will be identified as a result of activities 1 and 2 described above</td>
<td>Will be identified through intermediate and final evaluations with participants of SS-exchanges. Lessons learnt from previous experiences with international exchange by IIWE staff members, have been captured under “rationale for supporting SSC”.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. SS exchange visits (5) in second half of 2013 – each visit consisting of 1 week of visits and discussions:</td>
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<td>1. SS exchange visit CNT/Niger at CDT/Morocco – focussing on gender – 9 participants</td>
<td>1. Trade union benchmarking concerning innovative approaches with dissemination of innovative and adaptive multiplication. 2. Experiential learning to complement more formal trade union training programmes. 3. Strengthening of global union work through grassroots level learning and support.</td>
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<td>2. SS exchange visit CTH/Haiti at CSC/DRCongo – focussing on informal economy – 9 participants</td>
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<td>3. SS exchange visit CONSAR/South Africa at NDWTU/India – focussing on domestic workers – 9 participants</td>
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<td>3. SS exchange visit CONSAWU/South Africa at NDWTU/India – focussing on domestic workers – 9 participants</td>
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<td>4. SS exchange visit CLC/Cambodia at</td>
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exchange between organisations lead to evaluation of own and other organisations’ Best practices and opportunities. Such visits need to aim at adapting Best Practices in line with own organisational possibilities and realities. SS exchange visits have an encouraging effect on participant – as they feel part of a global union with similar challenges the world over. As first line managers have more opportunities for travelling, second line managers especially would greatly benefit from the encouraging effects. Adaptation and implementatio processes by individual organisations

CGT/Colombia – focussing on violation of rights – 4 participants

KSBSI/Indonesia at UGT/Brazil focussing on environment and climate change.

Number of participants depends on whether there is a shared language (9) or whether there is a need for interpreters (4). 1/3 of participants are women, 1/3 are first line managers, and 2/3 are second line managers. Visits and discussions are organised by programme coordinators of travelling and hosting groups, and are accompanied by an IIWE staff member. Participants list Best Practices with relation to 3 interlinked issues: service delivery (social dialogue), organisational development and institutional
mostly need external expert support – by preference from Southern experts who facilitate participative planning and implementatio n processes.

development.

2. General workshop for triangular exchange in February 2014 with 3 representatives of organisation involved in previous 5 exchange visits, IWE staff members and international experts for exchange on identified Best Practices regarding gender, informal economy, domestic workers, violation of rights and environment & climate change – to be complemented, finalised and documented. Towards the end of the workshop representatives of the 10 participating organisations come up with 10 draft innovation plans. (Further sharing of documenting Best Practices between the organisations involved as well as with others organisations
will be coordinated by IWE staff.)

3. Further SS exchange between March and December 2014 – whereby southern experts (from the 10 organisations involved or others) travel to the 10 organisations and engage in supporting participative development of innovation plans and implementation thereof.

| South-South & Triangular: CGSLB/COSATU | CGSLB (Liberal Trade Union of Belgium) | COSATU (South Africa) | Southern Africa, Africa. In the program we also work together via exchange of best practices between the following CGSLB African partners: SACCAWU (South Africa), CNTS (Senegal), CSB | Capacity building Focus on gender and the informal economy | 01/01/2012 - 31/12/2012 | Based on a need analyses from the partner organisation (COSATU) international department, the topic was chosen. Strength of COSATU as leading partner and to share knowledge & best practices with other African trade unions. CGSLB helping trade union from the south to build their own | Work method: PCM Objective: Internal capacity of COSATU strengthened to better cohere south-south cooperation (SSC) within a trade union movement. Indicator: Number of South-South cooperation initiatives taken by COSATU and the 21 COSATU affiliates are in line with an overarching international policy | Expected results: - COSATU has an endorsed international policy framework lining out the way to cohere & promote south-south cooperation between trade unions - guidelines and tools on international relationships exist and available for international relationship trade union officers & shop stewards | Innovative approaches to be followed up. | None to date, program only started in 2012. |
| (Burkina Faso) and FNTT/COS YBU (Burundi) | sustainable cooperation/partner programs | framework. - Terms of Reference (ToR) in place to set out the preparatory work on the tools and international policy framework needed to better cohere SSC initiatives - Draft Policy documented presented to members of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) for endorsement. - 21 COSATU affiliates informed and engage on SSC - 6th CEC rapport indicating SSC improvements in comparison to 5th CEC rapport - The international department of COSATU can guide, coordinate and manage their own SSC, share best practices and assist the cooperation programs of their 21 affiliates according to an official COSATU international policy | increased capacity building on south-south cooperation by mutual exchange and learning. |
| CLC-SBSI exchange | SBSI Indonesia | CLC-Cambodia | Asia | - General organisational development - Administration in a trade union organisation - Trade union capacity building. | 2006 - 2008 | The CLC is a young trade union confederation which is now in a similar stage of development as the SBSI 15 years ago. We saw similar issues and heard similar questions as the SBSI asked us 15 years earlier. By visiting each other, both organisations profited from each other’s experience. | CLC visited the SBSI with an extensive programme. CLC reported back to their organisation and implemented new views. A year later, SBSI visited the CLC, gave advice and also learned other ways of working. | Exchange of views and experience from major trade union confederations working in the same region, leading to improvement and increased knowledge in both organisations. | It was a good idea to suggest SBSI to also visit CLC: they learned more than they expected. | - Lessons on organisational development - Lessons on organisational administration - Lessons on trade union capacity building. |
| CLC – Exchange KCTU | CLC | CLC-Cambodia | Asia | - General organisational development - Administration in a trade union - Membership development - Capacity building. | September 2012 | After having visited the SBSI, we offered CLC the option to look elsewhere. After careful deliberation, CLC chose the neighbours of KCTU Korea. | - Contact KCTU - Preparation programme - Visit - Report and implementation knowledge in organisation. | The report has not yet been received. | The report has not yet been received. | The report has not yet been received. |
While Northern development assistance remains the main source of public concessional financing for international development, South-South cooperation (SSC) offers valuable resources for Southern development. SSC flows in infrastructure and productive sectors are complementing Northern aid in the social sectors. Southern providers’ demand-driven and non-intrusive approach is also strengthening government ownership and policy space in partner countries.

But SSC poses challenges as well. Southern providers use tied aid, lack transparency with aid information, are perceived to pay scant regard for wider social and human rights impacts, and do little to broaden engagement to actors other than recipient governments. SSC could be empowering governments with questionable commitment to democratic and pro-poor development.

Democratic ownership and adherence to human rights are key to effective development cooperation. Recipient governments are called on to continue efforts to democratize development policymaking and increase government transparency, and to ensure that partnerships with Southern providers are integrated into democratically-grown development strategies with long-term development in mind. Southern providers meanwhile must take greater responsibility for the effectiveness of their assistance by improving transparency, observing human rights, and bringing their practices closer to line with accepted standards with on lending, tied aid, and openness to non-government actors.